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The Secret Memoirs of 
Count Tadasu Hayashi 



G.CV.O. 



Edited by 

,y ■■:>■ 

A/M. Pooley 

Late Exhibitioner of Clare College, Cambridge 



With Portraits and a Map 



G. P. Putnam's Sons 

New York and London 

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1915 



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Copyright, igis 

BY 

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 



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Contents 

CHAPTER PAGE 

Introduction : 

The Career of Count Hayashi 3 

Count Hayashi 's Literary Work 24 

The Chino- Japanese War . . 37 

The Anglo- Japanese Alliance . 61 

I. — Origin of an Opinion for an Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance. The Three- 
Power Intervention, 1895 . . 77 

II. — Preliminaries of the Alliance . , 86 
Appendix: The Future Policy of Japan . 1 09 

III. — The Friends of the Alliance . 115 

IV. — The Negotiations for the Con- 
clusion OF the Anglo- Japanese 
Alliance 119 

V. — Later Notes on the Alliance . 200 

VI. — The Franco-Japanese Agreement, 

1907 212 

VII. — The Russo-Japanese Convention, 

1907 224 

iii 



IV Contents 



VIII. — The American-Japanese Agreement, 
1908. Hayashi on the American 
Question ..... 239 

IX. — Foreign Policy. Part I. To Bribe 

OR Not to Bribe .... 255 

X. — Foreign Policy {Continued). Part II. 

Friend ** Pidgin" .... 285 

XL — The Powers and China . . . 296 

Appendices 309 

A. Memorial OF Chang-pei-lun and 

THE Board of Censors, 1882. 311 

B. Text of Anglo- Japanese Al- 

liance, 1902 . . . 323 

C. The Franco-Japanese Agree- 

ment, 1907 .... 325 

D. The Russo-Japanese Con- 

vention, 1907 . . .327 

E. The American- Japanese Agree- 

ment, 1908 .... 329 



Illustrations 



Count Tad as u Hayashi . . Frontispiece 
From a photograph 

General Marquis Katsura, Prime Minister 
OF Japan . . . . . . 126 

From a photograph by Topical 

Count Komura, Japanese Minister for 
Foreign Affairs . . . . . 132 - 

From a photograph by Gerschel, Paris 

The Late Prince Hirobumi Ito . . 210 / 

Japan's Greatest Statesman 
Map . At End 



INTRODUCTION 



The Career of Count Hayashi 

Hayashi Tadasu was born in the second 
month of the third year of Kaei (1850), at 
Yedo. His father, Sato Taisen, was a native 
of the village of Kozu in the feudal fief of 
Sakura, where he had been adopted into the 
family of Hayashi Kaisha under the name of 
Hayashi Dokai. He followed his adoptive 
father's profession of physician, and became 
one of the best-known doctors of the pre- 
Restoration period, rising to the post of body- 
physician to the Shogun. 

At an early age the young Hayashi, in 
company with Ito Masunosuke, was placed in 
the house of an American missionary at 
Yokohama, where he quickly learned to 
adapt himself to the ways of the "barbarians" 
and acquired a good grounding in the English 
language. 

In 1866, on the recommendation of Sir 
Harry Parkes, the bakufu decided to make an 



4 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

experiment by sending a number of students 
to England, instead of to Russia and the 
Netherlands which had hitherto been the 
foreign lands selected for Government stu- 
dents. Thanks to his father's influence at 
the Yedo Court young Hayashi was amongst 
the number chosen for this trial. 

The party consisted of fourteen in all, and 
several of its members, as Hayashi himself, 
Toyama Shoichi, later Minister of Education, 
and Kikuchi Dairoku, now Baron Kikuchi, 
made names for themselves during the Meiji 
Era. Baron Kikuchi, who at that time was 
only twelve years old, is the only...surviving 
member of the party. 

Thanks to the arrangements made by Sir 
Harry Parkes, the party was enabled to travel 
to England on board an English warship 
returning from the Far East, the lads being 
placed under the charge of the chaplain, Mr. 
Lloyd. The voyage lasted from September, 
1866, to January, 1867. 

On arrival in London the British Foreign 
Office instructed Mr. Lloyd to take charge of 
the young men, and his first duty was to find 
accommodation for them. He made arrange- 
ments for them to lodge together in a house 
in Baker Street, but this did not suit Hayashi's 
views. He pointed out to their tutor that if 



The Career of Count Hayashi 5 

they all lived together they would talk only 
Japanese and would live in Japanese style 
as much as possible, from force of habit. As 
a result they would neither acquire fluency in 
the English language nor acquaintance with 
English manners and customs, the two objects 
of their sojourn. 

Mr. Lloyd, however, was unable to alter a 
situation which had the benediction of the 
authorities, but suggested that the boys should 
themselves draw up a petition to the Secretary 
of State. Hayashi took up this proposal 
with enthusiasm, and drafted his first diplo- 
matic document, setting out his views, and 
requesting permission for the party to separate 
and to live in different private families. The 
petition was in due course acknowledged 
and granted. 

The next move was to obtain some proper 
English education, and for this the students 
entered University College School in Gower 
Street, in the autumn of 1867. 

Before they had been there many months, 
however, news arrived from Japan of the 
outbreak of the Restoration movement, and 
the Tokugawa officials summarily recalled 
the whole party. 

When they arrived in Paris they found 
that the order for recall had been unaccom- 



6 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

panied by funds to pay for their passages, 
with the consequence that the fourteen were 
stranded there with their clothes, and the 
revolvers and military equipment which they 
had bought in London. 

Fortunately, a relative of the Shogun, Toku- 
gawa Minbunotayo, the Lord of Mito, was 
at that time in Paris, and in his suite was a 
gentleman who has since become famous as 
Japan's leading financier, Mr. (now Baron) 
Shibusawa. He arranged for the young men 
to return to Yokohama by the French mail- 
packet. 

The party arrived in Japan just after the 
smashing defeat of the Tokugawa army at 
the battle of Uyeno. Hayashi at once pro- 
ceeded to Hakodate, where he joined the 
remnants of the Shogunate forces, which had 
gathered there round Admiral Enomoto, the 
staunchest of the Tokugawa retainers. He 
seems to have fought strenuously at both the 
battles of Hakodate and Masumae, but after 
the dispersal of the Shogunites he was taken 
prisoner and thrown into a dungeon to await 
execution, as he believed. 

Although the real driving force behind the 
Restoration was the ambition of the great 
daimyoSj especially those of Satsuma and 
Choshu, who had been kept in subjection by 



The Career of Count Hayashi 7 

the Tokugawas, the Imperialist leaders were 
too far-sighted to imperil the future of the 
monarchy behind which they intended to 
establish their own oligarchy, by inhuman 
treatment of the enemy, although such would 
have been fully in accordance with the customs 
of the land. As soon, therefore, as the country 
had settled down imder the new regime the 
imprisoned supporters of the Shogun were 
released, and Hayashi was not less fortunate 
than his fellows. 

When the Emperor was safely on the 
throne a mission under Prince Iwakura was 
sent to the various Powers to announce the 
new order of things. Thanks to his know- 
ledge of English, Hayashi was attached to 
this mission as interpreter, with the rank of 
a second secretary. 

His connexion with it terminated rather 
suddenly whilst in London, owing to a piece 
of impertinence and disobedience on his part. 
Prince Iwakura being entertained by some 
personage expressed his delight at an apple, 
which he ate for lunch. His host on his de- 
parture presented him with a basket full of 
similar apples, which the Prince ordered 
Hayashi to dispatch to Japan. Realizing 
that the apples by the time of their arrival 
in the Far East would be unfit to eat or even 



8 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

to look at, Hayashi suggested to his fellow- 
secretaries to eat up the fruit and say nothing 
about it to the Prince. No sooner said than 
done! But, unfortunately, the Prince had 
either a longing for the apples or else a suspi- 
cion of Hayashi, for he asked on the following 
day if the fruit had been dispatched. The 
nervousness of the secretary whom he ques- 
tioned aroused further suspicion, and even- 
tually he learned the premature fate of the 
fruit. His rage was intense, and his first 
impulse was to send Hayashi back to Tokio 
in disgrace. 

Fortunately, it happened that the Govern- 
ment in Japan hurriedly recalled Marquis 
Kido, the second envoy, and at his request 
Hayashi was transferred to his suite and re- 
turned to Japan, at least not out of favour. 

About 1874, he was appointed interpreter 
to the Kanagawa Prefectural office. Mr. 
(later Count) Mutsu was then the Governor 
of Kanagawa-ken and was much struck by 
the tact displayed by his subordinate in 
handling the many difficult questions which 
arose between the foreign communities and 
the local authorities. Mutsu strongly recom- 
mended Hayashi to enter the diplomatic 
service and obtained for him an appointment 
in the Japanese Legation at London. 



The Career of Count Hayashi 9 

On his return to Japan he re-entered the 
service of the Kanagawa Prefecture, but was 
subsequently appointed Secretary of the In- 
dustrial Bureau, and in 1886 he became Secre- 
tary of the Imperial Household Bureau. 
Both these appointments he seems to have 
owed to the patronage of his former leader 
at Hakodate, Viscount Enomoto, who, like 
the great majority of the Shogun*s followers, 
had entered the Imperial service. 

In 1889, Hayashi was appointed Governor 
of Hyogo-ken, a post which he filled with 
considerable distinction. 

With the grant of a constitution, the popular 
demand for the revision of the foreign treaties 
became insistent, and Mutsu, who had be- 
come Minister of Foreign Affairs, realized the 
advantage of having someone in the Gaimusho 
well acquainted, not only with the matters 
to be discussed, but with the foreign attitude 
regarding those matters. There was cer- 
tainly nobody more suitable than his former 
assistant at Kanagawa, and, accordingly, in 
1 89 1, Hayashi left the Provincial Government 
to enter the Central Government as Vice- 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

That he occupied this post with conspicu- 
ous success is a matter of history. Mutsu 
has left it on record that his achievement in 



10 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

obtaining the revision of all the most impor- 
tant of the foreign treaties was principally 
due to the indefatigable labours and the 
unfailing good sense and tact of his colleague. 
It was at this time that the beginnings of 
the feud between Hayashi and Viscount Aoki 
occurred. Aoki, who was Japanese Minister 
at Berlin, was sent specially to London to 
conduct the negotiations with Lord Kimberley 
for the revision of the Anglo- Japanese Treaty, 
which terminated successfully in 1894. Ha- 
yashi had the opinion that in agreeing to the 
probationary clause Aoki rather let Japan 
down. However this may be, and it seems 
that Aoki really had no alternative but to 
accept the British terms, these two consider- 
able statesmen were ever after on the coolest 
terms. The differences between them were 
very marked. Hayashi was, of course, very 
pro-British, Aoki by his marriage and long 
residence in Berlin was equally pro-German. 
Aoki was a Yamagata-Katsura man, Hayashi 
had no political or clan associations. The 
crisis in their relations came in 1907, when 
Hayashi summarily recalled Aoki in connexion 
with the American negotiations over the 
immigration question, a matter in which, as 
events proved, Aoki was right and Hayashi 
lamentably wrong. 



The Career of Count Hayashi ii 

Owing to Mutsu's failing health, Ito took 
charge of the negotiations at Shimonoseki, 
forcing from Li Hung-Chang the Liaotung 
clause, to which Mutsu was opposed. Haya- 
shi remained in Tokio and was solely respon- 
sible for the negotiations for the Retrocession 
of Port Arthur. Mutsu, within a few days 
of the signature of the Shimonoseki Treaty, 
was stricken down by the painful disease 
which eventually terminated fatally, and had 
in fact left for America in search of a cure, 
before the Retrocession Edict was issued. 

It was after the intervention of the three 
Powers that the remarkable programme 
printed as an Appendix to Chapter II was 
penned. In the light of subsequent events 
it must be acknowledged to be one of the 
most interesting documents of Far Eastern 
history. 

No account of Hayashi 's tenure of the 
Vice-Ministership should fail to notice his 
influence on the Japanese vernacular Press. 
His own connexion with Mr. Fukuzawa, the 
proprietor of the Jiji Shimpo, gave him a 
special interest in that paper, which became 
and remained until his death the organ of his 
views. Hayashi was the first Japanese states- 
man to realize and utilize the power of the 
fudo (pen-brush). 



12 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

It was only during the Chino- Japanese 
War that the world at large began to take 
any serious notice of the Tokio papers. Pre- 
viously they had been regarded as amusing 
broadsheets. By the intimate relations which 
he established with the leading journals, 
Hayashi laid the foundations of that extra- 
ordinary system of Press control which has 
since been one of the features of the Japanese 
bureaucracy. 

It is a matter for regret that he did not 
confine his activities to the Press at home, 
and to such foreign papers in Japan as were 
willing to become the subsidized organs of 
the Government. But wherever he went he 
carried his Press Bureau with him. On his 
arrival at Pekin as Minister it was noted as 
a sign of his up-to-date methods that three 
accredited journalists were included in his 
official suite. The system which he initiated 
has since been carried to extremes, as was 
shown by the refusal a few years ago of the 
Minister of Finance to submit to the Diet 
the accounts of the I.J. Financial Commis- 
sioner in London, as the sums in question 
included various items for the entertainment 
of London journalists. 

Hayashi was in May, 1895, appointed 
Japanese Minister at Pekin, and proceeded 



The Career of Count Hayashi 13 

to his post immediately in order to complete 
the supplementary treaties and adjust mat- 
ters preliminary to the evacuation of Man- 
churia. He arrived at Taku on June nth, 
being accorded a salute of fifteen guns and a 
military parade. A warship had accompanied 
his steamer as escort, and Li Hung-Chang 
sent his yacht to convey him to land. He 
arrived in Pekin on June 22d, and created from 
the beginning a favourable impression, that 
was enhanced by his English, which was 
remarked as being without any accent. 

Almost his first duty was to lodge a com- 
plaint against high officials for gross disrespect. 
In two official documents the Board of Censors 
referred to the Japanese as "island barbari- 
ans,'' and Hayashi's remonstrance resulted 
in an Edict of reprimand. The Japanese, of 
course, now came under the most favoured 
nation clause, and reaped the benefits of Sir 
Thomas Wade's action, which made the use 
of — I — (barbarians) by officials a breach of 
treaty rights. 

It cannot be said that Hayashi's tenure of 
the Legation at Pekin was untroubled. The 
Franco-Chinese Convention and the Chinese 
Eastern Agreement provided opportunities 
for his diplomatic talents, whilst the assassi- 
nation of the Queen of Korea and the sub- 



14 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

sequent intrigues of M. Waeber in that 
unhappy country undoubtedly caused him 
much anxiety. 

It is interesting to remark that it is generally 
understood that Hayashi was ultimately re- 
sponsible for the premature publication in 
1896, by the North China Daily News, of the 
abortive Cassini Convention, although it 
should also be remembered that the Hong- 
kong correspondent of The Times had exposed 
the deal (but without a title) in October, 
1895, when Reuter's semi-official denial from 
St. Petersburg was itself semi-officially con- 
tradicted by Le Temps, 

In 1897, Hayashi, who had shortly after 
his arrival in Pekin been raised to the rank 
of Baron, was transferred to St, Petersburg, 
a post of which he has a good deal to say in 
the Memoirs, He was constantly occupied 
there in attempting to check the intrigues of 
Muravieff and Alexeieff to control Korea. 

In 1899, Hayashi went to Tokio on leave, 
and whilst there was offered the post of 
Minister in London in succession to M. Kato. 
He had never laid aside his hopes of an alli- 
ance between England and Japan, and ac- 
cepted the offer with alacrity, proceeding to 
his post in the following year. 

He quickly established a reputation in 



The Career of Count Hayashi 15 

connexion with the Boxer rebellion, and it is 
no secret that Japan's modest attitude in con- 
nexion with the settlement of that trouble 
was largely inspired by her Minister in Lon- 
don, who saw in such a course a method of 
soothing English susceptibilities and of laying 
a foundation for future joint action in Far 
Eastern affairs. 

The crown of Hayashi 's career was the 
signature of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance in 
1902, and its renewal on a broader basis in 
1905. Not only did this bring him high 
honours in his own country, but the promo- i 
tion of the Japanese mission in London from 
a legation to an embassy. Hayashi was the 
first Japanese Ambassador to the Court of 
St. James, whilst Sir Claude MacDonald, 
K.C.B., G.C.M.G., received reciprocal pro- 
motion at Tokio. 

In May, 1906, Hayashi was recalled to fill 
the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs in the 
first Saionji Cabinet, M. Kato having sud- 
denly resigned office. To him fell the hand- 
ling of the difficult post helium situation in 
Manchuria, the American Immigration ques- 
tion, and the general settlements of the Far 
East after the upheaval of the war. He 
negotiated agreements with France and Russia 
for the maintenance of the status quo, and 



i6 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

concluded the Fishery and other conventions 
foreshadowed in the Treaty of Portsmouth. 

It cannot be said that Hayashi's regime at 
the Gaimusho was very successful. How far 
this was due to himself and how far to cir- 
cumstances it IS difficult to say. Probably 
the blame must be divided. Hayashi came 
into office with strongly preconceived ideas, 
which appeared to run counter to the aims of 
the military part. Fully realizing the neces- 
sity of maintaining Japan's diplomatic credit, 
he insisted on the evacuation of Manchuria, 
which the soldiers strenuously opposed. In 
September, 1906, Hayashi retired, nominally 
on account of ill health, but really to avoid 
supporting a policy which he, like Kato, 
strongly disapproved. The Emperor ordered 
him back to office and he won the battle, but 
at the cost of the enmity of Prince Katsura 
and Prince Yamagata. That meant that he 
had against him Ito, Yamagata, and Katsura, 
the three most powerful figures in the Empire. 
Ito, who had always been pro-Russian and 
anti-British, had never forgiven Hayashi for 
his triumph in the matter of the alliance. 
Perhaps it was not for nothing that the 
Japanese used to say that Ito was more 
zurai (tricky) than jozu (clever). 

But though Hayashi feared the impetuosity 



The Career of Count Hayashi 17 

and greed of the military party he was always 
willing to support it, even beyond the bounds 
of treaty rights or diplomatic honesty, when 
he saw the Japanese position in Manchuria 
menaced. The Fakumen Railway incident 
showed that he was ready to go to extreme 
lengths in support of the Manchurian plans 
of the militarists. 

It was one of the ironies of fate that Haya- 
shi, who made the alliance, should have been 
the Foreign Minister who had to demonstrate 
to the world how easily the pledges of main- 
taining the integrity and sovereignty of China 
could be evaded, and what a vacuous shib- 
boleth the doctrine of the Open Door really 
was. 

Nevertheless Hayashi's occupation of the 
Gaimusho was not without serious influence 
on Japan's future policy. Just as in 1895 
he published a programme for the future 
conduct of the affairs of the country, so in 
1907 he laid down the lines along which Japan 
must conduct her policy, to attain the object 
she has always held in view, the domination 
of the East. 

The whole foundation of Japanese foreign 
policy as he enunciated it lay in simultan- 
eous political and commercial penetration. The 
political ends were to be attained by the ever- 



i8 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

present threat of naval and military action, 
combined with a network of foreign agree- 
ments which, if they did not favour Japanese 
policy, certainly did not hinder it. The 
commercial ends were to be reached by the 
consistent pushing of Japanese subsidized 
financiers, shipping companies and traders 
for concessions. Commercial concessions 
were to lead to political control, just as 
political control was to include commercial 
concessions. 

By a series of extraordinarily clever agree- 
ments Japan has been able to discount all 
Western obstacles which might arise in her 
path. The British, French, Russian, and 
American agreements with Japan have left 
that country practically a free hand in China, 
absolutely a free hand when their other en- 
gagements are considered. Germany did not 
count, for as far as Japan was concerned 
Germany was a negligible figure in Asia, until 
her position in Europe was finally assured. 
The Powers being therefore eliminated, 
Japan could proceed at leisure to nibble at 
China, either by conciliatory methods or by 
intrigue backed by force, as occasion might 
determine. 

That was Hayashi's plan. That he made 
a mess of it in no way detracts from its merit. 



The Career of Count Hayashi 19 

It remains to-day the avowed policy of the 
Gaimusho.^ 

Where Hayashi made a mistake was in 
underestimating American interest in Korea 
and China. It is significant that the only 
serious error he made during his whole career 
was in connexion with the one country he 
had never visited, America. A Chinese pro- 
verb says: ''A Hsf^*sai (B.A.) can manage 
the affairs of an Empire without leaving his 
room.'' A Japanese proverb says: ^'The 
cow thinks she can drink the river dry." 
Hayashi in dealing with the American ques- 
tions was the cow of the Japanese proverb 
and the B.A. of the Chinese. He was too 
sure ' of himself and of his abilities. Both 
Aoki and Hayashi recognized that China was 
the crux of the difficulty between Japan and 

^ Hayashi would probably not have approved of the action 
of Japan in regard to China, reported at the time of going to 
press (April, 1915). He fully foresaw the dangers of unprovoked 
aggression, as is shown in his article on the Alliance in the Coro- 
nation number of The Japan Times (July 22, 191 1). He wrote: 
"The value and importance of the Alliance will be unchanged, 
nor is there any doubt of its long continuance. The only point 
against which Japan must guard is a wantonly aggressive policy. 
On the contrary she must always adhere to a peaceful policy 
and endeavour to make the most of what she has gained so far 
and to promote her interests and development in a manner 
consistent with a pacific policy. If Japan should adopt a policy 
of wanton aggression the continuation of the Anglo- Japanese 
Alliance would be out of the question." 



20 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

America. Aoki realized that if the prob- 
lem of China were settled, Japan would be 
able to maintain her credit at Washington, 
for the school and immigration affairs were 
local difficulties on which it was uncertain 
even that Japan was in the right. Hayashi 
tried to shut out America from China by 
raising difficulties for her nearer home. He 
failed to realize that the Americans are a 
hard-headed business race, with a strong 
undercurrent of sentimentality. To their 
remonstrances with regard to Manchuria, he 
retorted by raising the school question. They 
came back with the immigration trouble, and 
Hayashi found that he had slung a boomerang, 
which returned in double quick time, bringing 
with it the whole of the credit which Japan 
had so carefully amassed in the States during 
fifty years past. 

In a few months he killed the long-estab- 
lished friendship between America and Japan, 
and in place has been substituted on the one 
side an openly expressed dislike and suspicion 
and on the other a swelling hatred, which is 
only kept within manageable bounds by 
official repression. 

After his recall Aoki intrigued with Katsura 
against Hayashi, and succeeded in excluding 
him from the Privy Council, a seat in which 



The Career of Count Hayashi 21 

should have been the reward of his eminent 
services. The alleged cause of his exclusion, j 
it will be recollected, was that he had become 
a Freemason, during his residence in London. 

The Saionji Cabinet fell. It had never 
been intended to live. The ostensible causes 
of the fall were the finances, the real cause 
was the ambition of Katsura to return to 
power. But Hayashi left a legacy at the 
Gaimusho in a carefully considered policy of 
expansion, on the success of which the integ- 
rity or disintegration of China hangs, and the 
position of Japan amongst the Powers. 

In the second Saionji Cabinet (1911-12) 
Hayashi held office ad interim as Foreign 
Minister, pending the return of Viscount 
Uchida from Washington, and permanently 
the portfolio of the Ministry of Communica- 
tions. 

During the military crisis in 1912, he stead- 
fastly supported Marquis Saionji in his oppo- 
sition to the Choshu demands. When the 
Cabinet resigned he was scathing in his 
denunciation of the Katsura clique. On his 
journey to Hayama he refused to occupy the 
special coach placed at his disposal by Baron 
Goto, his successor, travelling with his ser- 
vants and family in an overcrowded second- 
class carriage. 



22 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

He had for some time been suffering from 
acute diabetes, and from December, 191 2, 
lived in strict retirement at his villa at Ha- 
yama. In June of the following year he was 
thrown out of a ricksha whilst returning 
from Kamakura,. and fractured his thigh. 
He was removed to the Jutendo Hospital, 
where amputation was found to be necessary. 
He never properly rallied from the operation, 
and died in the hour of the Snake (lo-ii a.m.) 
on July 10, 1913. 

He was buried at the Aoyama Cemetery 
in the Foreign Office corner on July 13th. 

It is pleasant to recall that his eminent 
services to Japan received a somewhat be- 
lated recognition from his sovereign, who 
donated Y.5000, a quite exceptional amount, 
to the cost of the funeral expenses. 

Hayashi is said to have been rather soured 
towards the close of his career and is alleged 
to have complained because his services were 
not sufficiently requited. The claim seems 
to rest on but flimsy evidence. Hayashi was 
a man who was strictly honourable in all his 
dealings, and he scorned to use his official 
position for his private well-being. Like 
General Nogi he was deeply concerned at the 
course of events in Japan, and was much 
worried as to the future of internal politics. 



The Career of Count Hayashi 23 

He saw that the country was rapidly falling 
under the eontrol of men whose only use for 
power was profit, their own not the nation's, 
and he was deeply grieved at the prospect. 
In a country where it has become the rule 
for statesmen to amass fortunes, he was a 
brilliant exception. He had no private means 
and never acquired any. When he retired 
he sold his house in Tokio and lived on his 
small pension in the country. 

His death was a loss to Japan. He was 
one of the old school, one of the few statesmen 
remaining who had been trained in the atmos- 
phere of the Restoration. He has been 
described as an Edokko"- to the backbone; 
quiet and unpretentious, a scholar and a 
gentleman, he was a man of strong opinions, 
and a good fighter. An excellent host, a 
good conversationalist, he was an authority 
on art and music and an expert at go. 

His favourite recreations were singing and 
dancing, and he was a patron of many of the 
leading geisha^ whilst as a calligraphist his 
manuscripts and writings were highly prized. 

^ Edokko — a term used frequently by novelists to denote a 
special type of character, of which boldness, fortitude, chivalry, 
hospitality, high culture, and lavish prodigality were the principal 
traits. 



II 

Count Hayashi's Literary Work 

The late Count Hayashi published a novel 
in English {For His People, Harper, 1903), 
and also contributed the introductions to 
Mr. Alfred Stead's Mysteries of China, and 
to Mr. Arthur Lloyd's Everyday Japan. 

The first of these was a romance dealing 
with a local episode in the feudal history of 
Sakura, the author's legal birthplace. Kinchi 
Sogoro, headman of Kozu, one of the villages 
on Lake Inoa, in the fief of the Lord Hotta, 
rouses his fellows against the tyranny of their 
feudal chief. Failing to obtain redress for 
their wrongs, Sogoro determined on the ex- 
treme and unforgivable step of appealing 
directly to the Shogun, counting the inter- 
vention of the bakufu on behalf of the peasants 
as worth more than the death which Hotta 
would mete out to him according to law for 

addressing the Shogun. Sogoro carried out 

24 



Count Hayashi's Literary Work 25 

his plan and actually succeeded in handing 
his petition to Tokugawa. He, his wife, and 
children were condemned to death, crucified 
and beheaded. In his last moments Sogoro 
vowed revenge and ordered his spirit to haunt 
Hotta till his family should be wiped out, a 
curse which was duly fulfilled. 

Count Hayashi's object in publishing the 
story was to teach the West the spirit that 
animated his countrymen: presumably their 
persistence in a course once determined on, 
their revenge for slights and wrongs. 

The novel is noteworthy for the excellent 
English in which it is written, which contrasts 
most favourably with the so-called ''quaint'* 
English with which Anglicized Japanese au- 
thors of to-day harass their readers. As a 
picture of pre-Restoration times For His 
People is without doubt a faithful likeness. 
The close connexion of the Hayashi family to 
Sakura and the Shogunate ensures that the 
descriptions of Yedo and the customs of the 
court and people are faithfully reproduced. 

The introductions to Mr. Stead's and Mr. 
Lloyd's volumes are brief and to the point. 
In the former the reader is able to surmise 
the writer's profound knowledge of Chinese 
character. He practically summarizes the 
Chinese as necrologists, blind worshippers of a 



26 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

dead past, but he frankly admits the brilliance 
of that past, even though it is a hindrance 
to a decent present or future. 

He says: "The essential feature of the poli- 
tical teaching of the great sages is the supreme 
importance attached to the individual moral- 
ity of the ruler, and its prevailing spirit is that 
intense reverence for antiquity which con- 
stitutes the extreme form of conservatism/' 

"The Chinese mind was utterly enslaved 
by the influence of these doctrines, so that 
the idea of instituting a comparative study 
of political or ethical questions was banished 
therefrom." 

"The inevitable result was careful preserva- 
tion of a civilization acquired during a period 
of greater receptivity but a complete cessation 
of all further progress." 

In introducing Mr. Lloyd's book. Count 
Hayashi emphasizes the important part Japan 
must play in Far Eastern affairs and the 
necessity of the world at large knowing every- 
thing possible about her. As is evident from 
parts of the Memoirs he fully realized the 
power of the pen, but he did not sympathize 
with the views of most of his colleagues, that 
books on Japan should reveal only the bright 
side of life in that country. He had mixed 
too much with foreigners, both in Japan and 



Count Hayashi's Literary Work 27 

abroad, not to know that in every country 
there must be dark spots, and in every govern- 
ment some abuses requiring correction. As 
he says, ''Fish do not see water,'' and the 
ability to ''see otirselves as others see us'' is 
as valuable a one in a nation as in individuals. 

It has been asserted that if he had lived 
Count Hayashi would not have published his 
Memoirs. There is no evidence whatsoever 
for such a statement. He left explicit in- 
structions that they were to be published. 
His whole course of life was a proof that he 
was not ashamed to criticize his nation. In 
a conversation I had with him in January, 
19 1 2, soon after I arrived in Tokio, he said: 
"Don't be afraid to handle thorns. It will 
be good for you and us!" He himself was 
not afraid, as his articles in the Jiji Shimpo 
on the Korean Conspiracy Trial and the pre- 
valence of torture in prisons in Japan and 
Korea and on the fall of the Saionji Cabinet 
in 1912, fully show. 

In Japanese, Hayashi published Itarii Shi 
{History of Italy) , and a translation of Mill's 
Political Economy. 

So far as I have been able to learn, Hayashi, 
on account of his official rank, rarely contri- 
buted signed articles to the Japanese Press, 
but he was practically responsible during 



28 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

many years for the attitude of the Jiji Shimpo 
on foreign questions, and wrote a great num- 
ber of anonymous articles in that paper and 
in the Chuo Koron. The consistently high 
standard which the Jiji Shimpo has maintained 
on all matters of foreign policy and its out- 
and-out pro-British stand was in no small 
degree due to the relationship between 
its proprietor, M. Fukuzawa, and the 
diplomat. 

I have referred on an earlier page to the 
connexion which Hayashi practically initiated 
between officialdom and the Press. It is a 
matter of the utmost importance. For many 
years the British and American Press have 
been so slovenly represented in Tokio, and 
indeed is so to-day, that the close connexion 
between the Government and the vernacular 
Press has been sadly overlooked. If it were 
realized that such institutions as the Bank of 
Japan, the Finance Department, and the 
Foreign Office have each their own organ of 
publicity, whilst every leading statesman has 
some paper wedded to his views, the naive 
dementis of vernacular statements issued in 
London would not receive so much credence 
as they do. 

After the fall of the second Saionji Cabinet, 
I travelled in the same carriage with the late 



Count Hayashi's Literary Work 29 

Count from Tokio to Yokohama. He was 
then on his way to his villa at Hayama. In 
the course of conversation he said that he 
would like to be younger, when he would 
adopt a journalistic career. 

About a year later I was travelling from 
Oiso to Tokio in company with Baron Kato, 
the present Foreign Minister. Discussing 
the late Count, Baron Kato said that Hayashi 
had actually intended to enter journalism 
and had hoped to become a regular contri- 
butor on Japanese affairs to The Times, which 
paper had a year before lost the services, 
through death, of its veteran correspondent, 
Captain Brinkley. 

The Memoirs which are published hereafter 
were written during 1902, 1903, 1906, 1907, 
and 1908. The intention of the late Count 
had been to write a history of Japanese diplo- 
macy from the time when he began in 1871, 
"as a small potato of the diplomatic world,'* 
down to his retirement from office at the fall 
of the first Saionji Cabinet in 1908. 

Such a work would have been, in fact, a 
complete history of the whole of that remark- 
able period of the Meiji Era, during which the 
enormous changes in Japan itself and in 
Japan's foreign relations occurred, which 
raised that country from being an unknown 



30 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

and rather discredited island to one of the 
Powers of the world. 

Unfortunately, methodical as he was in his 
diplomatic work the Count was most un- 
methodical in his literary work. He obvi- 
ously intended to base his history on his own 
diary and on the numerous articles which he 
contributed to the Press. He planned out 
the whole of the proposed volume but never 
actually wrote more than the chapters dealing 
with the Anglo- Japanese Alliance and the 
chapters dealing with his own tenure of the 
Foreign Office. Even these latter were not 
complete, for the portions dealing with the 
American Immigration question and with the 
Fakumen Railway are not available. This is 
a matter of considerable regret, as on both 
of these some pleasing indiscretions might 
from the circumstances of the case have been 
reasonably looked for. 

In the Memoirs as they are published here 
certain material has been included which was 
not in the completed manuscript, but was 
contained in unfinished chapters or in articles 
contributed to the vernacular Press. It has 
been considered advisable to insert this mate- 
rial for the purpose of rounding off the Count's 
story. 

From May, 19 13, the Chuo Koron, a reput- 



Count Hayashi's Literary Work 31 

able but little known monthly review in 
Tokio, began the publication of a series of 
disjointed paragraphs which were described 
as the reminiscences of a retired diplomat. 

On July 29, 191 3, the Jiji Shimpo began 
to publish a series of articles embodying the 
paragraphs from the Chuo Koron and en- 
titled ''History of the Anglo- Japanese Alli- 
ance/' The paper announced that these 
articles were narrative stories dictated by 
Count Hayashi. The following day a second 
article appeared which was much more de- 
tailed in the information which it conveyed 
and was obviously the diary of the late states- 
man. A footnote added by the editor stated 
that the article was, in fact, a reproduction 
from the diary of the late Count Hayashi 
which had been placed at the disposal of the 
newspaper by the executors, and that it was 
proposed to continue its publication. On 
the following day, July 31st, the Jiji 
Shimpo announced that it had received the 
following letter from the Japanese Foreign 
Office: 

"The matter under the heading of the 'His- 
tory of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance' is con- 
sidered objectionable, and you are requested 
not to publish any more articles of the series. 



32 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

I write this at the instruction of the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs. 

(Signed) "Yoshida Yosaku, 
^^Confidential Secretary to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs ^ 

On August 2 1st, the Jiji Shimpo rushed out 
a supplement containing a summary of the 
continuation of the articles. It was immedi- 
ately seized by the police and suppressed, and 
every effort made to prevent any translation 
of the same going abroad, both telegrams 
and letters being stopped. I was fortunate 
enough to smuggle a translation to London, 
where it was published and created no small 
surprise. 

At that time it was not to be expected that 
any further parts of the Memoirs would be 
available, as the Foreign Office seized all the 
material which the Hayashi family or the 
Jiji Shimpo held, and extracted an under- 
taking that they would not countenance or 
encourage any further publicatiop. 

In October, 1913, I was approached by a 
certain Japanese, who held a manuscript 
written by Count Hayashi and specifically 
given by him to the owner witlii instructions 
for it to be published. The owner had ob- 
tained a loan on the manuscript, which was a 



Count Hayashi's Literary Work 33 

wonderful example of calligraphy, and if I 
paid off the loan I could have the use of the 
manuscript. An undertaking was given me 
at the same time that the manuscript was 
the legal property of the gentleman in ques- 
tion. On receiving the manuscript I found 
a letter from Count Hayashi to the owner as 
follows: 

''I give you this manuscript with the inten- 
tion that you shall publish the same after 
my retirement from office or at some proper 
occasion. 

(Signed) ^'Hayashi." 

I had the most important parts of the 
manuscript translated and my translations 
were on their way to London and Shanghai 
within forty-eight hours. A few days later 
I was able to borrow this manuscript again 
to complete and check my translation. 

The day before the publication of the 
selected extracts, I was approached by a re- 
presentative of the Hayashi family, who 
desired to suppress the publication. How 
they learned about it I never knew, but I 
suppose somebody talked. This gentleman 
informed me that they believed that the 
manuscript I had used was a copy made by 



34 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

an employe of the Jiji Shimpo, and was very 
much surprised to find it contained material 
of which he had never heard, and was one of 
which the Hayashi family had no knowledge 
whatever. 

To prevent any charge of breach of faith 
being made against any members of the 
Hayashi family or any members of the staff 
of the Jiji Shimpo, I addressed the letter 
given below to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
It is perhaps not a matter for surprise that I 
received no acknowledgment of it. 

''H. E. Baron Making, 
'^H.I.J.M.'s Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
^^Tokio. 
''Your Excellency, 

''With reference to the continuation of the 
late Count Hayashi 's Memoir s, which my 
company (Renter* s) are now publishing in 
London and Shanghai, I take the liberty of 
informing Your Excellency that no member 
of the Hayashi family nor any member of the 
staff of the Jiji Shimpo has had any connexion 
whatsoever with the same. 

"The manuscript from which I have had 
the advantage of working is one of which they 
knew nothing, and of the existence of which 
they were totally unaware. 



Count Hayashi's Literary Work 35 

*'I write this letter in order that no charge 
of breach of faith may be brought against 
them. In fact, they have done everything 
possible to prevent publication of the same. 

"lam, 
"Your Excellency's obedient servant, 
(Signed) ''Andrew M. Pooley." 

To protect the reputation of the Hayashis 
and their friends I had a copy of this letter 
sent out to every newspaper in Tokio. 

In April, 19 14, I learned through Japanese 
friends that there was yet another manuscript 
in existence, actually in the possession of a 
pawnbroker. I obtained access to this, and 
was enabled to compare it with the other 
material in my possession. It was a very 
incomplete affair of some forty sheets, and 
but comparatively little of it was in a suffi- 
ciently finished state to be of value. It 
consisted mostly of articles contributed to 
the Press. 

The most interesting point in connexion 
with the suppression of the Memoirs is that 
on the day of King George's Coronation, 
Hayashi published a summarized and in- 
nocuous account of the negotiations for the 
Alliance in The Japan Times. Three days 
later he published a more extensive and dis- 



36 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

tinctly non-official version in the Asahi Shim- 
bufif but did not sign it. This latter version 
created some interest, but was pooh-poohed 
by everybody as being a fiction of journalistic 
imagination. Even so shrewd a critic as 
The Japan Chronicle headed its translation: 
''What passes for history!" 



Ill 

The Chino-Japanese War 

By the Treaty of 1885, known as the Tientsin 
Convention, signed by Li Hung- Chang and Count 
Ito, the relative positions of China and Japan 
towards China's vassal State, Korea, were defined. 
The final clause of the treaty stipulated that 
neither Power should send troops into Korea 
without notifying the other signatory. Each 
Power should have the right to send an equivalent 
number of troops to that sent by the other, in 
case either side should consider such a measure 
necessary. 

The Tientsin Convention was regarded by 
Japan as a diplomatic triumph, annulling China's 
suzerainty over Korea, and giving Japan equal 
rights in that country. Nevertheless it did 
nothing to modify the strong dislike of the Korean 
Coiirt and people for the Japanese, a dislike which 
was steadily fostered by the Chinese Resident, 
Yuan-Shi-Kai, and by the Russian Minister at 
Seoul, M. Pavloff, who in 1888 concluded the 
*' Overland Commercial Treaty" with Korea. 

37 



38 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

The Japanese authorities had ever since that 
year been preparing to settle the Korean question 
by force of arms, in the event of a peaceable 
settlement proving impossible. The army and 
navy had been steadily improved both in mate- 
rial and personnel, and, as events were soon to 
show, had reached a remarkably high state of 
efficiency. 

Nevertheless it is improbable that the Japanese 
statesmen would have pushed matters to a crisis 
in 1894, but for a fortunate concatenation of 
circumstances. 

In February, 1894, a certain Kim-ok-In, a 
Korean political refugee, who had for some years 
been living in Japan, was enticed to Shanghai on 
the pretence of negotiating with representatives 
of the Korean Court, and was there murdered. 
Rumour was strong that the mtirder of Kim origi- 
nated in the brain of Yuan-Shi-Kai. Whether 
this was so or not, his death removed from the 
scene a very useful pawn, on whom the Japanese 
Foreign Office had been able to rely as a go- 
between between itself and the Korean reformers. 
His murder was made the opportunity for the 
formation of a political association called the 
** Anti-Korean Association," which had for its 
avowed object the forcing of an active Korean 
policy on the Imperial Government. It was 
largely financed by semi-official institutions, 
and was kept in touch with the authorities 
by a certain Ryonosuke Okamoto, who has been 



The Chino-Japanese War 39 

well described as the stormy petrel of Korean 
politics. ^ 

Owing to the intrigues of the ''Anti-Korean 
Association*' and the financial support accorded 
from Japan, the Tong-haks started an insurrec- 
tionary movement in Southern Korea towards the 
end of May, 1894. The insurrection in itself was 
of little importance, and there does not ever ap- 
pear to have been any real danger to either the 
Korean dynasty or to the foreign residents of the 
country. Both China and Japan availed them- 
selves of the terms of the Tientsin Convention 
to send troops into Korea, each country formally 
notifying the other of its intention. China took 
this step first. Li Hung-Chang undoubtedly was 
anxious not to send troops into Korea, and it was 
only after considerable delay that he deferred to 
the opinion of Yuan-Shi-Kai, who was naturally 
afraid that the Japanese forces would arrive first 
on the scene. There is little doubt but that both 
Li and Yuan were worked on by Russian influence, 
the former by Count Cassini and the latter by 
M. Pavloff, for neither of these extremely astute 
diplomats had any desire to see Chinese influence 
at Seoul replaced by Japanese domination. Li 
accordingly dispatched 3000 men to Asan. On 

* Ryonosuke Okamoto was subsequently forced on the Korean 
Court as Military Adviser; he led the band of assassins who 
murdered the Queen of Korea in 1896. Later he was one of the 
leaders of the Japanese participating in the Chinese Revolution 
of 191 1, and died at Shanghai in 191 2. 



40 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

June 9th a mixed division of 8000 Japanese troops 
landed in Korea, although, as The Eastern World 
of Yokohama pointed out, nothing had as yet 
happened in Korea to necessitate the dispatch of 
such a large force. 

On June i6th the insurrection was declared to 
have been suppressed, and China notified Japan 
that she was about to withdraw her forces, and 
requested Japan to do the same. 

A week later it became known that Japan had 
refused to comply with this proposal, and the 
situation between the two countries was declared 
by the Tientsin correspondent of The Times to be 
critical. On June 24th a Chinese squadron was 
ordered to Chemulpo. On the 25th a Japanese 
official statement claimed that the Tong-hak 
rebellion had not been suppressed, and alterna- 
tively that even if it had been steps must be taken 
to prevent a recurrence of the trouble and that 
such steps were of vital importance to Japan, as 
her economic interests in Korea were greater than 
those of China. A joint intervention and the 
establishment of a scheme of fiscal reform were 
proposed by Japan. China replied that it was 
contrary to traditional policy to interfere with 
the internal affairs of a vassal State, a reply that 
elicited the retort that unless China agreed to 
intervene, Japan would have to do so alone. 

The Korean situation was, as a result of the 
Tong-hak trouble, favourable to Japanese policy. 
Conditions in that country, especially in the parts 



The Chino-Japanese War 41 

proximate to Japan, gave a nominal justification 
for intervention, even though the rebellion itself 
was but a poor thing as rebellions go, and without 
doubt fostered by Japanese. The internal situa- 
tion in Japan was also not without its arguments 
in favour of drastic action. For many years the 
strongest movement in the political world had 
been that which demanded the revision of the 
Japanese treaties with foreign Powers, and the 
retrocession of the treaty ports. Cabinet after 
Cabinet had fallen on account of failure to accom- 
plish this. It was perhaps unfortunate that coin- 
cident with the rise of the revision movement 
came the efforts of Count Itagaki to establish 
government by political parties. This at once 
made the question one of internal politics. The 
Diet, composed as to a large majority of men who 
had no knowledge of foreign affairs, and ignorant 
of the very A B C of politics, was unable to co- 
ordinate the expenditure of large sums of money 
on armaments with the continuation of extra- 
territoriality. This resulted in bitter fights 
between the Cabinet and the Parliament, and the 
period from December, 1893 to June, 1894, saw 
the dissolution of two Diets, the first of which only 
sat for a month, and the second for only eighteen 
days. The dissolution of both was due to the 
insistence by an Opposition more powerfiil than 
the Ministry on the pursuit by the latter of a 
strong foreign policy. 

The large force thrown into Korea was primarily 



42 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

a sop to popular feeling. The withdrawal of the 
expedition at the request of China would have had 
most serious results in Japan, for the situation 
would have resolved itself diplomatically into a 
status quo ante, whilst politically it would have 
meant ruin for Ito and Mutsu. 

Besides the Korean situation and the condition 
of internal politics there was another impulse of 
which notice must be taken. Since 1893 Mutsu 
had been negotiating with the British Government 
J for a revision of the Anglo- Japanese Treaty. The 
conduct of the negotiations had been entrusted 
to Viscount Aoki, Japanese Minister at Berlin. 
When the Korean crisis arose, the draft of the 
new treaty had been agreed upon by both sides, 
but Lord Kimberle^T- refused to allow the new 
treaty to come into force until the codes had been 
revised and were operating satisfactorily. A re- 
vision of the treaty with Britain was a diplomatic 
success on which Ito could have justifiably de- 
manded praise from the Diet. A revision, the 
action of which could be indefinitely postponed, 
would be worse than useless. On the other hand, 
a successful Korean campaign would not only 
unite all parties, but would distract public atten- 
tion from the question of the treaty revision, and 
probably help forward the revision of the other 
treaties. 

The above were the immediate reasons for 
Japanese action. There were, however, greater 
issues at stake than the future of Parliamentary 



The Chino-Japanese War 43 

government in Japan or the Parliamentary future 
of Ito or Mutsu. For years Japan had had the 1 

run of every secret document in China. In 1882 
the Board of Censors had raised in a memorial 
to the Throne the problem of Korea. Chang- 
Pei-Lun, afterwards the son-in-law of Li Hung- 
Chang, in a very cleverly argued report, urged on 
the Throne the necessity of China thoroughly 
reforming her army and navy, finding a satisfactory 
excuse for war with Japan, and then thoroughly 
crushing the wojen, a contemptuous term for the 
Japanese. He advanced reasons for the belief 
that Great Britain and the Powers would support 
China. This memorial was sent by the Throne 
to Li Hung- Chang for his opinion. The Viceroy 
approved in the main the argument for reforming 
the arm}^ and the navy, but was more inclined to 
believe that the Loochoo Islands would form a 
better excuse for a war with Japan than the ques- 
tion of Korea. He thought, contrary to Chang- , 
Pei-Lun, that the European Powers would support 
Japan against China. ^ The Japanese Foreign 
Office had a copy of this memorial, and was con- 
sequently fully aware of the intention of China to 
pick a quarrel one day with Japan and fight. 
The Japanese Government had therefore for years 
been preparing for the day, and was determined 
itself to decide the time of the conflict. The late 
Captain Brinkley, The Times correspondent in 

^ Appendix A. 



44 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

Tokio, and a close friend of Count Ito, entirely 
endorses this view, both in the columns of his 
own paper, The Japan Maily and also in the cor- 
respondence which he contributed to The Times. 
He says that Japan was prepared to the last but- 
ton, and "as for cartridges, she has stacks more 
than she could possibly use in a war against China.** 
He admits that Japan's actions were not dictated 
by philanthropy but were intended to transmogrify 
Korea into a profitable neighbour for Japan. 
*' Japan," he writes, '*was ambitious to annex 
Korea, but knew that her ambitions would be 
restrained by the Powers, and Japan fears nothing 
so much as European complications." 

The manner in which Japan fomented trouble 
in Korea and fixed a quarrel on China was ugly, 
but at the worst she was only forestalling a similar 
course of action by China. Her policy was oppor- 
tune in view of the situation at home and abroad, 
especially in China, where a closer rapprochement 
with Russia was being effected. After all, the 
Korean question as between China and Japan was 
eine Machtfrage. Japan forced the issue, and 
because she was prepared, whilst China had only 
talked preparation, she won. 

From June 25th, when Japan declared her in- 
tention of continuing her intervention in Korea, 
matters became critical. Some doubt existed in 
Japan as to the attitude of the European Powers 
in the event of war breaking out. The Memoirs 
left behind by the late Count Mutsu give an ac- 



The Chino-Japanese War 45 

count of the diplomatic conversations which took 
place in order to clear up this doubt. It is a 
matter for regret that the Japanese Foreign Office 
seized and destroyed as many copies of this work 
as it was able to, and forbade further publication 
of the same. It is from one of the few remaining 
copies that I obtained the following summary of 
these conversations. 

There were only two Powers from whom Japan 
had to fear hostile action. They were Great 
Britain and Russia, Of these two the former was 
by far the more important. If Great Britain could 
be persuaded to maintain a neutral position it was 
highly improbable that Russia would take any 
steps beyond diplomatic representations. The 
first point to be elucidated was as to whether 
Great Britain had any secret agreement with 
China, which would necessitate her taking naval 
or military action on China's behalf. 

The Japanese Minister in London was instructed 
to ascertain the views of Downing Street. The 
result of the interview was a warning to Japan 
that Great Britain would deprecate any outbreak 
of hostilities, and would most certainly refuse to 
tolerate any actions which infringed her own in- 
terests in China or the integrity or independence 
of Korea. The Japanese representative was in- 
structed that this information was insufficient, 
and was ordered to try and obtain a further state- 
ment as to how far Japan could go without tres-f 
passing on the limits prescribed by Great Britain, 



4^ Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

limits which Mutsu described as being "very 
ambiguous.'* He was instructed to point out 
that Japan's only object was to obtain a settle- 
ment of the Korean question by reforming her 
internal administration. The reply to this was 
that Great Britain would weclome any ameliora- 
tion of the internal conditions of Korea, but she 
would not be able to regard with indifference any 
material change in the foreign regulations of 
Korea, nor would she acquiesce in the transfer 
to Japan of any of the territorial possessions of 
the King of Korea. This very definite exposition 
of the British point of view was accompanied by 
the warning that any attempt of the Japanese 
to control the peninsula would certainly lead to 
Russian intervention, and possibly the seizure 
of a Korean harbour by Russia. On the receipt 
of the above statement Mutsu instructed the 
Japanese Minister at London to give a formal 
assurance to the British authorities that whatever 
the outcome of the existing situation, Japan had 
no intention whatsoever of seizing any Korean 
territory. 

This assurance was very timely, as the general 
impression in foreign circles in the Far East was 
that Japan really wanted to grab Korea, or as 
Bishop Corfe more politely expressed it, ** Japan 
only wants to annex Korea," 

There was good reason for Japanese fear of 
opposition from Russia. Li Hung-Chang practi- 
cally disclosed in his farewell speech to Count 



The Chino-Japanese War 47 

Cassini that the dispatch of Chinese troops to 
Korea had been the result of the latter's advice, 
whilst the identical note presented on June 25th 
by the corps diplomatique at Seoul to Yuan-Shi- 
Kai, and M. Otori, the Japanese Minister, calling 
on both parties to withdraw their forces, was 
drafted by M. Pavloff, though it was nominally 
presented at the request of the King. China 
agreed immediately to the request, but Japan 
never answered the note. 

On June 28th Li Hung-Chang issued the fol- 
lowing manifesto: 

"China is Korea's suzerain; she receives tribute 
and confers investiture, and therefore she owes 
protection to the vassal State. Accordingly at 
the King's request she dispatched troops to quell 
the Tong-hak rebellion, informing Japan thereof 
in accordance with the Convention of 1885, and 
engaging to withdraw her troops on the suppres- 
sion of the rebellion. There was no need for the 
interference of Japan, though Japan, too, has the 
right to send troops to Korea. 

"On the appearance of the Chinese forces the 
rebels dispersed. China now desires to withdraw 
from Korea, but Japan refuses to evacuate Korea 
simultaneously with China, and proposes joint 
occupation, administration of the finances, and the 
introduction of reforms. These are tasks which 
China cannot accept, though she is willing to join 
Japan and other nations interested in recommend- 
ing the reforms necessary to the King of Korea. 



48 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

"Japan's attitude threatens to cause a crisis in 
Eastern Asia and may prove dangerous to both 
countries, as well as deplorable to general commerce. 

"The Viceroy, Li Hung-Chang, considers the 
action of Japan to be inconsistent with the law 
of nations, and with existing treaties. He will 
nevertheless endeavour to preserve peace without 
dishonour to China/* 

The reply of Ito and Mutsu to this protest was 
to present to the King of Korea a series of further 
demands, including the abandonment of Chinese 
suzerainty, the dismissal of the Chinese Resident, 
the reform of the civil, military, and legal systems, 
and the grant to Japan of certain railway, mining, 
and loan concessions. 

Li Hung-Chang turned to Russia for advice. 
Russia was in no mind and in no condition to draw 
the sword to assist China, but she was willing to 
go as far as possible in moral support, in order to 
maintain the status quo in Korea. M. Hitrovo, 
the Russian Minister at Tokio, called on Count 
Mutsu and handed him a note in which the Rus- 
sian Government expressed the point of view that 
China had explicitly fulfilled all the conditions of 
the Tientsin Convention; further, that she was 
prepared to evacuate Korea, and that Japan should 
do the same; further, that if Japan declined to 
follow this advice and a breach of the peace should 
be caused thereby, Japan alone could be held 
responsible. The Japanese Minister tried to draw 
M. Hitrovo, by asking him whether he was to 



The Chino-Japanese War 49 

understand by the last clause of the note that 
Russia was prepared to support China otherwise 
than diplomatically, but the Envoy only answered 
that he had no instructions beyond those contained 
in the note. 

Mutsu was still in doubt as to how far Russia 
would go, when a quite unforeseen turn was given 
to events by a bellicose statement in the Novoye 
Vremya, that if Japan went too far, Russia would 
declare a joint protectorate over Korea with 
China. This brought Germany into the field, 
with a declaration that any attempt to introduce 
Russia into the settlement of the Korean question 
would result only in the creation of a Far Eastern 
Egypt, a threat which was followed by the dispatch 
of warships to the North Pacific. 

On July 1 6th, the Anglo- Japanese Treaty was 
signed, and on the 19th the Japanese Minister 
in London informed Lord Kimberley that Japan 
would insist even by force on a satisfactory solu- 
tion of the situation. As a result Lord Kimberley 
telegraphed to Rome, Berlin, Paris, and St. Peters- 
burg, asking the Governments of the Powers to 
instruct their representatives at Pekin and Tokio 
to use all their efforts for the maintenance of peace. 
At the same time Mr. Gresham, the American 
Secretary of State, telegraphed to Mr. Dunn and 
Mr. Foster, the United States representatives at 
Tokio and Pekin, offering the services of the 
United States as mediator. These dispatches 
were held up by the Japanese authorities. 



50 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

On July 22 d, the King of Korea accepted the Jap- 
anese demands, contingent on the immediate evac- 
uation of the country by Japan, a condition which 
was promptly refused. On July 23d, the Japanese 
troops in Seoul seized the person of the King, and 
in a riot which ensued killed a number of Koreans. 

War was thereafter inevitable. Great Britain, 
with the view of limiting the area of hostilities, 
demanded, and Japan agreed, to the neutraliza- 
tion of Shanghai. The Kowshing incident imme- 
diately followed, and war was formally declared 
on August 1st. 

The Retrocession of Port Arthur, 

As Count Hayashi remarks, the action of Russia 
was by no means unexpected. The note of M. 
Hitrovo, before the outbreak of war, had clearly 
shown that Russia would side with China, and it 
is possible that only the death of Alexander III. 
and the assassination of President Carnot pre- 
vented her taking more effective measures than 
diplomatic representations. In January and 
February, 1895, when the overwhelming victory 
of the Japanese forces was obvious to the whole 
world, Russia began military preparations of some 
importance. Numerous transports were dis- 
patched from Odessa to the Far East, the survey 
of the Siberian Railway was ordered to be hurried 
on, and preparations made for strengthening the 
Vladivostock squadron. 



The Chino-Japanese War 51 

On February ist, a circular was sent by the 
Russian Foreign Office to the Russian ambassadors 
at Paris, London, and elsewhere, outlining the 
views of the Czar's government, as to the terms 
of peace which Japan should be permitted to 
make with China. In the circular it was suggested 
that France had already agreed to the Russian 
proposals, and that both England and America 
would agree to them. This surmise proved to be 
painfully incorrect. In the circular it was further 
stated that the terms which Japan would be al- 
lowed to impose would be limited to the cession 
of islands, the imposition of a war indemnity, the 
opening of certain ports and trading places, and 
the grant of certain commercial concessions, but 
under no circumstances would she be allowed to 
hold permanently one inch of Chinese territory 
on the mainland, though she would be allowed 
temporarily to remain in possession of certain 
districts, which might be mutually agreed on, to 
be held as security for the payment of the indem- 
nity and to be evacuated as the indemnity was 
paid off. 

Count Hayashi assumes that Germany had had 
the intention of intervening from the very begin- 
ning of the war, whatever terms of peace might 
be made. This assumption does not altogether 
appear to be justified. In March, 1895, the Ger- 
man Minister at Tokio had been instructed by 
Berlin to warn Japan that any permanent occupa- 
tion of a portion of the Chinese mainland, as a 



52 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

condition of peace, would provoke the interven- 
tion of Russia. To this Count Hayashi specifically 
refers. Germany, at the time she gave this 
warning, was in receipt of the terms of the Russian 
circular of February ist, and suspecting that 
Russia would be only too pleased to take advantage 
of any incident which might give her the oppor- 
tunity of interfering and arrogating to herself a 
decisive position in the Far East, warned Japan 
in the most friendly spirit. In addition to this 
Germany, certainly if she had any ambitions 
herself in the Orient, could not afford not to join 
Russia and France, after the threat made in July, 
1894, that any interference by Russia would result 
in the Egyptianizing of the Korean question. 

In addition there were other motives for Ger- 
many joining the Russian protest. Count Capri vi 
had allowed the ^'Reassurance Treaty" with 
Russia to lapse, and that country had made an 
alliance with France. Since the beginning of the 
Chino- Japanese War, Prince Hohenlohe had 
succeeded Count Caprivi as Imperial Chancellor. 
Hohenlohe was a good deal in touch with Bismarck 
through his reliance on Count Herbert Bismarck. 
The early days of the Hohenlohe regime were 
devoted to trying to regain the Russian position 
which Caprivi had thrown away, and one of the 
steps taken towards this end was an almost touch- 
ing acquiescence in the Russian proposals. 

Yet another reason was the Kaiser's personal 
attitude. It was at this period that he was coming 



The Chino-Japanese War 53 

into notice as an earnest advocate of a strong 
colonial policy and a strong navy. It was on 
January 9, 1895, that he invited to a soiree at 
Potsdam all the members of the Reichstag, and 
delivered to them a vehement lecture on the 
pressing need of a powerful fleet. As was an- 
nounced at the time, he worked into this lecture 
numerous references to the lessons of the war in 
the Far East. A month later he re- delivered this 
lecture with further references to the Asiatic 
situation before the officers of the Marinamt. 
Then again he demanded more colonies. It is 
clear that William II. was fully alive to the possi- 
bilities of future German development in the Far 
East, and realized that by having a say in the 
resettlement of the Treaty of Shimonoseki Ger- 
many would be entitled to a voice in all further 
dealings of Europe with Asia. It certainly does 
not appear to have ever entered the heads of any 
of the German statesmen that Japan was a nation 
whose friendship might one day be of value to 
Germany. This, however, is not to be wondered 
at in view of the published opinions of the Kaiser 
on the coloured races. 

There was undoubtedly some sort of agreement 
between the three Powers as to the price which 
they were to extract from China for assisting her. 
According to a Russian statement^ Russia paid 
for the co-operation of France with an undertaking 

*Novoye Vremya, April 22, 1895. 



54 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

to support an eventual French demand for a 
rectification of the Indo-Chinese frontier, and 
for Germany's help with a promise to forward 
German demands for industrial and commercial 
concessions. 

Although the three governments were agreed, 
the policy of intervention by no means received 
the unanimous support of the three nations. The 
German industrial circles were much upset by 
the commercial privileges obtained by Japan, the 
Government's reply to an interpellation that the 
concessions were for all nations being met by 
the retort that Japan alone could benefit by the 2 
per cent, commutation tax on cost, owing to the 
cheapness of labour in Japan. The German 
Radicals were loud in their assertion that the 
transfer of Formosa and the Pescadores to Japan 
converted the China Sea and the Gulf of Pechili 
into Japanese lakes. The Vossische Zeitung led 
a very strong campaign against the policy of 
intervention, arguing that as Germany did not 
hold a foot of territory in China she had no interest 
in the business, beyond gratitude to Japan for 
opening markets which eventually would be of 
the greatest value to German industries. "In 
any case," continued the paper, ''there is no 
reason for Germany to strengthen the footing of 
potential enemies, as Russia and France are, in 
the Far East." 

The Neueste Nachrichten of Berlin became curi- 
ously prophetic in its disgust at the Government's 



The Chino-Japanese War 55 

policy. It wrote: ''In a struggle with France and 
Russia Japan would be a very useful ally, and her 
forces are strong enough to distract from her 
Western frontier a good portion of the Russian 
armies. As the end of the affair we seriously fear 
that Germany will pay bitterly for her action, for 
the Japanese will eventually seek their revenge.'* 

It is to be hoped that the writer of the above 
passage is still living, to see the correctness of his 
deductions. 

In France the Soleil cleverly expressed the real 
object of the German Government — to curry 
favour with the Czar. 

The Figaro disapproved of the intervention 
unless Great Britain should agree to join the other 
Powers. The journal pointed out that after all 
Great Britain had the biggest stake in China, and 
unless she actively acquiesced in the policy of the 
Triumvirate, she would "open up and monopolize 
the markets of the Rising Sun, whilst France will 
be alienated" — another prophecy, which has been 
almost exactly fulfilled. 

Great Britain refused the invitation of Russia 
to join in the intervention, on the ground that 
such intervention would be contrary to the estab- 
lished principles of international relationship, and 
because British interests were in no way menaced. 
On the contrary, they were considerably benefited 
by the industrial and commercial concessions 
extorted from China by Japan for the whole 
world. It may be also that public opinion in 



56 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

England was to some extent sentimentally influ- 
enced by the evidence of Japanese progress which 
the war had afforded, and commercially by a 
statement from the Japanese Legation that large 
orders would be forthcoming from Tokio, especially 
for a new fleet. The refusal of the Russian invi- 
tation by Great Britain certainly was of great 
negative value to the Japanese diplomats. It 
limited the intervention programme purely to 
the question of the cession of continental territory 
and entirely knocked on the head Lobanoff's 
programme of the retrocession of the Pescadores 
and the proclamation of a Russian protectorate 
over Korea. 

As the result of the intervention the Mikado's 
Government withdrew the clause ceding Port 
Arthur and accepted instead a further indemnity 
of Tls. 30,000,000, which was raised by a Russian 
loan to China. 

No account of the negotiations which 'accom- 
panied or followed the signature of the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki would be complete without noticing 
a truly Oriental touch in the bargaining on either 
side. Hayashi points out that both Ito and 
Mutsu anticipated intervention, and it was only 
in accordance with the circumstances that they 
drove a bargain with China from which ample 
deduction could be made in the event of foreign 
opposition. Indeed it is not exposing any secret 
to say that Japan was prepared to retrocede 
Port Arthur, even without monetary compensa- 



The Chino-Japanese War 57 

tion, and a statement to this effect was actually 
and officially issued at Tokio. Mutsu was strongly 
opposed to the Liaotung clause but had to give 
way to I to and the army chiefs. 

On the other hand, Li Hung-Chang was equally 
astute, and, like Count Witte at Portsmouth, 
surrendered nothing which he was not prepared 
and glad to get rid of, except the indemnity. He 
always considered Formosa a curse to China, and 
was exceedingly pleased to hand it over to Japan, 
and he shrewdly guessed that Japan would find 
it a great deal more trouble than it was worth. 
In this he proved himself a true prophet, for even 
to-day (191 5) the Japanese have not succeeded in 
pacifying Formosa, and insurrections are frequent, 
in spite of the drastic methods of the Japanese 
gendarmerie. 

As regards Liaotung, the Viceroy was more than 
willing to sign it away to the Mikado, for he had 
already received very definite promises from Count 
Cassini that Russia would never permit Japan to 
keep it. Further, he had actually had a proposal 
from Russia to lease it herself. He was only too 
delighted to let Japan have the sensation of own- 
ing the place as a preliminary to the chagrin of 
losing it. As for the Pescadores they were and 
always had been useless to China. The commer- 
cial privileges agreed to were bound to come even- 
tually, as the result of the constant knocking on 
the Chinese door by the merchants of Etuope and 
America. The permission to import machinery 



58 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

was merely the translation into law of a custom 
obtained b}'' bribery. 

Li Hung-Chang writes in his Memoirs after his 
return to Pekin from Japan: *' I have pored to-day 
over a mass of translated correspondence from 
St. Petersburg, part of which is from my friend 
Count Cassini, and my old frame seems to be 
given thereby a new elixir of life. 

"I can return South with better feelings if less 
honour. 

"Now once more the Throne feels more friendly, 
but there is an apparent coldness in the treatment 
accorded me by the Empress. Yet she was 
gracious enough to acknowledge that the satis- 
factory assurances are the result of my representa- 
tions to the Russian Court, last year, when these 
troublous times were approaching. 

"Briefly we discussed the Russian letters, and 
their Majesties are heartily grateful that Japan 
will not be permitted either now or in the future 
to seize upon any part of Manchuria or the Main- 
land. 

"Why did not I have these assurances before I 
went to Japan ?^ 

"Had I known the way the Czar's Government 
feels in the matter of Japanese aggressions in Korea 
and Manchuria, after my armistice proposal had 
been answered in the manner it was, I could and 
would have said to Ito, ' Go ahead with the war ! ' 

* He did have them. — Ed. 



The Chino-Japanese War 59 

"Still, there is often a very serious doubt in my 
mind as to the real object of these Europeans, and 
I have found that some of their most able and 
honourable diplomats will lie with as much ease 
as a Nanking bird-hawker.'* 

Again under date of June 11, 1897, he writes: 
** England has ever asserted that in all my diplo- 
matic work I have had Russia's interests con- 
stantly in view. England is very wrong, just as 
she has been many times before in other matters. 
If I have appeared to be working for Russia's 
interest, it is because in doing so I have believed 
that I was accomplishing the greatest good for 
China. The British Foreign Office caused me to 
be rated officially over the Manchurian Agreement 
with the Czar's Government; but the British re- 
fused to say that they would help us in the slight- 
est during our Japanese conflict or after; while 
Russia, at the close of the war at least, let Japan 
understand that China was not alone. 

''It may not be generally known that as early 
as 1873, when complaints came from the British 
traders at Tientsin I earnestly memorialized the 
Throne to offer Taiwan to the English Govern- 
ment to do with the wretched island as they saw 
fit." "This memorial," the Viceroy continues, 
"nearly cost me my position as well as my head. 
Being summoned to Peking, I was asked by the 
Grand Council what I meant by advocating that 
a part of the Imperial territory be given away, 
to which I replied that it was a hindrance rather 



6o Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

than a benefit to the nation. If the great island 
could not be sold I advocated that it be made a 
present to England. I told the Council that as 
England had been so ready to grab Hong-Kong 
we might in a measure get even with her by making 
a gift of Formosa. 

"It is true that when Marquis Ito made stipu- 
lations as one of the chief terms of peace of the 
cession of Formosa, I immediately declared that 
I was willing to agree to almost anything except 
that; yet, had I been in another apartment, all 
alone, I would have danced with joy in spite of 
my infirmities. As it was, my heart was indeed 
glad, but I requested the chief plenipotentiary at 
least to say that the Mikado would not insist upon 
having the big island. His Excellency agreed to 
put the question over until the next session of the 
commissioners, and during the intervening time 
I was sore afraid that he would change his mind 
and make a declaration that his Government did 
not want it."^ 

^ For the above and other details of Li Hung-Chang's nego- 
tiations with Marquis Ito and his views on the Treaty the reader 
is referred to Mr. Foster's Memoirs of Li Hung-Chang. 



IV 

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 

Probably no diplomatic instrtmient has 
been so discussed, so praised, and so abused 
as the Anglo- Japanese Treaty. Count Haya- 
shi^s relation of the preparatory propaganda 
which he conducted and of the negotiations 
which preceded its signature is in all likelihood 
the only authentic account of the intrigues and 
counter-intrigues of that time which England 
shall ever have. 

The whole of Great Britain's relations with 
Japan have been so glossed over and so 
illuminated with a halo that the true condi- 
tion of affairs in the Far East during the last 
decade of the nineteenth century has been 
almost forgotten. 

With the exception of a comparatively 
small circle, Japan, until the Chino- Japanese 
War, was regarded as being very much of a 
light-opera country, the setting for dainty 
music and farcical situations. It was princi- 
pally thought of as a mysterious land, which 

6i 



62 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

was the home of the musume and the impres- 
sionist painter, where the houses and hand- 
kerchiefs were made of paper, where the 
people wrote with a brush and wore gloves 
on their feet, worshipped a strange thing 
called bushido, and had a quaint reputation 
in matters of morality. 

The China War changed all this. It was 
quickly recognized that a new Power had 
arisen in the East. Many recognized it as a 
Power potential of great benefits or of great 
harm. On the whole, there was in England 
a disposition to treat Japan well. The pro- 
gress she had shown and the nerve she had 
displayed created a sentimental feeling in her 
favour, which was well displayed by Tenniel's 
cartoons in Punch. The Japanese Foreign 
Office fostered and developed this attitude 
by the most wonderful Press campaign the 
world has ever seen. 

The very careful manner in which the 
oracle was worked closed the usual avenues 
by which a knowledge of the true sentiments, 
the true policies, and the real intentions of 
Japan could pass to the outer world. 

No man was more intimate with the great 
statesmen who have shaped the country's 
destinies than the late Captain Brinkley. 
Yet, so far as I am aware, it was not until 



The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 63 

1904, when he published his monumental 
work on China and Japan, that he informed 
the public of the real goal at which the 
Mikado's Government was aiming. In that 
book, referring to Japan's object in forcing a 
war on China, in 1894, he said, "Japan is 
fighting for the supremacy of the Far East, 
for the hegemony of Asia. A Japanese pro- 
verb says: 'Better be the tail of the ox than 
the comb of the cock.' By beating China 
she became the comb of the cock of Asia and 
will go on to be the tail of the ox." 

Old residents in Japan laugh cynically 
over Japanese asseverations of friendship for 
England. They recall the days of the war 
with China, when England was loathed and 
foreigners were stopped on the streets and 
asked if they were English, and when the 
reply was in the affirmative were impolitely 
told to go to a yet warmer climate. The 
Japanese equivalent of ''Gott strafe England" 
was a common saying in the streets of Tokio 
then. 

The leaders of Japan have always been 
divided into two camps. Sometimes they 
are called the soldiers and the sailors, some- 
times Choshu and Satsuma, sometimes anti- 
British and pro-British. 

The military party, the men of Choshu, 



64 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

are even to-day strongly anti-British, just as 
the naval party are pro-British. Their dis- 
like of the British is in part an heritage from 
"to and the British limitation of the area of the 
Chinese War, and in part a eonsequence of 
their German training and sympathies. 

The people, who had no say in the matter, 
were rather well disposed to England as hav- 
ing held aloof in 1895 and as being their 
principal customers from whom they expected 
much future gain. 

The following, written by Hitomi Ichitaro 
in 1897, gives a fair idea of the situation: 

'*Un peu avant la guerre Chino-Japonaise, 
I'Angleterre et le Japon se meprisaient Tun 
Tautre: T Anglais croyait que la Chine forte 
et riche etait la maitresse de TExtr^me Orient, 
et que le Japon pauvre et faible n'etait rien. 

*'Le Cabinet dTto a toujours cherche la 
faveur de la Russie, et affecte de s'eloigner 
de I'Angleterre: mais le peuple Japonais a 
meprise la Russie que le Cabinet craignait et 
sympathise avec I'Anglais qu'il repoussait." 

The hakabatsu (white peril) campaign, the 
doctrine that the whites are the curse of the 
yellow race, which was a remarkable accom- 
paniment of the Californian agitation two 
years ago, was only a revival of a spleen 
which found an earlier but not less violent 



The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 65 

expression eighteen years before and was led 
on both occasions by Tokutomi, Okuma, and 
the Choshu clan. 

So far as Japan is concerned, any alliance 
between herself and a white race must be one 
of political expediency. There can be no 
other ground or justification for it. The 
Japanese are Orientals. It is perfectly futile 
to argue that their veneer of Western civiliza- 
tion has made them anything else. If the 
Chinese and Japanese have a vicious deep- 
seated contempt for each other, as they have, 
it is nothing in comparison with the innate 
contempt, the burning detestation, which the 
Japanese have in excelsis for all white men. 

Since 1895 this feeling has been deliberately 
educated and developed by the Japanese 
authorities, by means of that most extra- 
ordinary religion which Professor Basil Cham- 
berlain has so ably and relentlessly exposed, 
namely. Mikado- worship.^ 

The idea was sown and fostered and has 
grown into a national creed, that there is no 
country in the world which is so great as 
Japan, and that any and every other country 
is infinitely inferior. This idea has found 
utterance on numerous occasions in official 

^ The Making of a New Religion. By Prof. B. Chamberlain. 
London, 191 1. 



66 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

documents and in the Diet, both from the 
lips of Ministers and members. One expres- 
sion of it, which is worth remembering in 
these days of land agitation in California and 
British Columbia, is the refusal to allow for- 
eigners to own land, because such ownership 
would be a "pollution of the sacred soil/' 

In all matters concerning Japan it has to 
be remembered that public opinion in that 
country is practically non-existent, except 
on such rare occasions as after the Treaties of 
Shimonoseki and Portsmouth and at the 
death of the Meiji Tenno, when the sentiment 
of the whole people was deeply affected. The 
political riots which are now almost an annual 
featvire of life in Tokio are not expressions 
of public opinion but the carefully organized 
demonstrations of the "outs'* against the 
"ins." 

It is for this reason that the Alliance was 
and is, so far as Japan is concerned, a political 
expedient. I believe that the Japanese people 
themselves would at one time, if they had 
been canvassed and allowed to vote freely 
(which would have been a rarity for them), 
have been found to appreciate it deeply. 
But this would not have been for any reasons 
of foreign policy, but because the Japanese 
people are a folk trying to be politically free 



The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 67 

and to attain, themselves, to those heights 
of democracy at which they know England 
has already arrived. The time for that is, 
however, past. The Alliance now means to 
them nothing but an increase of expenditure, 
a constant rise in taxes, and a constant soaring 
of the cost of living. 

The great development of reading the 
numerous translations of American and Eng- 
lish works, is gradually arousing a general 
feeling that the country must be governed by 
the people for the people. The consistent 
disregard for the rights of the individual shown 
by such men as Prince Yamagata, the late 
Prince Katsura, Viscount Oura, and Count 
Okuma, the steadily mounting debt and the 
increasing burden of taxation, are creating a 
social unrest that must before long find an 
escape. In Japan all that is required for a 
popular outbreak on a scale with which Impe- 
rial edicts and Ministerial platitudes will be 
unable to cope is a leader who will prove him- 
self worthy of public confidence and adamant 
against bribes of office and reward. 

When that day comes it will be a duty of 
the British Government to show that the 
Alliance, if still in force, is not only a diplo- 
matic instrument to secure Japan's military 
aid in time of crisis, but is also founded on a 



68 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

sincere regard for the Japanese people them- 
selves and a desire to see them develop along 
the true lines of Western civilization and 
freedom. 

At the present time the Alliance is merely 
a political arrangement between govern- 
ments, which is used by the Japanese bureau- 
crats as an excuse, and a very plausible one, 
for constant additions to armaments, and as 
a safeguard for themselves in a policy of 
aggression and expansion, which has for its 
ultimate object a protectorate over China. 

Whether from the English point of view 
the Alliance has attained the objects intended 
is a matter of doubt! Whether it was ever 
really necessary or advisable is a frequent 
subject of discussion! 

When the first alliance was signed its honest 
ultima ratio, so far as England was concerned, 
was fear of Russian aggression on India and 
Constantinople. So far as Japan was con- 
cerned it was the absorption of Korea and a 
predominating position in China. England 
was to keep the ring whilst Japan attacked 
Russia. 

The net result was that Russia's ambitions 
on the Pacific were checked and diverted to 
Persia, Central Asia, and the Balkans, where 
she is considerably nearer to India and her 



The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 69 

manifest destiny, Constantinople, than ever 
before. The document which provided for 
the integrity of China and the independence 
of Korea handed over the latter country for 
annexation by Japan, and a slice of the Chinese 
Empire as big as India to Japanese control. 
A British Government which had put its seal 
to the Alliance, ostensibly to ensure China^s 
sovereignty over her own territories, became 
an active party to the abrogation of that 
sovereignty over a vast stretch of China. It 
is not, perhaps, to be wondered at that Ger- 
many expressed surprise at England's respect 
for a *^ scrap of paper'' in August of last year. 

The second alliance treaty was the reitera- 
tion of the first on a broader basis, except 
that Germany was the enemy feared, and that 
it included the enunciation of Japan's reward 
for her services against Russia. 

The third alliance treaty was an emascula- 
tion of the second by the removal of any pos- 
sibility of England's being called on to fight 
America. It has been a source of the greatest 
dissatisfaction in Japan, for America is the one 
Power which Japan fears may attempt to annul 
her claims to keep China in leading strings. 

It will be for the historian to decide to what 
extent any of these treaties were necessary, 
and how far they were due to a lack of political 



70 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

foresight. The ostensible cause of the first 
treaty, namely the integrity and independence 
of Korea, was of coiirse nonsense. Lord 
Lansdowne declared England had no import- 
ant interests in Korea. Then why did he 
mix England up in the affairs of the Hermit 
Kingdom? Why did he sign a treaty which 
he gravely feared was one-sided? 

The British Government was repeatedly 
warned in 1895 that Japan and Russia must one 
day fight about Korea. England had nothing 
to gain by interference. By being inveigled 
into the arena she has lost the whole of her in- 
terests in Korea, Manchuria, Shantung, and 
Fukien, and much of her prestige in China. 

Count Hayashi reveals two things of great 
importance. The first that Count Witte in 
1897 and 1898 proposed a rapprochement with 
England, which failed on account of the atti- 
tude of the Press and the city. It would be 
interesting to know to what extent Japan 
influenced that attitude. 

Secondly, he says Germany proposed a 
Triple Alliance of Britain, Germany, and 
Japan, from which Germany was eventually 
cold-shouldered.^ Attempts have been made 

^ This statement has been denied in Berlin. On the other 
hand, I have heard it confirmed by German diplomats of high 
rank. 



The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 71 

in interested quarters to minimize the import- 
ance of this statement. It cannot be mini- 
mized. It is the key to everything that has 
happened since in the Far East, and of much 
that has happened in Europe. This exclusion 
in 1902 was the first of a long series of similar 
acts, each and every one of which was intended 
to shut Germany out of the Far East. It 
will be an important duty of the historians 
of posterity to decide to what extent German 
ambitions have been clipped and German 
opposition to England developed by the 
manner of her treatment in the East of Asia. 
The political idealist can find food for thought 
at what would have happened if either of 
these overtures had materialized, and then 
consign his vain reflections to the limbo of 
diplomatic might-have-beens. 

The only justification of the Anglo- Japanese 
Alliance is that existence in Europe outweighs in- 
terests in Asia. It will be for Time, the inexora- 
ble accountant, to decide to what extent the 
menace to England's existence in Europe was 
due to slovenly diplomacy, and to what ex- 
tent the sacrifices England has made in Asia 
have been recompensed in the moment of trial. 

China is the country which has most reason 
to complain of England's policy in the Far East. 
Instead of the Alliance really safeguarding 



^2 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

her rights and territory, the process of ab- 
sorption and the policy of aggression by 
neighbouring Powers had been vastly accel- 
erated since 1902. As the Sinwan Pao ex- 
pressed it this year: *^If the value of the 
Alliance is only to substitute a lingering death 
for a quick one, then so far as China is con- 
cerned it has no value at all. Beheading is 
infinitely preferable to the thousand slices.'* 
That Japan has been the most wanton aggres- 
sor is now generally recognized. But that she 
has been in a position to carry out successfully 
such a policy is due to the Alliance of 1902 
and its corollaries. 

I shall be very much surprised if within a 
few years England does not realize that her 
money and her support have raised up against 
us in the Far East a Power as powerful and as 
dangerous as Germany has become, and one 
infinitely more difficult to handle on account 
of her geographical position. 

Japan is distinctly a country to be treated 
with cautious courtesy and a country about 
which English statesmen require to know a 
great deal more than they do know. A theo- 
cratic bureaucracy is probably the most effec- 
tive government conceivable. Obedience is its 
watchword. In Japan the world has the most 
highly organized bureaucratic machine in 



The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 73 

existence. As ex-President Roosevelt would 
put it, " They have Germany beat to a frazzle." 

It must be remembered, too, that the 
Japanese are first-class diplomats, and every- 
thing which that connotes. In Oriental diplo- 
macy there is no room for scruples. 

Diplomacy is war in the council chamber 
instead of on the field. The true diplomat com- 
bines the subtlety of the serpent with the sim- 
plicity of the dove. He may affect to believe 
everything and should, in fact, believe nothing. 
He has his goal marked out and has to get there 
or as near to it as may be humanly possible. 
In Japan the European diplomat lives in an 
atmosphere of blandishment and hushido, but 
he should never forget that the ''ethics of bu- 
shido make no distinction between the 'ways 
which are dark and the tricks which are vain ' 
so long as the aim is attained.'' Hence I may 
say again that England's policy in the Far 
East should be one of polite preparation. 

If a study of the late Count Hayashi's 
Memoirs in the light of subsequent events 
opens the eyes of the public to the futility of 
a foreign policy which looks only to immediate 
gain and recklessly disregards the future, then 
they will not have failed in the purpose of their 
publication. 

A. M. P. 



THE SECRET MEMOIRS OF 
COUNT HAYASHI 



75 



CHAPTER I 

Origin of an Opinion for an Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance 

The origin of the desire for an alliance to 
be concluded between Great Britain and Japan 
is to be traced to the feeling existent in poli- 
tical circles in the latter country after the 
close of the Chino- Japanese War, when the 
intervention of the three Powers, Russia, 
France, and Germany, necessitated the retro- 
cession of Port Arthur. 

Prior to that intervention and during the 
progress of the war with China, France had 
shown herself to be friendly to Japan, a feeling 
which was reciprocated by that country. 

As regards the relations between Great 
Britain and Japan, the late Count Ito, who 
was at that time the President of the Council 
of Ministers, before the war with China was 
decided on, entertained great anxiety as to 
the real position which Great Britain would 

77 



78 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

take up. His anxiety was shared by other 
persons occupying important positions in the 
State and at Court. They feared lest Great 
Britain might have a secret agreement with 
China, and in the event of war breaking out 
with Japan, she might render China some 
aid. 

Although Great Britain had tried very 
hard to prevent the outbreak of hostilities 
between Japan and China, when it was certain 
that nothing could hinder such a development 
instructions were given to the British Charg6 
d* Affaires at Tokio at the end of July, 1894, 
to demand from Japan a guarantee that 
Shanghai and its vicinity should be regarded 
as outside the area of hostilities. 

As a result of this demand from the vside 
of the British Government, the Japanese 
authorities realized that Great Britain had 
no secret agreement with China, and in con- 
sequence war with China was resolved upon 
on August I, 1894. 

An important matter at this time was that 
the negotiations for the revision of the Anglo- 
Japanese Commercial Treaty had been con- 
cluded, and shortly before the declaration of 
war Great Britain had requested an early 
exchange of ratifications. This appeared to 
signify that, victory or defeat, neither result 



Origin of Anglo-Japanese Alliance 79 

would affect the question of the revision of 
the treaty. 

The net result of this was that Great 
Britain^s attitude proved in reality to be the 
exact opposite of what the Japanese authori- 
ties believed it was. Instead of being bound 
to China and hostile to Japan, Great Britain 
seemed favourably inclined to the latter 
country. On the other hand, the interference 
of the three continental Powers after the 
conclusion of the war seriously affecting the 
interests of Japan had the result of drawing 
Japan towards Great Britain, and created 
an opinion very favourable towards a future 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 

The Three-Power Intervention , 1S95. 

The first hint of the possibility of interfer- 
ence with the policy of Japan in connexion 
with the conditions to be imposed by her on 
China as the result of her victories came from 
the dispatches sent to the London Times by 
its famous correspondent at Paris, M. de 
Blowitz, during January and February, 1895. 

Both the Premier, Count Ito, and the 
Foreign Minister, M. Mutsu, anticipated such 
action on the part of Russia, France, and 
Germany, but they were quite unable to 



8o Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

anticipate what direction intervention would 
take, nor could they guess to what extent it 
would be carried. They considered the matter 
and came to the conclusion that even if they 
were to make less stringent terms with China 
than those which they had in view, it would 
still be impossible to avoid intervention from 
the side of the Powers, as it was quite certain 
that the latter had made up their minds to 
control China^s action and also to deal a deadly 
blow at Japan. 

Consequently the Japanese statesmen de- 
termined to make no alteration in the terms 
of peace which they already had in mind, 
but to go as far as possible without paying 
any immediate attention to the prospect of 
intervention by the continental Powers. 

Of course it was quite clear that interven- 
tion from the side of Russia would mean an 
excellent opportunity for that country to 
extend her influence in the Far East, and it 
was very natural that she was at the bottom 
of the whole affair. France had an Alliance 
'with Russia and on account of that Alliance 
was obliged to support Russia's action, in 
spite of her own earlier friendship for Japan. 
The statement of M. Harmand, the French 
Minister to Tokio at the time, fully proved 
the real circumstances actuating French policy. 



Origin of Anglo-Japanese Alliance 8i 

As for Germany, she had no reason what- 
soever for being at enmity with Japan, and 
she had no obligation whatsoever in Europe 
to oblige her to support Russia, as was the 
case with France. On the occasion of the 
signature of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, 
which concluded the war between China and 
Japan, the German Minister at Tokio, Baron 
von Gutschmid, was the first to dispatch a 
telegram of congratulation to the Foreign 
Minister. Consequently it was a great sur- 
prise to the Japanese when Germany suddenly 
changed her attitude and agreed to take 
common action with France and Russia, to 
obtain the surrender of Port Arthur by us. 

An inquiry was made by our Foreign Office 
from the German Minister in Tokio as to 
the reason for German action in joining Russia 
and France. Baron von Gutschmid replied 
very composedly that the German Govern- 
ment had given warning to the Japanese 
Government at the beginning of 1895, ^^^ 
had at that time pointed out that intervention 
by the Powers would be inevitable if Japan 
should take any steps towards the partition 
of Manchuria. In spite of this friendly warn- 
ing the Japanese Government had concluded 
a treaty with China embodying territorial 
acquisition, and as a consequence Germany 



S2 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

was forced to stand by the side of Russia 
and France. 

This must indeed be called a strange ex- 
planation. Preliminary notice as to the pos- 
sibility of intervention might possibly be 
listened to, but that a country should join 
in intervention, simply because of non-accept- 
ance of the warning, is to me incomprehensible. 

In short, it must be assumed that Russia 
and France intervened solely on account of 
our territorial aggrandizement, but Germany 
had had the intention of intervening, what- 
ever conditions^ of peace were made, long 
before the conclusion of the Jireaty ^of 
peace. ^ 

With regard to the attitude of the German 
Government towards Japan at the time of 
the intervention, the following interesting 
anecdote throws some light. 

At the time of the intervention of the three 
Powers, Count Mutsu, the Foreign Minister, 
was absent in the Kyoto district, and the 
management of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was in my hands, and it was I who 
carried on the negotiations with the Ministers 
of the three Powers. On one occasion (April 
23, 1895) the Russian and French Ministers 
called on me at the Foreign Office and brought 
and read to me a memorandtmi briefly written 



Origin of Anglo-Japanese Alliance 83 

in the French language and left it for my 
further perusal and consideration. 

The same day the German Minister called, 
but later in the afternoon. In spite of a 
sufficient knowledge of English and French, 
the German Minister apparently thought it 
an indignity to draft a memorandtim in either 
of these languages, and in consequence of 
my inability to understand German brought 
me a memorandimi written in romaji (Japan- 
ese written in Roman letters, according to 
the Japanese phonetics), and caused his secre- 
tary, Herr Weipert, to read it out. Now the 
secretary was extremely well acquainted with 
the ordinary Japanese script and was vexed at 
having to read out an unfamiliar transcript 
of the original text, which had been composed 
from Chinese ideographs. It was quite clear 
that neither the secretary nor the Minister 
understood a single word of what the former 
was reading, whilst I, though paying the 
deepest attention, was barely able to catch 
the meaning of the memorandum. 

The memorandum which had been left 
by the French and Russian Ministers was 
practically a brief sentence advising the retro- 
cession of the territory acquired by the Treaty 
of Shimonoseki, and giving as a reason for the 
advice friendship for the neighbouring country. 



84 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

The German memorandum, on the other 
hand, said that there was no possibility of 
Japan being able to hope for a victory in 
fighting Russia, Germany, and France, and 
therefore it would be beneficial for Japan if 
the advice tendered by the three Powers 
should be accepted. 

Standing at the table opposite to the Ger- 
man Minister I said, **Your Excellency's 
colleagues, the Ministers of Russia and France, 
have been here and have given friendly advice 
for the purpose of maintaining peace, and in 
doing so they have used a friendly termino- 
logy. But your Excellency's memorandum 
is phrased as if it were the proposal to solve 
the question by force of arms. If you mean 
this then the dignity of the State, as well as 
the feeling of the nation, must be considered, 
let alone the words in which the memorandum 
is couched. It seems as if the memorandum 
has been written in the Japanese language, 
with which you are unfamiliar, and conse- 
quently errors have been made in the use of 
words." 

The German Minister, in the most awkward 
manner, said that the views expressed by me 
as being in the memorandum were not so 
meant, and if such views occurred in it, it 
was due to errors in the wording of the memo- 



Origin of Anglo-Japanese Alliance 85 

randiim in Japanese. He promised to cancel 
the memorandum and asked me to regard the 
German memorandum as being identical with 
those of the Russian and French Ministers. 

Note. The following was the text of the Russian 
Note, which was also adopted by the French Minister, 
and, in the circumstances described above, by the 
German Minister, with, of course, the necessary 
verbal alterations. 

"The Government of His Majesty the Emperor 
of All the Russias, in examining the conditions of 
peace which Japan has imposed on China, finds that 
the possession of the Peninsula of Liaotung, claimed 
by Japan, would be a constant menace to the capital 
of China, would at the same time render illusory the 
independence of Korea, and would henceforth be a 
perpetual obstacle to the peace of the Far East. 

"Consequently the Government of His Majesty 
the Emperor would give a new proof of their sincere 
friendship for the Government of His Majesty the 
Emperor of Japan by advising them to renounce the 
definite possession of the Peninsula of Liaotung." — Ed. 



CHAPTER II 
Preliminaries of the Alliance 

As the result of the intervention by the 
three Powers after the Treaty of Shimonoseki, 
the interests of the different countries in the 
Far East fell into a new grouping. France 
and Germany stood with Russia on the one 
side; whilst Great Britain, Japan, and the 
United States stood on the other. The result 
of this was that an opinion gradually spread 
both amongst the public and in the official 
world at Tokio that an alliance with Great 
Britain would be beneficial. 

The Alliance was really an epoch-making 
event, when it had been concluded. It 
stands out in the history of the world. The 
glorious victories of our army and navy -in 
the Russo-Japanese War and the great fight 
in the Straits of Tsushima were in themselves 
almost unprecedented in the history of war- 
fare, but they could never have taken place 
without the Anglo- Japanese Alliance. 

86 



Preliminaries of the Alliance S7 

After the war great changes took place in 
the relations between the Powers. Those 
Powers which had previously been antipathetic 
to Japan arranged compromises, and now 
there is no reason to anticipate another war. 
This result has been due entirely to the virtue 
of the alliance. 

Not one of the persons who, after the retro- 
cession of Port Arthur, approved the idea of 
an alliance, ever imagined that it would have 
such far-reaching consequences. They only 
felt at the time of discussing it that without 
some sort of support the pressure of the 
European Powers might be renewed. Indeed, 
there were even different opinions as to 
whether an alliance with Great Britain would 
be the most suitable for our requirements, or 
whether a Russo-Japanese Alliance or even a 
Russo-Franco-Japanese Alliance would not 
be better. Both these latter proposals re- 
ceived the support of minorities in Japan. 1 
The main point kept in view by everybody 
was, however, that Japan's isolated position 
must be abandoned. 

I admit that I felt most strongly the 
attitude of Germany in the intervention 
question, as I considered that that country 
had no interest whatsoever in the matter. 
On the other hand, I keenly appreciated the 



\ 



S8 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

joint interests of Russia and France, with the 
result that shortly after the intervention 
question had been settled I wrote an essay 
bearing the title: ''Future Policy in Foreign 
Affairs.'* This was completed towards the 
end of May, 1895, ^^d I presented it to the 
late Mr. Fukuzawa, the proprietor and manag- 
ing editor of the Jiji Shimpo, This gentle- 
man was a great savant^ and entirely agreed 
with the views expressed therein, with the 
result that in June, 1895, ti^ published the 
essay in the Jiji Shimpo, Shortly afterwards 
I was appointed Minister to China and left 
Tokio for Peking. A few days after my de- 
parture, on June 2 ist, the Jiji Shimpo published 
yet another article from my pen, again setting 
out my views on the country's foreign policy 
and emphasizing the necessity for the con- 
clusion of some sort of an arrangement with 
Great Britain. The considerable attention 
paid to these two articles by the general public 
is evidence enough that the idea of an alliance 
was beginning to obtain a hold amongst the 
people. 

The then Foreign Minister, Count Mutsu 
(created Count after the Treaty with China), 
was also in favour of an alliance. 

During the whole of my residence in Peking, 
and later in St. Petersburg, having the object 



Preliminaries of the Alliance 89 

of creating the alliance always in view, I 
tried continuously to cultivate the society of 
the British representatives at those places. 
I therefore considered it a matter for self- 
congratulation that Sir Nicholas O'Connor, 
who had been my colleague in Peking, should 
also have been my colleague in St. Petersburg. 

The idea of the alliance gradually extended 
until, on a certain day in March, 1898, Mr. 
Joseph Chamberlain, the then Minister for 
the Colonies in the English Cabinet, had a 
conversation with M. (later Baron) Kato, 
who at the time was the Japanese Minister 
in London, at a public banquet, which both 
were attending. Mr. Chamberlain on that 
occasion expressed to M. Kato the readiness 
of Great Britain to enter into an agreement 
with Japan for the settlement of relations in 
the Far East. M. Kato sent a long telegram 
to Count Okuma, at that time the Minister 
I'or Foreign Affairs at Tokio, and urged on 
him the advisability of complying with the 
British statesman's wishes.^ 

In 1899 I returned to Tokio from St. 

^Kato, Taka-aki, b. 1859. Entered Foreign Office, 1887; 
Private Secretary to Foreign Minister, Count Okuma, 1888; 
Minister at London, 1894-99; Ambassador at London, 1906-13; 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1900-01, 1906, 1913, 1914; G.C.M.G. 

Okuma, Shigenobu, b. 1838. Foreign Minister, 1888, 1896- 
97; 1898-99; Premier, 1897, 1914. — Ed. 



90 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

Petersburg and visited Count Ito at his 
residence on Reinanzaka (one of the resi- 
dential quarters in Tokio). Count Inouye 
was present at that interview, and asked me 
if I would like to go to London as Minister. 
To this inquiry I replied that such was my 
most earnest desire. 

Count Inouye then continued by saying 
that M. Kato was always pressing on the 
Foreign Office the urgent necessity of an 
alliance with Great Britain, and he asked 
for my views on the matter. I replied that I 
considered the alliance to be most advisable 
and important, but pointed out that an 
alliance means something mutual, each side 
bringing something into the bargain. If 
Japan were not able to bring sufficient into the 
alliance as her contribution then indeed it 
might suit Great Britain better to make 
an arrangement with Russia, which country 
could certainly offer more than Japan. And 
even if matters should not go so far as an 
Anglo-Russian Alliance, it might well be that 
the idea of an Anglo- Japanese Alliance would 
be blocked. I said that my experience in 
Russia had been that England was very 
popular with certain sections, and therefore 
it would be very difficult to bring about an 
Anglo- Japanese Alliance. To explain this 



Preliminaries of the Alliance 91 

statement I then added certain particulars of 
matters which had happened whilst I was 
Minister in St. Petersburg (March, 1897- 
1899). 

Pourparlers that miscarried. 

At the time when I was Minister at St. 
Petersburg the Russian Government was 
getting more and more interested in Far 
Eastern affairs. 

It is digressing a little to relate the follow- 
ing story, but as it concerned a very important 
matter and was illustrative of the above I 
will "strike it in, whilst the iron is hot.*' In 
regard to the Korean question in 1897, in 
disregard of the Yamagata-Lobanoff Agree- 
ment,^ the Russian Government, without 

' The Yamagata-Lobanoff Agreement was signed at St. Peters- 
burg in 1896 on the occasion of the visit of Field-Marshal Count 
(now Prince) Yamagata to St. Petersburg to represent the 
Mikado on the occasion of the coronation of the Tsar and Tsarina. 
The agreement was to all intents and purposes merely a ratifica- 
tion of the Komura-Waeber Convention, signed at Seoul on May 
13, 1896, by the late M. (afterwards Marquis) Jutaro Komura, 
then Japanese Minister to Korea, and M. G. Waeber, Russian 
Minister to Korea. Under the Komura-Waeber Convention 
both Powers obtained the right to maintain a Legation guard 
of 800 men, whilst Japan obtained the further right to maintain 
a telegraph guard of 200 men to patrol the cable line between 
Fusan and Seoul, which was the property of a Japanese conces- 
sionaire. — Ed. 



92 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

notifying the Japanese Government, sent 
several military officers to Korea for the 
purpose of training the Korean army, and 
also a financial adviser. Count Oktima, who 
was then the Minister of Foreign Affairs at 
Tokio, protested against this to the Russian 
Government, and I, in accordance with his 
instructions, saw Count Muravieff on the 
matter. He said to me, "That is something 
which happened under my predecessor, and 
I have nothing to do with it." I replied 
that a Government's responsibility could not 
change just because the Foreign Minister 
changed. ''Well,'' he said, ''to tell you the 
truth the Korean Emperor desired to have 
some military advisers, and so we sent them. 
We could not refuse the request of the ruler 
of a country with whom we have (diplomatic) 
relations." 

I then asked: "Would you then comply 
with any request made to you by the Emperor 
of Korea? Would you act thus in defiance 
of the convention which you have signed 
with us? If so, the agreement you have made 
with Japan is not worth the paper on which 
it is written. I must ask you to let us know 
exactly where we stand." "No," replied 
Count Muravieff. "What I mean is that we 
have sent these officers to Korea and we can- 



Preliminaries of the Alliance 93 

not recall them immediately. As a matter of 
fact, we were to have increased their numbers, 
but we will not send any more. We will 
correct the matter and make amends to you 
for it as you consider it a violation of the agree- 
ment. But we must have some further time 
for the matter to be settled in." This ended 
the conversation, but there was never any 
definite settlement of the matter. 

Meanwhile there had been a change of 
Ministry at Tokio, and the third Ito Cabinet 
had taken office with Baron Nishi as Foreign 
Minister. 

In January, 1898, the Russian Foreign 
Minister proposed, acting under the direct 
instructions of the Tsar, to negotiate an 
agreement with Japan in regard to Korea. 
I at once telegraphed this information to 
Tokio, and as our Government also wanted 
to have the question settled I received tele- 
graphic instructions to agree. 

The Nishi-Rosen Negotiations, 

My own opinion was that if Japan and 
Russia were to make an agreement that 
should require both countries to retire from 
Korea, then Japan's interests being so com- 
plicated she might be obliged to have to stand 



94 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

by, only being able to watch whatever might 
occur internally in Korea. (It should be 
remembered that, since the China War, 
Japan had very materially increased her 
interests in Korea, independently of her 
political situation toward that country. At 
the close of 1897, for example, she obtained 
the concession for the Seoul-Fusan Railway.) 
Russia having fewer interests internally in 
Korea might also be content to stand by and 
watch, but, on the other hand, might, in 
spite of the agreement, interfere if anything 
serious should happen. It appeared to me 
therefore better for both countries to be able 
to send advisers to Korea, a course which, 
as I thought, might work out more advan- 
tageously than any agreement on the other 
lines proposed at the time could do. 

There were already a number of Russian 
military advisers in Korea training the Korean 
army, and as their number was large it would 
be a difficult matter to recall them. There 
was also one financial adviser, M. Alexeieff 
(head of the short-lived Russo-Korean Bank. 
He succeeded Mr. McLeavy Brown as Finan- 
cial Adviser to Korea in the autumn of 1897). 
His recall would not, however, be a difficult 
matter. I thought that Japan should prefer 
to supply Korea with a financial adviser, 



Preliminaries of the Alliance 95 

rather than with military advisers. I there- 
fore telegraphed to Tokio suggesting that a 
clause might be inserted in the proposed agree- 
ment, that Russia and Japan should mutually 
agree to take over the military and financial 
adviserships respectively. Later, the negotia- 
tions were transferred to Tokio and in April, 
1898, the Nishi-Rosen Convention was signed, 
whereunder military and financial advisers 
to Korea should only be appointed with the 
mutual consent of both countries.' 

Whilst the negotiations for this convention 
were in progress it looked as though the 
question of the appointment of the military 
and financial advisers to Korea might create 
some trouble. 

Russian Clumsiness, 

Just at that time the Russian Government 
presented certain demands to the Korean 
Government. The Korean authorities were 
as usual very dilatory in their reply. M. 
Spiers, the Russian Charge d'Affaires, de- 

^ The Nishi-Rosen Convention stated that both countries 
recognized the sovereignty and entire independence of Korea 
and pledged themselves not to interfere in the internal affairs 
of Korea. Russia agreed not to interfere with the development 
of the commercial and industrial relations between Korea and 
Japan, and neither country should send advisers to Korea without 
the consent of the other party to the Convention. — Ed. 



96 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

manded a reply within a certain definite 
time, and threatened if a reply were not 
forthcoming within the time limit to with- 
draw the Russian military and financial 
advisers. The Korean monarch was very 
frightened and confidentially asked the Japa- 
nese Minister, M. Kato, for his advice. M. 
Kato gave him the following opinion: "Since 
the Russians threaten to withdraw their 
advisers on their own account, it would be 
perfectly correct for you to consent to the 
withdrawal, unless — ^you are anxious to retain 
their services!" 

The Korean Government at once informed 
the Russian representative that Korea had 
no need of the services of the Russian advisers 
and consequently he could order their with- 
drawal as soon as he liked. The Russian 
representative was hoist with his own petard. 
He could not very well eat his words. He 
therefore thundered at the Korean Ministers: 
*'If you think that you can take care of your- 
selves, just remember not to get any more 
foreign advisers to come and help you.*' He 
then flung out and sent the Russian officers 
home. ^ 

^ When the Convention had been signed the Russo-Korean 
Bank put up its shutters, and M. Alexeieff followed his military 
colleagues home. Col. Potiola and the Legation guard followed 
shortly after. — Ed. 



Preliminaries of the Alliance 97 

The precipitate action of the Russian 
Charge thus solved the difficulty which lay- 
in the way of the conclusion of the Convention, 
for the advisers having disappeared it was 
possible to arrange that no others should be 
sent without mutual consent. Later, when I 
met the Russian Foreign Minister, he said 
to me: ''We have recalled the military officers 
whom we had sent to Korea. I hope that 
you are now satisfied ! " I replied, '' I certainly 
should be satisfied, but since you have with- 
drawn them of your own accord, there is no 
special reason for Japan to thank you. " 

Who intervened first ? 

As I have digressed so far from my main 
theme I may as well digress a little further 
to mention another matter which occurred 
about the same time as those events which 
I have just been discussing. I refer to the 
leasing of Port Arthur. 

The Yin-chow (Liaotung) Peninsula had 
once been Japanese territory, under the 
terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. On 
account of the intervention by the three 
Powers, Russia, France, and Germany, we 
restored it to China, receiving in return an 
indemnity of Tls. 30,000,000. China raised 



98 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

the loans to furnish this and the war indem- 
nity on guarantees given by Russia. In 
payment for this service China agreed to give 
Russia a concession for a branch of the 
Siberian Railway, which was to penetrate 
Northern Manchuria. Each one of these 
steps had been planned by Count Witte, the 
Russian Minister of Finance. 

At that time there was living in Paris a 
certain M. Schion, who had formerly been 
a Councillor in the Department of Finance 
at St. Petersburg. He had resigned his post 
on account of disagreements with the policy 
of Count Witte, and from his retirement at 
Paris published open letters attacking very 
trenchantly the policy of his former chief. 
These attacks were the more serious inasmuch 
as they were based on material which he had 
collected when employed at the finance de- 
partment. Amongst other things exposed by 
M. Schion was the fact that it was Count 
Witte who had initiated the policy of inter- 
Ivention at the conclusion of the Chino- 
\japanese War, and further, that he was 
prepared to carry that policy to the point of 
hostilities, if necessary. Indeed (according to 
M. Schion), Count Witte had given Count 
Lobanoff , the then Russian Foreign Minister, 
assurances that he would guarantee the raising 



Preliminaries of the Alliance 99 

of sufficient funds to carry on war, if it should 
become necessary. 

Later I heard from my British colleague 
at St. Petersburg, Sir Nicholas O'Connor, 
that Count Lobanoff had once assured him 
that Count Witte was entirely responsible 
for the intervention and retrocession policy, 
and that he, Count Lobanoff, had only been 
entrusted with the execution of the programme 
drawn up by the Finance Minister. I am 
therefore inclined to believe that M. Schion 
was writing the truth in his open letters. 

Count Witte' s Programme. 

M. Schion went even further, however. 
He attacked the scheme for the penetration 
of Northern Manchuria with a railway. He 
pointed out that as part of it would run 
through the territory of another nation it 
would be very difficult for Russia to defend 
that portion of the line. Again, he wrote 
that the primary objects of a railway should 
not be only to connect the termini of the line 
but also to tap the regions through which it 
should pass. The value of a line could not be 
estimated simply by its mileage track. 

In my opinion, however, M. Schion's ar- 
gument on this point is fallacious, because 



100 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

Count Witte never had any intention of re- 
specting China's sovereignty over the portion 
of Chinese territory through which the railway 
would pass. 

Count Witte's programme was to build a 
railway, to create cities along that railway, 
to develop the regions through which it 
passed, and, as soon as this had been effected 
in the Sungari district, to move on down to 
the south. By this means the gradual de- 
velopment of the line would blind other 
nations, and by the time the crisis in the Far 
East should arrive, Russian power would be 
so fully developed and so strong that no other 
country would or could dare to risk opposing 
her advance. 

Moreover, by this method Count Witte 
would have been able to effect considerable 
financial economies in the construction of the 
line, for each section of it would have been 
self-supporting. 

The diplomacy by which the Count created 
the Triple Entente for the purpose of intimi- 
dating Japan had been very striking. The 
Count did not speak any English, and so I 
was never able to talk intimately with him, 
although I met him often. Nevertheless I 
could not do otherwise than admire his ability 
as a statesman. Had his programme been 



Preliminaries of the Alliance loi 

carried out as he at first proposed, what 
would not have been the result? But just 
after the programme had been planned an 
event took place which ate up an enormous 
amount of money. This was the leasing of 
Port Arthur. 

The Occupation of Kiaochow, 

However, before I speak of the Russian 
occupation of Port Arthur I shall discuss the 
German occupation of Kiaochow. 

As a recompense for the support rendered 
by the Triple Entente to China, Russia ob- 
tained the concession for the construction 
of the Chinese Eastern Railway (August 27th, 
September 8, 1896), France obtained con- 
cessions in Yunnan and along the Yangtse, 
but Germany only obtained the concession of 
a portion of the city of Tientsin for the exclu- 
sive use of the German colony at that place. 
This was not enough for Germany. She 
naturally yearned after a concession at 
Kiaochow. ^ 



^Kiaochow, according to the reputed Cassini Convention, 
had been earmarked by Russia. The premature publication 
of this famous document by the North China Daily News in 
August, 1896, gave the Far East such a shock that both China 
and Russia vehemently denied the authenticity of the document. 
The Chinese Eastern Railway Agreement is, however, so obvi- 



102 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

How Germany managed to obtain her 
enormous interests in Shantung, everybody 
knows ! "^ 

When Germany first secured the concession 
of Kiaochow, she had no idea why she wanted 
it. She took it haphazard, without any 
definite end in view. This is seen by the 

ously framed on the Cassini Convention that the denial has not 
gained much credence. There is reason to believe that the 
Cassini Convention was a draft agreement intended to bind China 
down on the Manchurian question, but not intended to be ratified 
or promulgated. — Ed. 

^ The Kiaochow Concession was extorted from China as in- 
demnity for the murder of two German missionaries in Shantung 
in the autumn of 1897. Kiaochow was seized on November 
14, 1897, pending the settlement of the diplomatic questions 
raised. In order to make the weight of the mailed fist still more 
impressive, Baron von Heyking, the German Minister at Peking, 
was ordered to prolong the negotiations by refusing to accept 
any offers of reparation made by China. Meanwhile Prince 
Henry of Prussia was dispatched to the Far East at the head of 
a strong squadron. On March 6, 1898, the leasing agreement 
was signed. Tsingtao, which is the official German name of the 
colony, has proved itself a white elephant to the German Govern- 
ment, a destiny which was perhaps expected in view of the retro- 
cession clause contained in the agreement. In 1914, on the 
outbreak of the war between the Triple Entente and Japan, and 
Germany and Austria, in response to the request of the British 
Government that Japan should put into force the terms of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Mikado's Government sent an 
ultimatum to Berlin demanding the unconditional surrender of 
Tsingtao to Japan for eventual retrocession to China. The 
demand being unanswered, siege operations were undertaken 
by a combined British and Japanese naval and military force 
and the fortress surrendered in November, 1914. At the time 
of writing it has not yet been restored to China. — Ed. 



Preliminaries of the Alliance 103 

fifth clause of the lease which provides 
that in the case Germany should desire to 
vacate the concession before the expiration 
of the lease, China shall refund to her any 
money expended on the same, and also 
shall grant to Germany a more appropriate 
territory. 

At the time of the Kiaochow affair, acting 
under instructions from the Foreign OfHce 
at Tokio, I called on the Russian Foreign 
Minister, and asked him for his opinion as to 
Germany's true intentions. Count Mura- 
vieff replied: "Probably the Kaiser wanted 
it in order to encourage the expansion of the 
German Navy." I then asked him: "Was 
your Government consulted about it?" He 
replied: "No, we were not. We were only 
informed of the matter after the place had 
been seized." 

However, the very month after the Kiao- 
chow lease was signed the lease of Port 
Arthur to Russia was signed (March 2^- 
April 9, 1898). I cannot help thinking, there- 
fore, that there was a secret agreement 
between Germany and Russia on the mat- 
ter, in spite of Count Muravieff's statement 
tome. 

In that case the negotiations with Japan 
on the Korean question at about that time 



104 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

were only intended to blind that country as 
to Russians true intentions on the mainland.^ 
What crippled Russia afterwards was the 
useless expenditure of enormous sums of 
money immediately after her acquisition of 
Port Arthur, and with no prospect of getting 
any returns. Having obtained that place 
she at once wanted to occupy Manchuria. 
As the proverb says, ''The hunter who chases 

^ Count Hayashi's assumption does not appear to be justified. 
Not only did both Count Witte and the Russian Foreign Min- 
ister explicitly deny at the time that there was any previous 
arrangement with Germany, but as Count Hayashi has earlier 
pointed out, the acquisition of Port Arthur at that moment was 
rather an unfortunate event for Russia, as it upset Count Witte's 
railway schemes. Probably the Russian statesmen considered 
that this inconvenience must be endured for reasons of strategy 
and prestige. In addition to these presumptions there is more 
direct evidence on the point. After the Boxer Rebellion the 
secret archives of the Tsung-li-yamen fell into foreign hands, 
and completely established the statement that Russia instructed 
her representative at Peking to do everything possible to block 
the granting of the lease to Germany. In Europe also everything 
was done to try to turn the Kaiser from his objective, as Russia 
had always considered Kiaochow earmarked for an ice-free base 
for her Pacific fleet. To Prince Henry of Prussia is owing the 
information of how the deadlock was terminated. In a speech 
before the German club at Shanghai he told how the Kaiser had 
met the Tsar, and pointed out that Germany was in Kiaochow 
and intended to stop there. Russia could have no claim to the 
place, because the Cassini Convention, which was the only docu- 
ment mentioning it, had been declared by both Russia and China 
to be spurious. He suggested that Russia should take Port Arthur 
and Talienwan, which would be far more suitable to her needs, as 
they could be made into great mihtary outposts, and Russia's 
future in the Far East was obviously on the mainland. — Ed. 



Preliminaries of the Alliance 105 

the deer does not see the mountain before 
him.'' Russia plunged into the absorption of 
Manchuria without regard to the opinions of 
other countries, and this policy led her to the 
war with Japan. 

Rivalry Jor Power. 

There is no clear evidence to prove it, but 
there appears to have been something behind 
the leasing of Port Arthur. Count Witte and 
Count Muravieff were really rivals for power. 
Each wanted to do something which would 
hand his name down to posterity as famous. 
It was this which led to the leasing of Port 
Arthur. Judging from the statements current 
in Russian political circles at that time, there 
was a good deal of truth in this story of 
rivalry between the two statesmen. 

About that time I met Count Muravieff 
accidentally. He said to me: ''The agree- 
ment for the lease of Port Arthur has been 
signed. As, however, events have moved so 
rapidly we have no map of that region. Now 
as Japan once held Port Arthur it is probable 
that you have a good map of that territory. 
If this is so, would you be so kind as to lend 
it to me?" I smiled as I looked at the Count, 
and I replied: ''Certainly Port Arthur was 



io6 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

once occupied by Japan, and we have very 
good maps of that region. But we have none 
of them in our Legation here. And even if 
we had I could not comply with your request, 
though if I can accommodate you in any other 
way I would be glad to do so." The Count 
smiled grimly and said: ''You are quite right 
and I don*t blame you.'' 

The intervention of the three Powers had 
taken place under his predecessor, and he did 
not at the moment remember it. Anyhow, the 
leasing of Port Arthur had taken place so 
hurriedly that he had no maps of the district 
and had come to me to borrow one ! 

Sometime after when negotiating with the 
British Minister the Count mixed up Dairen 
(Dalny) and Port Arthur, and there was a 
bitter quarrel between them, as a result of 
which the British Minister was transferred 
to Turkey. But the cause was most certainly 
Count Muravieff 's extraordinary lack of geo- 
graphical knowledge. 

Russians pro-British Policy. 

After the lease of Port Arthur, Counts 
Witte and Muravieff became estranged. The 
latter was the protege of the Empress Dowager 
Marie (he was also the son of Muravieff of 



Preliminaries of the Alliance 107 

Amtir fame), and had been promoted to be 
Minister of Foreign Affairs from the very in- 
significant post of Minister to Denmark. He 
had therefore considerable influence with the 
Tsar and the Court. His Far Eastern policies 
were very well conceived and executed. Now 
that Russia had by the leasing of Port Arthur 
obtained the much desired ice-free port on the 
Pacific, she must go further and secure railway 
connexions between the port and the Siberian 
Railway. The construction of the railway and 
the towns along it was estimated to cost about 
R. 100,000,000. 

As the result of Count Muravieff's policy 
the labours of Count Witte, who had sole 
charge of the Russian finances, were doubled. 
It was the urgent necessity of obtaining 
money which sent Count Witte to the British 
Minister with a proposal. 

Count Witte' s Proposal to Great Britain, 

Count Witte said to the British representa- 
tive: *^ Hitherto our policy has been to raise 
national loans for political purposes in France 
and Germany exclusively. The markets in 
those countries are tightening, and we must 
therefore seek a market for our national bonds 
in your country. The British Government 



io8 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

appears, however, to have but very little 
influence over the money market, and so to 
make any issues a success we must first secure 
the goodwill of the British people. Russia is 
therefore planning to give your countrymen 
greater freedom to engage in the Russian 
coastal trade, to introduce British capital 
into industries, and other commercial privi- 
leges. We also propose to send a committee 
to London, to be permanently established 
there, and they too will try to secure the good- 
will of the British public. We should like to 
have the British Government with us and 
give us all the help in its power to achieve 
our end. '^ 

Further developing his idea Count Witte 
proposed that a strong delegation of Moscow 
merchants should visit London for the purpose 
of studying the commercial situation and 
business conditions, and that later this visit 
should be balanced by a return visit from 
English merchants. 

However, this proposal to exchange visits 
was dropped afterwards by reason of the 
attitude of the City of London, where public 
feeling ran high on account of indignation 
at the arbitrary methods adopted by the 
Russian Government to quell an insurrection 
in the interior of Russia. 



Preliminaries of the Alliance 109 

Indeed, the whole proposition eame to 
nothing at that time, for the British people 
were then very ill-disposed towards Russia. 
Even so, if the Russian statesmen had gone 
about their work in the right way they would 
have been able to reverse this feeling, for 
Russia was in a position to offer many favours 
to Great Britain. 

APPENDIX 

THE FUTURE POLICY OF JAPAN 

{Summary of Articles in ^'Jiji Shimpo^^ in June 
and July, 1895.) 

Our countrymen must be warned that the Treaty 
of Shimonoseki and its amendments by no means 
end matters. We must be prepared for many years 
to come to carry on both warlike and peaceful 
measures for the assertion of our rights. We must 
not shrink from attacking both to the North and the 
South with that object in view. 

As to the permanent occupation of Port Arthur, 
that port of Fengtien, which the second article of the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki gave to us, we have had to 
surrender it. The Russian, French, and German 
Governments considered our possession of it threaten- 
ing to the peace of the Far East. They therefore 
advised our Government to hand it back to China, 
and as our only object has been the peace of the Far 
East, we decided to accept that advice and to return 



no Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

the Liaotung Territory. This is made quite clear by 
the Imperial Rescript. 

It is naturally very unpleasant to relinquish some- 
thing which has once been in our possession, and 
though we did this as the result of the friendly advice 
of the Powers, it seems an insupportable hardship 
that what we have once gained should be so lost. 

Opinions may differ in connexion with this matter, 
but as I have always pointed out, the ways of inter- 
national intercourse amongst the so-called civilized 
nations are inconceivably intricate. 

If of course everybody is satisfied with the present 
state of affairs, then there is nothing more to be said. 
But as the proverb says, "To each ten men ten 
complexions," and it is only natural to expect that 
there will be many people who will be deeply dis- 
satisfied with the turn which affairs have taken. 

But there is no necessity to advise such people to 
smother their discontent, nor to persuade them to be 
contented, nor to seek to turn them to an amiable 
frame of mind. 

It must never be forgotten that discontent is the 
prime factor which incites men to greater activity 
and dihgence. We should therefore retain our dis- 
content to spur us on to greater diligence, with a view 
to one day dispersing the gloom around us. We must 
persistently suffer the insufferable and support the 
insupportable for the sake of what the future will have 
in store for us. In this way we shall truly promote the 
strength and prosperity of our nation. 

We should exert ourselves to develop our commerce 
and our industries, for these are the principal factors 
of national expansion. Commerce and industry 
produce wealth. We must also devote more attention 



The Future Policy of Japan iii 

than ever to building up on scientific principles our 
army and navy. 

We must continue to study according to Western 
methods, for the application of science is the most 
important item of warlike preparations that civilized 
nations regard. If new ships of war are considered 
necessary, we must build them at any cost. If the 
organization of our army is found to be wrong, it 
must at once be renovated. If advisable our whole 
military system must be entirely changed. We must 
build docks to be able to repair our ships. We must 
establish a steel factory to supply guns and ammuni- 
tion. Our railways must be extended so that we can 
mobilize our troops rapidly. Our oversea shipping 
must be developed so that we can provide transports 
to carry our armies abroad. 

This is the programme that we have to keep always 
in view. We have suffered hard things, and we must 
suffer yet harder things before we arrive at our destiny. 
Whilst our preparations are in the making things will 
not be easy. Our taxes will increase, our people will 
suffer distress, our Government officials must work 
for small salaries, and amidst a discontented populace. 
Political parties will use the distress to raise political 
disputes, and our whole Empire may feel unhappy. 
But if we always keep in view the great ends which I 
have indicated, then we shall endure all these things 
gladly. 

Peace has been restored, but it cannot be a lasting 
peace. We must sacrifice ourselves, we must work 
for those who come after us, we must face difficulties, 
even as "combing our hair in the rain and bathing 
in the wind." Many will be disappointed and dis- 
contented, but they must endure all their disappoint- 



112 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

ment and discontent in silence and with a brave heart. 

If they were private merchants they would endure 
and continue struggling. As a nation we must do the 
same. The actions of great Powers are like those of 
individual merchants. Each one seeks his own gain, 
and if he cannot at once win continues with increased 
energy until he does so at last. 

The man who misunderstands the attitude of the 
Powers is a stupid clodhopper. It is no good being 
angry with a merchant because he sets his prices high. 
It is equally unreasonable to be angry with the Powers 
because their gain is our loss. 

It is not the first time in history that a Power which 
has been strategically successful has been beaten in the 
Council Chamber. Russia beat Turkey, but England 
cancelled her victory and she returned home empty- 
handed, leaving behind the mountain of treasure for 
which she had fought. 

On another occasion Russia was beaten in the field 
by England, but she was able to nullify all England's 
victories by her diplomacy. 

No modern war except the Franco-Prussian War 
has been concluded without interference from some 
outside Power. Even America, which boasts of its 
isolation, keeps good watch on the events of the other 
States of both North and South America. No Power 
is to be blamed if it takes advantage of the weakness 
of another and can gain advantages for itself thereby. 

The precedents of history teach us that no sur- 
prise should be evoked because Japan has been forced 
by a combination of Powers to evacuate the Liao- 
tung. Three Powers were banded against her, and it 
was in her own interests as well as to preserve peace 
that she followed their advice. 



The Future Policy of Japan 113 

What Japan has now to do is to keep perfectly 
quiet, to lull the suspicions that have arisen against 
her, and to wait, meanwhile strengthening the founda- 
tions of her national power, watching and waiting 
for the opportunity which must one day surely come 
in the Orient. When that day arrives she will be able 
to follow her own course, not only able to put meddling 
Powers in their places, but even, as necessity arises, 
meddling with the affairs of other Powers. Then 
truly she will be able to reap advantages for herself. 

If, however, the continental Powers are going to 
continue the Alliance against her in order to curb 
our just aspirations, to fulfil which we have poured 
out life and money, then we too must endeavour to 
ourselves make an alliance which shall counteract 
their machinations. 

The recent change of Ministry in England seems 
likely to lead to a still further anti-Russian feeling in 
that country. 

During the war with China, feelings in Japan were 
by no means friendly to England. Her arbitrary 
limitation of the area of hostilities was strongly felt 
by our military men, and it was on account of this 
that our plans for an attack on Nanking had to be 
based on Shantung. 

England's attitude is, however, not difficult to 
understand, and when it came to the time of making 
peace her attitude veered from being strictly neutral 
to being rather friendly to us. True, she advised us 
to give way before the Three-Power Note, but this 
was not because she approved of the attitude of 
Germany, France, and Russia, but because she fore- 
saw that if we were to resist war would result. But 
on the question of Formosa she strongly resented the 



114 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

French attitude, and let us know that she preferred 
us to be in occupation of that island and not France. 
For this we must be very grateful to her. 

Affairs in the Far East are now only in a pre- 
liminary stage. Russia certainly intends to obtain 
a predominating position, and in that case England's 
position in China might well become precarious. In 
this country all are agreed that the question must 
finally be settled by the sword, but England is not in a 
good strategical position for such a course, for the 
struggle would be settled on land and not on sea. 

If, however, England and Japan should make an 
alliance the problems of the Far East would be already 
settled. If the events of the late war have proved to 
the English statesmen that China is merely a big 
idol, then they may in time come to realize that Japan, 
though she is young and inexperienced, is earnest and 
energetic. China is no longer the Power of the Far 
East, nor is Japan yet it. Russia is trying to be it. 
But the real Power in the Far East is England. If 
she casts her lot in with Russia she can no longer be it, 
for Russia can coerce China by land, which England 
cannot oppose. But if England casts in her lot with 
Japan, then she will more than ever be the Power of 
the Far East, for she is the deciding factor at present. 
England and Japan together can control China and 
ensure the maintenance of peace in the Orient. 



CHAPTER III 

The Friends of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance 

I SHALL now go back to the point where I 
left off discussing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
when I was at Count Ito's house. I had 
then said in reply to a question by Count 
Inouye that an Anglo-Japanese Alliance would 
be most desirable. I had pointed out that 
an alliance was in reality an exchange of 
benefits. But as Russia was a much richer 
country than Japan she would be able to offer 
much better terms to Great Britain, and conse- 
quently it would be a matter of considerable dif- 
ficulty to bring about such an alliance as that 
under discussion. I had the facts about Russia 
which I have now related and I used them as 
the basis of my conclusions. I could only guess 
at the real attitude of Counts Ito and Inouye, 
but I formed the impression that they were in 
favour of an alliance with Great Britain. 

115 



ii6 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

In 1899 1 was appointed Minister at London, 
and in 1900 took up my post there. 

If I remember rightly it was in March, 1900, 
in the early part of the month, that I discussed 
the proposal for an alliance between Great 
Britain and Japan with Dr. Morrison, the 
famous correspondent of The Times at Peking, 
whom I met in the rooms above the Jiji 
Shimpo office at Tokio.^ 

Mr. (now Sir) Valentine Chirol, the Foreign 
Editor of The Times, visited the Far East 
twice whilst I was Minister at Peking, and I 
met him several times there and exchanged 
views with him. When I was returning from 
Peking I travelled on the same steamer with 
him. Ever since I have been in close contact 
with him, and he has always heartily favoured 
the idea of an Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 

I knew a great nimiber of newspaper men 
when I was in London, and the large majority 
have been in favour of an alliance. 

In the year 1900 the Boxer trouble broke out 
in China, and the Legations in Peking were in- 
vested. Troops were mobilized from the differ- 
ent nations for the rescue of the Legations. 



^ The Count here refers to the Kojunsha Club, which forms 
part of the buildings of th.Q Jiji Shimpo, and which was also 
founded by the late Mr. Fukuzawa. There is a private entrance 
to the club from the editorial offices of the Jiji Shimpo. — Ed. 



Friends of Anglo-Japanese Alliance 117 
Pro-Japanese Sentiment in England, 

At that time England was tired of war, 
that in South Africa having only just been 
concluded.^ She could not very well stretch 
out her arms to the Far East. The people 
of England were very alarmed at the reports 
of the situation in China. When, however, 
they found that Japan had mobilized an 
army for the rescue of the Legations they 
were very much obliged to Japan and felt 
very relieved. I was received in audience 
by Queen Victoria at Buckingham Palace 
at this time for the purpose of presenting 
my credentials, and Her Majesty specially 
requested me to convey her thanks to the 
Emperor of Japan for the prompt dispatch 
of Japanese troops to China. 

According to my judgment at that time, 
the pro- Japanese sentiment in England ex- 
tended from the highest to the lowest and 
himiblest citizen. 

On the other hand, Russia was planning 
to occupy the Manchurian Provinces as a 
set-off to and as an indemnity for the Boxer 
outrages. Then began the infamous cam- 
paign of bloodshed along the Amur River. 

England could not but feel rather resentful 

' The South African War had not been concluded. — Ed. 



ii8 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

towards Russia. She realized the necessity 
of joint action with Japan in the Far East, 
and that proved to be one of the most im- 
portant reasons why the Anglo- Japanese 
Alliance was later concluded. 

However, no immediate steps were taken 
by either England or Japan. Although public 
sentiment in both countries greatly appre- 
ciated the idea of an alliance, the Governments 
of the two countries did not then enter into 
any serious negotiations for such an under- 
standing. 



CHAPTER IV 

The Negotiations for the Conclusion 
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 

It was in March or April of last year (1901) 
that Baron von Eckardstein, who was then 
the German Charge d'Afiaires in London, 
called on me on several occasions. In the 
course of my conversations with him he 
expressed to me the opinion that nothing 
would prove more effective for the main- 
tenance of peace in the Far East than the 
conclusion of a triple alliance between Japan, 
Great Britain, and Germany. He told me 
also that so far as he could learn many in- 
fluential members of the British Cabinet, 
the Marquis of Lansdowne, Mr. Arthur 
Balfour, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, and the 
Duke of Devonshire had been of this opinion 
for some time, and that lately the Marquis 
of Salisbury had also accepted the suggestion. 

So far as Germany was concerned, continued 

119 



120 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

the Baron, the popular feeling against England 
was certainly very strong, but the German 
Government itself did not share this feeling. 
The Baron specially mentioned that two of 
the most distinguished dignitaries of the 
Empire were favourable to the idea of making 
an alliance between the three Powers. I 
presume that the two persons to whom he 
referred were the Kaiser and Count (now 
Prince) von Biilqw. On the occasion of the 
funeral of the late Queen Victoria the Kaiser 
met King Edward several times at Osborne, 
and then Baron von Eckardstein always at- 
tended the Kaiser and so he was in a posi- 
tion to know the real circumstances. The 
Baron suggested that if the Japanese Govern- 
ment should take the initiative in formally 
proposing to conclude such an alliance the 
scheme would most certainly be crowned with 
success. 

Even to-day I am still doubtful of the true 
object Baron von Eckardstein had in view 
in making the above proposals to me. Did 
he speak to me, suggesting such an alliance, 
because he had been so instructed by his own 
Government, or had he some other reason? 

There was no doubt in my mind that if 
the British Government had an intention of 
entering into such an alliance as the German 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 121 

Charge had outlined, it would prove to be a 
combination of the utmost advantage to Japan. 
I also thought that it would be an advantage, 
and it certainly could do no harm, to find out 
the intentions of the British Government in 
the matter. I therefore applied to my own 
Government for its permission to try to do so. 
I was authorized by a telegram, dated April 
1 6th of last year (1901), to sound the British 
Government, but to do so only on my own 
responsibility, and in such a manner as in no 
way to bind my Government, which expressed 
itself as not being in a position to give an 
opinion either for or against the idea. 

The following day, April 17th, I had occasion 
to call on Lord Lansdowne, and in the course 
of the conversation I referred to the situation 
in China, and explained that the future of 
that country was a source of anxiety to myself 
and that I believed that it was a matter of 
urgent necessity for Great Britain and Japan 
to make a permanent agreement for the main- 
tenance of peace in the Far East. I expressed 
this as being my own personal view. I asked 
the opinion of Lord Lansdowne on the point, 
and he agreed that it was advisable to elabor- 
ate some means for the purpose I had sug- 
gested. Owing, however, to the absence 
from London of the Premier, Lord Salisbury, 



122 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

the British Government could not at the 
moment consider this very important matter. 
Lord Lansdowne said, however, that he was 
quite wilHng to listen to me if I had any good 
suggestion to make as to its solution. As I 
was about to leave him Lord Lansdowne 
added that an agreement such as I had 
suggested would not of necessity be confined 
to two countries, but any other country might 
be admitted to it. 

Considering this last statement of Lord 
Lansdowne in conjunction with those already 
made to me by the German Charge d'Affaires, 
I came to the opinion that the British Govern- 
ment had already had occasion to consider 
the matter, and might even have gone so 
far as to seek the views of the German Govern- 
ment on the same. However, owing to the 
absence of Lord Salisbury from London, it 
was impossible to do anything further in the 
matter at that time. 

I decided nevertheless to watch the atti- 
tude of the British Government and to renew 
my conversation with Lord Lansdowne when 
Lord Salisbury returned. I accordingly tele- 
graphed in these terms to my Government. 
But I also thought that it would be difficult 
for my Government to form a sufficiently 
concrete idea of the conditions so as to be 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 123 

enabled to send me any precise instructions, 
as so far I had only been able to refer to the 
matter in a vague way. I thought therefore 
that it would be as well to have some sort 
of a basis on which to negotiate, and this 
would tend to hasten any negotiations that 
might result. Accordingly I suggested in my 
telegram that if my Government should 
decide to try to make an Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, the following basic principles should 
be adopted, on which to negotiate: 

(i) That the principle of the open door 
and the territorial integrity of China should 
be maintained. 

(2) That no country should be permitted 
to obtain from China any territorial rights, 
beyond those already granted by China in 
published treaties. 

(3) That Japan, having greater interests 
in Korea than any other country, should be 
allowed freedom of action in Korea. 

(4) That should either party to the alliance 
become involved in hostilities with any other 
country, the other signatory should maintain 
neutrality in the struggle, but in the event 
of a third nation joining in the struggle and 
attacking a party to the alliance then the co- 
signatory should take up arms to assist her 
ally. 



124 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

(5) That the existing Anglo-German Agree- 
ment with regard to China remain in force. 

(6) That the terms of the alHance relate 
exclusively to Eastern Asia, and the sphere 
of its operations shall not extend beyond the 
limits of Eastern Asia. 

The reply which I received from Tokio 
expressed no opinion on the terms which I 
had suggested, but paid particular attention 
to the possibility of an understanding having 
already been arrived at between Great Britain 
and Germany on the matter. This my 
Government considered very possible, in view 
of Lord Lansdowne's statement that such 
an agreement as I had suggested should not 
necessarily be confined to the two countries. 
I was therefore instructed that it was very 
necessary to find out whether any under- 
standing already existed between England 
and Germany, and I was again ordered to do 
this on my own responsibility. 

It was not until May loth that Lord Salis- 
bury returned to London, and letting a few 
days elapse I again called on Lord Lansdowne 
on May 15th. I asked him for his views on the 
agreement between Great Britain and Japan 
with regard to Far Eastern affairs, which I 
had suggested at our last meeting. 

Lord Lansdowne said that, first, he would 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 125 

like to have some idea as to my opinion as to 
the lines which such an agreement should 
follow. I replied that the policy of Japan 
towards China had been repeatedly declared 
and was to-day the same as it was in the 
declarations, namely, the maintenance of the 
open door and the territorial integrity of 
China. As regards Korea, we only wished 
to maintain our interests in that country. 
I added that in my opinion the interests of 
Great Britain and Japan in China were 
identical, and I reiterated that I thought it 
of the utmost importance for the two countries 
to stand together against any combination 
of other countries. Lord Lansdowne replied 
that the discussion of the main lines of an 
agreement was easy, but the difficulty would 
arise when details came to be settled. He 
said, however, that he would refer the matter 
to Lord Salisbury, and tell him my views, 
and he again repeated that the proposed 
agreement would not necessarily be confined ^ 
to Great Britain and Japan, but a third 
country could also be admitted. ^ ^ 

Next day Baron von Eckardstein called 
to see me, and told me that he had visited 
Lord Lansdowne just after I had seen him 
(Lord Lansdowne) on the previous day. 
The British Foreign Secretary had told him 



126 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

the piirport of the conversation which he 
had had with me. 

I telegraphed to Tokio, reporting the details 
of my conversation with Lord Lansdowne, 
and at the same time recommended that the 
Japanese Cabinet give the matter very careful 
consideration. Meanwhile a Cabinet change 
had taken place in Tokio. The fourth I to 
Ministry collapsed and Prince Ito had resigned 
the Premiership on May loth, being replaced 
by Marquis Saionji as temporary Premier. 
His appointment was, however, quickly 
followed by another change, and on June 26. 
Viscount (later Prince) Katsura was appointed 
Premier. M. (now Baron) Kato was replaced 
as Foreign Minister by Viscount Sone, who 
also held the office of Minister of Finance. 

On account of these changes at Tokio and 
the confusion which ensued I received no 
answer to my telegram, and as I received no 
communication from Lord Lansdowne I was 
obliged to let the matter rest. 

On July 15th, Sir Claude MacDonald, the 
British Minister at Tokio, who was then in 
London on leave of absence, unexpectedly 
called to see me, and told me that in an 
audience which he had had with King Edward 
VII. a few days previously His Majesty had 
expressed the opinion that it was necessary 



h'^'J^'S, 




Topical 



GENERAL MARQUIS KATSURA, PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 127 

for England and Japan to come to an under- 
standing in some way or another, and it was 
desirable that it should not be a merely 
temporary understanding. Sir Claude even 
went further and said that he had seen Lord 
Salisbury, whose views on the matter went 
beyond those of the King. His opinion was 
that an alliance must be made between Great 
Britain and Japan which would provide that 
in the event of two or more countries com- 
bining against one of the parties to the 
alliance then the ally should assist the party 
attacked by force of arms. Sir Claude said 
that the British Government had the idea of 
making such an alliance, but as this would be 
a departure from the long-established policy 
of the country in foreign affairs the negotia- 
tions of such an agreement would take some 
time, and Lord Salisbury was a little afraid 
that in the delay Japan and Russia might 
form an alliance. Sir Claude added that 
Baron von Eckardstein had been to the 
Foreign Office and expressed fears that Japan 
might make an alliance with Russia. 

After I had considered my conversation 
with Sir Claude I came to the conclusion that 
his object in calling on me and in referring 
so specifically to the question of the proposed 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance was to pave the 



y 



128 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

way for the opening of serious negotiations, 
and that his visit had been inspired by in- 
structions from Lord Salisbury. I therefore 
telegraphed to my Government the details of 
my conversation with Sir Claude, and added 
that as the British Government was nervous 
of a possible alliance between Japan and 
Russia, if my Government would hint that 
Japan and Russia would combine if there were 
no prospects of the successful conclusion of 
the proposed Anglo- Japanese Alliance, the 
British Government would be stimulated into 
(making a favourable agreement. 

What Sir Claude MacDonald actually said 
in his conversation with me was: "Whilst 
we are wasting time in discussing the terms 
of an agreement with Japan, the Japanese 
Government might take up the idea of making 
an alliance with Russia. In fact, the German 
Ambassador (? Charge) has been to the Foreign 
Office and said that there was a possibility 
of such action on the side of Japan. " 

To this I replied: "As you know, the 
feelings of Japan are not friendly to Russia, 
but are friendly to England. Of course 
sentiment should be subordinated to con- 
siderations of actual profit, and without doubt 
if Russia should see her way to make sub- 
stantial concessions to Japan, then certainly 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 129 

our feelings of enmity to that country would 
disappear." 

It appeared to me that Sir Claude Mac- 
Donald was expressing opinions formed by 
Lord Lansdowne after a consideration of my 
views, and was striving for the materializa- 
tion of what I had said about an Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance. Considering his remarks, 
I came to the conclusion that the British 
statesmen sincerely desired an alliance treaty, 
but were fearfiil of the conclusion of a con- 
vention between Japan and Russia. I 
thought, therefore, that we might take ad- 
vantage of that fear on England^s part, and 
by pretending that an agreement would be 
negotiated with Russia hasten on the con- 
clusion of the treaty with Great Britain. 
Consequently when I telegraphed to Tokio 
the details of my conversation with Sir 
Claude MacDonald I also telegraphed my 
own views as I have expressed them above. 

I saw Lord Lansdowne on July 31st, when 
the following conversation took place. He 
said: ''We think that the time has come to 
discuss seriously the question of making a 
permanent treaty with Japan. I want, there- 
fore, to ask you what is the view of the 
Japanese Government with regard to the 
relationship of international interests in Man- 



130 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

churia, and secondly what sort of treaty you 
would want to make with us. '* 

My reply was: '' In my opinion the interests 
of Japan in Manchuria are only indirect. 
But, if Russia should one day occupy a part 
of Manchuria and extend her influence in 
those parts, then she would be able to absorb 
Korea, against which Japan would be obliged 
to protest. What Japan wants is to prevent 
Russia from coming into Manchuria, and if 
to do this she should be involved in war with 
Russia she wants to prevent a third party 
coming to the help of Russia. As for our 
general policy in regard to China, we wish 
to maintain the principle of the open door 
and to maintain the territorial integrity of 
China, as I said at our last conversation." 

Lord Lansdowne answered: ''As regards 
Korea, England has very little interest in 
that country, but she does not wish to see 
Korea fall into the hands of Russia. As re- 
gards China, our policy is identical with 
Japan's, namely, the maintenance of terri- 
torial integrity and the open door. I believe 
that in time we might adopt measures for 
the mutual protection of our interests in 
Eastern Asia. Now, please tell me, when 
Russia proposed to make Korea a buffer 
state, why did Japan refuse to agree?'' 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 131 

I replied: ''With regard to Korea, it is 
quite useless to attempt to hold a neutral 
position. The Koreans are totally incapable 
of governing themselves, and we can never 
tell when civil war may not break out. In 
the event of civil war, who will hold the reins 
of government? It is after all very natural 
that the international interests in Korea 
should be conflicting." 

At this point Lord Lansdowne interjected 
the remark that the situation between Japan 
and Korea was very similar to that which 
had obtained between Great Britain and the 
Transvaal. Lord Lansdowne said that my 
views were a suitable basis for discussion, 
and he would refer them to Lord Salisbury 
with a view to negotiations for a definite 
agreement being commenced. 

I telegraphed this conversation to the 
Foreign Office in Tokio, and on August 8th 
received the following telegram in reply: 

''Japanese Government acknowledges the 
purport of the propositions made by England 
regarding a definite agreement and accepts 
in toto your reports of your conversations 
with Lord Lansdowne. It desires you to 
proceed to obtain full particulars of the 
British attitude in this matter. Success or 
failure of this convention depends on your 



132 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

carefulness. When our policy is fully decided 
upon the work will be easy/' 

Of course I felt delighted when I received 
this telegram. Indeed, I had never felt 
happier in my life. I had a further interview 
with Lord Lansdowne and went into further 
details with him. As I had not yet received 
the power of plenipotentiary to conduct the 
negotiations with him, I continued to speak 
with him as a private person. 

On August 1 6th Lord Lansdowne went to 
Ireland for a holiday. Before he left London, 
however, he told me that he would give the 
matter his most careful consideration during 
his holiday, and he asked me meanwhile to 
get the power of plenipotentiary from my 
Government. Matters therefore remained in 
abeyance for a time whilst I telegraphed to 
Tokio for the power of plenipotentiary. 

In Tokio a change had taken place at the 
Foreign Office. On September 21st Count 
Komura had been appointed Foreign Minister. 
On October 8th he sent me the following 
telegram: 

*'The Japanese Government has carefully 
considered the question of the proposed 
alliance with Great Britain, and has formed 
a definite policy supporting the same and 
approving the course taken by you as pre- 





Photo Gerschel, Paris 

COUNT KOMURA, JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 133 

viously telegraphed. Hereby you are given 
power to exchange officially views with 
the British Government in regard to the 
same." 

Having thus received the formal power of 
plenipotentiary I was ready to commence 
the real negotiations. 

On October i6th, Lord Lansdowne having 
returned to London, I called on him at the 
Foreign Office. Our conversation on that 
day resulted in the drafting of the preamble 
of the treaty. 

Our conversation was briefly as follows: 
^* Although/' I said, "I have received the 
formal power of plenipotentiary to negotiate 
the treaty, I have not yet received the in- 
structions of my Government about details. 
Under these circumstances would you object 
to my continuing to discuss the matter for 
the present as a private person, which would 
save a loss of time?'' 

To this Lord Lansdowne replied: ''As I 
understand from your remarks that though 
you have the formal power of plenipotenti- 
ary from your Government to negotiate the 
treaty, you are as yet not in possession of full 
instructions from your Government with re- 
gard to details, I am therefore quite willing 
to have our conversation regarded as per- 



134 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

sonal, and that what you may say shall not 
be taken as binding on your Government.** 

I thanked him and said that we could 
discuss the matter, and my home Government 
could afterwards instruct me as to any 
alterations which they might desire. 

The Marquis again agreed and then said: 
''As the first thing in making an agreement 
is to ascertain the views and wishes of the 
other contracting parties, I would like to 
know officially what are the wishes of Japan 
in this matter.'* 

I said in reply to Lord Lansdowne: "My 
country considers as its first and last wish 
the protection of its interests in Korea, and 
the prevention of interference by any other 
country in Korea. ** 

"What, then, next," asked the Marquis, 
"is your policy in China?'* 

I answered: "As I have before stated, we 
entirely agree with the British policy in that 
country. That is to say, we wish to maintain 
the territorial integrity of China and the 
principle of equal opportunity. ** 

"Very well,** said Lord Lansdowne; "now, 
what sort of a treaty do you think that Great 
Britain and Japan should enter into?** 

I said: "The nature of the alliance should, 
in my opinion, be, that in the event of one 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 135 

of the allies appealing to arms to realize the 
above objects, the co-signatory to the treaty 
should maintain and observe neutrality, but 
if another Power or other Powers should aid 
the enemy country, then the allied Power 
should at once take up arms in aid of its 
ally."^ 

To this Lord Lansdowne replied: ''What 
you ask appears to me to be reasonable. We 
think, however, that the treaty should be on 
broader lines than you suggest, and that aside 
from the specific conditions which you have 
mentioned and which would be embodied in 
the treaty, Great Britain and Japan should 
always maintain the closest friendship and 
connexion, especially in respect to Far East- 
ern affairs, and in regard to those we should 
exchange views without reserve and act 
throughout in a concerted manner. We 
think that that is very important. '* 

I agreed with this proposal, but I thought 
that Lord Lansdowne wanted to tie us down 
beforehand so as to prevent us from entering 

^ There is a striking difference between the above MS. version 
of Count Hayashi's proposed terms of the alliance and the version 
published in the Jiji Shimpo. The latter version said: "We 
should like a treaty so that if another country should attack one 
of the allies, and a third country should go to the assistance of the 
hostile country, then the non-belligerent ally shall go to the help 
of the attacked ally." — Ed, 



136 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

into any engagement with another country, 
once we had signed the proposed treaty of 
alliance with Great Britain. I said that the 
wishes of my country would be the same, 
and the Marquis ended the interview by 
saying that he would report all I had said 
to Lord Salisbury, and that as soon as they 
had carefully studied the matter he would 
discuss it with me again. 

Before leaving the Marquis I asked him: 
*'What are your plans with regard to in- 
cluding Germany in the agreement?" 

He replied: ''We think that it will be best 
to negotiate with you first and then later we 
can invite Germany to join in the negotiations 
and come into the alliance. '' 

The reason why I asked about Germany 
was because I was uncertain as to the re- 
lationship of England and Germany on the 
matter, and I wanted, as my Government 
had instructed me, to find out whether or 
not there was a definite arrangement between 
England and Germany that the latter country 
would have to be invited to join in the treaty. 

I had various other conversations with 
Lord Lansdowne following on the one above, 
and I was quite satisfied that the British 
Government regarded the proposed alliance 
seriously. 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 137 

On November 6th Lord Lansdowne handed 
me the first draft of the proposed treaty. 
It was as follows: 

''Desirous of maintaining the present state 
of the affairs in the Far East, of preserving 
the general peace, and in especial of pre- 
venting the absorption of Korea by another 
country, and of maintaining the independence 
and territorial integrity of China and of 
securing to every country equal commercial 
and industrial privileges in China, the Govern- 
ments of the two allied nations have agreed 
upon the following articles: 

*'(i) If either of the two nations (Great 
Britain and Japan) shall be engaged in war 
with another foreign country for the object 
of protecting the interests mentioned in the 
foregoing, the allied nation shall maintain 
a strict neutrality and shall endeavour to 
prevent any other nation from supporting 
the hostile country. 

'' (2) If, in the conditions mentioned above, 
another foreign country shall join the enemy 
of the allied nation, then the two allied coun- 
tries shall make common war, and peace 
shall only be concluded with the mutual 
consent of the two allies. 

" (3) The allied nations shall not enter into 
any agreement with another country affect- 



138 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

ing the interests of the allies in Korea without 
mutual consent. 

*' (4) In the event of Great Britain or Japan 
at any time considering the interests men- 
tioned above as being jeopardized, then the 
Governments of the two countries shall com- 
municate together fully and frankly without 
concealment/' 

Lord Lansdowne asked that the Japanese 
Government should most carefully study 
this draft and said that he thought that it 
fully covered all I had said about Japanese 
interests in Korea. 

He then said: ''In the Cabinet Council, 
when this draft was discussed, two or three 
members expressed the opinion that Japanese 
interests in Korea are very great, in fact 
much greater than British interests in the 
Yangtse. They felt, therefore, that the 
treaty as it is outlined there would be rather 
one-sided and too much in favour of Japan. 
They suggest, therefore, that its scope be 
extended so as to bring our Indian interests 
under it. I would like you to consider this 
point and later let me know your opinion 
about it.'' 

The above draft showed no material differ- 
ence from the substance of my conversations 
with Lord Lansdowne. There was, however. 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 139 

one very important point about it. It said 
that no foreign country should absorb Korea. 
But it did not say that Great Britain recog- 
nized Japan's paramount interests in Korea, 
and it gave no assurance that Great Britain 
would not interfere with Japan in any action 
she might feel called on to take to protect her 
interests in Korea. 

I felt that this was the whole essence of the 
treaty and must be made clear, and if Great 
Britain was likely to feel embarrassed by 
putting a clear statement in the treaty, then 
it must be covered by a secret treaty. I, 
therefore, telegraphed to Tokio, sending with 
Lord Lansdowne's draft my views on the 
same. 

On November 13th I received the following 
instructions from Tokio : 

''Regarding the draft treaty the Govern- 
ment will communicate its decision as soon 
as reasonably possible. In the meanwhile go 
to Paris and meet Marquis Ito and com- 
municate to him all the telegrams exchanged 
with regard to this matter, and try to get his 
support to the British draft. Telegraph the 
result of your conversation with him imme- 
diately.'' 

I miist now say something in explanation 
of Marquis Ito's appearance in Europe. 



140 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

Some weeks previous to this I had received 
a private communication from home stating 
that a Genro (Elder Statesmen) Council had 
been held at the residence of Count Katsura, 
the Premier, presumably in connexion with 
the suggested Russo-Japanese Agreement, and 
it had been proposed that on the occasion 
of Marquis Ito's visit to America he should 
be entrusted to proceed to St. Petersburg 
to conduct the negotiations to conclude the 
proposed agreement. 

I had learned from newspaper statements 
that the intended visit of Marquis Ito to 
America was for the recovery of his health, 
and to receive the honorary degree of LL.D. 
on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary 
of the foundation of Yale University. 

On receiving the above-mentioned private 
communication I felt that as, the Acting 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Viscount Sone, 
had sent me telegraphic instructions on August 
8th to initiate negotiations for the conclusion 
of an Anglo- Japanese Alliance, there should 
have been no reason for the Premier to contem- 
plate a Russo-Japanese Agreement, or even to 
agree to the contemplation of such an agree- 
ment by others. 

Of course the Russo-Japanese Agreement 
might not be irreconciliable with the Anglo- 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 141 

Japanese Alliance, but as the latter was 
already in course of negotiation it would be 
most inopportune to negotiate simultaneously 
with Russia, inasmuch as such an agreement 
as a Russo-Japanese one ought only to be 
concluded after mutual consideration and 
after the conclusion of the alliance. 

I thought, therefore, that the private com- 
munication which I have mentioned really 
only dealt with a rumour. At all events if 
Marquis I to should proceed to St. Petersburg 
I might have an opportunity of meeting him 
in Europe first, and as there was no necessity to 
keep the matter secret from him, I could speak 
to him fully and frankly of the affairs in con- 
nexion with the negotiations with England. 

I did not, therefore, pay much attention to 
the private communication to which I have 
referred, but went on with the negotiations 
for the alliance, and steady progress was 
made in the pourparlers. Though I had 
informed the British Government that it was 
my private individual opinions which I was 
presenting, all the proceedings were reported 
to my home Government, and the Foreign 
Minister had assured me that all my actions 
would be duly approved. Still, I felt that as 
long as the instructions sent me on August 
8th and October 8th were in force, whereby 



142 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

I was empowered to exchange views with the 
British Government, the proposal that Mar- 
quis Ito should visit Russia ought to be sus- 
pended, if he had not already left Japan, or if 
he had already started he ought to be recalled 
from America. If the Government wished to 
conceal the Anglo-Japanese negotiations from 
Russia, some other means should have been 
found not involving such dangers and risks. 

Marquis Ito had just arrived in Paris when 
I received the telegram of November 13th, 
quoted above. He had proceeded directly 
from America to France without coming to 
England, presumably as the result of orders 
to hurry on the negotiations for the Russo- 
Japanese Agreement. 

I had thought that the Marquis should 
preferably pass by England, as otherwise it 
might attract public attention. On the fol- 
lowing day, therefore, November 14th, I 
proceeded to Paris and submitted all the 
telegrams to the Marquis and reported to him 
the details of the negotiations I had been 
carrying on with Lord Lansdowne in regard 
to the proposed alliance. 

In the various manuscripts of the Memoirs there are two 
diflferent versions of the conversations with Marquis Ito in Paris. 
As they differ in important details it is considered best to give 
them both. — Ed. 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 143 

Version as given by **Jiji Shimpo. '* / 

The following is a summary of the conver- 
sations which I had with Marquis Ito in 
Paris. He told me that before he left Japan he 
had seen Marquis Yamagata, Count Inouye, 
and other Genro, and also the Premier, Count 
Katsura, and the Acting Foreign Minister, 
Viscount Sone. In his opinion it was unpro- 
fitable for Japan and Russia to continue to 
look at each other with *^ cross eyes" in regard 
to Korea. It was urgent that a compromise 
should be effected, and it was therefore decided 
that Marquis Ito should go from Yale to Rus- 
sia, taking with him M. Tsusuki as his diplo- 
matic assistant, and at St. Petersburg discuss 
the Korean problem. At the time of his 
departure from Japan the Government had 
not considered the negotiations with England 
as being serious. It did not really believe 
that an Anglo-Japanese Alliance was possible. 

The terms on which the Marquis was to 
negotiate in St. Petersburg were as follows: 
Russia was to have a free hand in Manchuria 
and Japan to have a free hand in Korea. 
Both Powers were to agree not to establish 
a naval base at Masampo. 

This was as much as it was dared to ask for. 

Whilst I was in Paris Mr. Tsusuki told me 



144 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

^ that M. Kurino had accepted the post of 
Minister at St. Petersburg on condition that 
power was given him to conclude a convention 
with Russia. 

Marquis Ito was much puzzled at my mis- 
sion to him in Paris. He had had no idea 
that the negotiations with Britain had pro- 
gressed so far and he was at a loss to know 
what to do. 

I was in the same dilemma. Here was I 
negotiating with Lord Lansdowne, getting 
out plenipotentiary powers from Tokio to 
negotiate an alliance, and yet the Govern- 
ment at home had sent Ito to negotiate a 
convention with Russia. If M. Tsusuki's 
statement with regard to Mr. Kurino was 
true, the matter was even more outrageous. 
I thought that it was most inconsistent of my 
Government to have telegraphed accepting 
my views with regard to an Anglo- Japanese 
Alliance and then to take such steps. 

I therefore telegraphed from Paris to ask 
the Government to reflect on the affair. The 
answer which I received was as follows : 

''The Government has not changed its 
policy and Kurino has been given no such 
mission." 

When I received this telegram and showed 
it to Marquis Ito he was still more puzzled. 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 145 

The Marquis realized, however, that the 
negotiations with Great Britain had reached 
such a point that the Japanese Government 
could not withdraw. So after further discus- 
sion it was arranged that he should support 
the Anglo- Japanese Alliance in principle, and 
I only gained this point after employing much 
persuasive oratory. It was further agreed 
that he should continue his visit to Russia, 
as his coming had already been annotmced to 
the Russian Government. 

I agreed not to give any reply to the British 
Government with regard to the draft treaty 
until after I had heard from the Marquis, 
after his arrival in St. Petersburg. 

MS. Version. 

The Marquis, discussing my report of the 
negotiations with Lord Lansdowne, said: 
*'It had been my intention to proceed to 
America for a visit, and before starting I met 
Marquis Yamagata and Count Inouye at the 
residence of the Prime Minister, Count Kat- 
sura. There were also present at the meeting 
other persons, including Viscount Sone, the 
Acting Foreign Minister. The three states- 
men, Yamagata, Inouye, and Katsura, said 
that a consultation must be made with Russia 



146 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

as further complications with that country 
would not be endurable. They requested 
me to take the opportunity of my visit to 
America to proceed as far as Russia, and there 
to take such measures as might suit the occa- 
sion. I felt it a nuisance to have to go to 
Europe, but I accepted their request, anyhow, 
without considering much what would be the 
outcome. I am now informed by you of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance negotiations, which 
have made such progress that withdrawal 
from them is no longer possible. It is con- 
trary to my anticipations.*' 

That evening, November 14th, the Marquis 
dispatched a telegram to the Japanese Govern- 
ment, stating that he adhered to the principles 
of the proposed Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 

The next day the Marquis told me that as 
the pourparlers for the Anglo-Japanese Alli- 
ance had made such progress he thought that 
he would rather return to Japan without 
proceeding to Russia, but, on the other hand, 
as preliminary notice had been given to Russia 
of his intended visit, he must go to St. Peters- 
burg. He said, however, that he would 
endeavour to do nothing there which might 
disturb the Anglo-Japanese negotiations. 

M. Tsusuki, who accompanied the Marquis 
as his diplomatic assistant, seemed to favour 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 147 

a Franco-Russian- Japanese Alliance or Agree- 
ment. Moreover, he informed me that report 
had it that M. Kurino was to be appointed 
Minister at St. Petersburg, and that as he 
(Kurino) had asserted for a long time that 
he would accept the St. Petersburg post only 
on the condition that he were permitted to 
negotiate a triangular treaty, it must be 
presumed that he had received instructions 
to conclude such a treaty. 

I was very greatly surprised at this news. 
As I have stated, it might be difficult to pre- 
dict which would be the more preferable, a 
Franco-Russian- Japanese Treaty or an Anglo- 
Japanese Treaty, but I for my part was 
confident that the latter would be preferable. 

As according to my instructions I had good 
reason to believe that my Government was 
of the same opinion as myself, I had been 
able to make good progress with the negotia- 
tions in London. Since the telegraphic in- 
structions had been sent to me on October 
8th the British Government, in spite of my 
non-committal declaration of October i6th, 
seemed to have recognized that I h^d certainly 
been acting under instructions from my home 
Government. 

Whilst the Anglo-Japanese negotiations had 
on the one hand reached to such a point, one 



148 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

of the Elder Statesmen had been dispatched 
to St. Petersburg with the object of conclud- 
ing an agreement with Russia. Even if it 
were pretended that his visit was only an 
ordinary trip in his private capacity, no one 
in England would believe it. 

Then there was also to be considered the 
statement about M. Kurino, that he was em- 
powered to make a triangular arrangement 
between Japan, Russia, and France. . If that 
was true the success of the one policy must 
inevitably lead to a loss of confidence in the 
other. 

After carefully thinking the matter over 
I dispatched a telegram to the Foreign Minis- 
ter on November i8th on the subject, and on 
November 19th received the reply. ^ This 
absolutely denied M. Tsusuki's statement, and 
said that the Government had no intention 
whatsoever of withdrawing in any degree 
from the position it had taken up in regard to 
the proposed treaty of alliance with Great 
Britain, and that the instructions given to 
M. Kurino had merely been to endeavour to 
obtain a settlement of Korean affairs, and 
that similar instructions would be given to 
any Minister who might be accredited to 
Russia. 

[End of MS. version.] 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 149 

Later I received a communication on the 
subject from M. Kurino, but in it he did not 
appear to recognize the true significance of 
the telegram sent me from Tokio. 

I returned to London on November 19th. 

In spite of the reassuring telegrams which 
had been received by Marquis Ito and myself 
from Tokio, I was still much perturbed over 
the business, especially as Marquis Ito was 
still going on to St. Petersburg. After my 
arrival in London, therefore, I telegraphed 
to the Marquis in the following terms: 

*^So long as it is our policy to conclude a 
Russo-Japanese Convention we should adopt 
one or other of the following courses: first, 
conclude the Anglo- Japanese Treaty, then 
notify Britain of our intention to negotiate a 
convention with Russia and proceed to the 
conclusion of the convention; or, secondly, so 
long as the Anglo-Japanese negotiations in 
London are in progress, you shall not discuss 
a convention with the Russian statesmen, 
unless they first propose it. In that case 
you must put them off as best you can.'' 

I felt that it would be most risky to attempt 
to introduce Machiavellian tactics into either 
the Anglo-Japanese or Russo-Japanese nego- 
tiations. When Marquis Ito received my 
telegram he replied assuring me that he would 



150 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

; adopt the second of the two courses formulated 
by me. 

The day after my return from Paris I saw 
Lord Lansdowne, who asked me for the reply 
of the Japanese Government to the draft of 
November 6th. I had to tell him that I had 
not yet received the reply and he then said 
that there was grave danger in delay, as the 
news of the proposed treaty might leak out 
and obstacles might then be raised. 

I said that I would telegraph to Tokio, 
asking them to hasten their reply. 

The Marquis then asked me about Marquis 
Ito's visit to Russia and expressed a wish that 
he should come to England. He appeared 
to be rather annoyed that he had not done so. 
He said that if it was the intention of the 
Japanese Government to negotiate a conven- 
tion or agreement with Russia whilst the ne- 
gotiations with Great Britain were in progress 
the British Government would be very angry. 

I replied that an alliance was quite a new 
departure in Japanese policy, and therefore 
it was necessary to study the proposal very 
carefully. That was the reason for the delay 
which had occurred, and as for the visit of 
Marquis Ito to Russia, that had no special 
meaning at all. I said that the Marquis 
^^ ! could not come to London in November, 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 151 

because in that month the London climate 
was at its worst, and fogs were general, and 
would prejudice Marquis Ito's health, which 
was not good. 

Lord Lansdowne evidently did not think 
very much of my explanation. He knew 
quite well that Marquis Ito had travelled 
across the Atlantic from America to France. 
He (Ito) had given out that he was travelling 
for his health. Why, if he was travelling 
for his health, did he go to St. Petersburg in 
the winter? The British Foreign Minister 
was very dissatisfied with my explanation 
of the Marquis's movements. 

After I had left Lord Lansdowne I met 
Mr. Bertie, the Under-Secretary of State, 
who was much more outspoken and came 
immediately to the point. He asked me 
straight out if Marquis Ito had any intention 
of trying to negotiate an agreement with 
Russia, and when I denied this he said : 

"If the news of our negotiations with you 
were to leak out and come to Russian ears, 
Russia would most certainly try to make an 
agreement with you, and perhaps offer you 
what at first sight would appear to be more 
advantageous terms. But,'' he added, *'you 
could not rely on those terms, for Russia 
would certainly repudiate them whenever 



152 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

it appeared to suit her." I said that I thought 
that this was very probable. ''Well," said 
Mr. Bertie, ''I want to warn you to be very 
careful." I promised that I would be. 

It was, of course, very natural for Lord 
Lansdowne, Mr. Bertie, and others to talk 
in this manner, and it was just because I 
knew the state of mind of these men that I 
had telegraphed to Marquis Ito the day be- 
fore to be sure not to make any negotiations 
with Russia, when he should arrive at St. 
Petersburg. I was strongly convinced, from 
the mere fact of my being approached with 
conversations of the above tenor immediately 
on my return from Paris, that the British 
Government was closely watching the move- 
ments of Marquis Ito in Europe. 

After my return from the Foreign Office 
I telegraphed to Tokio, stating what were 
the conditions in England and reporting my 
conversations with Lord Lansdowne and Mr. 
Bertie, and I strongly advised the Japanese 
Government to proceed with the negotiations 
with Great Britain, and to drop all idea of a 
convention with Russia until after the con- 
clusion of the treaty of alliance. I also sent 
a copy of this telegram to Marquis Ito, in 
order that he might be warned to be very 
careful to confine his conversations with the 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 153 

Russian statesmen to ordinary topics, and 
leave Russia as soon as possible. 

Marquis Ito telegraphed to me in reply 
that he fully recognized the necessity of pro- 
ceeding with the Anglo- Japanese negotiations, 
and that he would be most careful not to 
touch upon any vital issues in the conversa- 
tions which he might have with the Russian 
authorities. 

I also received a telegram from my Govern- 
ment saying that the Japanese Government 
had no intention of playing a double game as 
between Britain and Russia, and definitely 
stating that Marquis Ito had no official mis- 
sion in St. Petersburg, which information I 
was instructed to give to Lord Lansdowne, if 
the matter came up again in the conversa- 
tions between us. The telegram concluded 
with the statement that the Foreign Minister 
was sick and unable to deal with affairs of 
State for the moment, but the Government's 
reply to the draft agreement would be sent 
as soon as possible. 

Both these pieces of information I conveyed 
to Lord Lansdowne, and he expressed his 
satisfaction that Marquis Ito's visit to Russia 
was not an official one. 

On November 30th the Tokio Government 
sent me by telegraph the following amend- 



154 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

ments to the draft of the treaty which Lord 
Lansdowne had handed me on November 
6th. 

In the preamble it was proposed that the 
words ''Far East/' should be changed into 
''Extreme East," and the words "China'* 
and "Korea" into "Chinese Empire" and 
"Korean Empire" respectively, whilst the 
words "or any part thereof being occupied" 
were to be inserted after the words "absorp- 
tion of Korea." 

In the second article, "another country" 
was to be changed into "one or more foreign 
countries." 

In the third article, "affecting the interests " 
should be changed into "jeopardizing the 
interest." 

The following was to be added as a fifth 
article: "The alliance shall continue for five 
years from the day of signature, and if the 
high contracting parties so desire it may be 
further continued thereafter. In case the 
term of the alliance shall expire during a war, 
then the alliance shall be continued in force 
until peace shall have been restored." 

The following was to be added as a special 
provision: "Great Britain shall recognize 
Japan's right to take the necessary steps for 
the protection of her interests in Korea.'* 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 155 

Together with the foregoing amendments 
my telegraphic instructions from Tokio read: 

"The Government has presented the pro- 
posed amendments before the Throne; His 
Majesty the Emperor referred them to the 
Elder Statesmen remaining at this time in 
Tokio for their opinion on them; His Majesty 
also asked for the opinion of Marquis Ito 
now in Europe. You shall attend to this 
matter over there. But in order to keep the 
amendments absolutely secret, you shall send 
a member of the Legation staff to St. Peters- 
burg, and he shall take to Marquis Ito a copy 
of the amendments in cipher, and this shall 
be deciphered only after his arrival in St. 
Petersburg. He shall give the amendments 
to Marquis Ito for his advice on them." 

Almost immediately after I had received 
this telegram came another informing me 
that Count Komura had given the following 
note to the British Minister at Tokio, Sir 
Claude MacDonald: 

''The Japanese Cabinet, after making slight 
amendments in the original draft of the treaty 
as proposed by the British Government, has 
decided to accept that draft. The nature 
of the amendments is such as we believe that 
the British Government will not object to 
accept. The Cabinet, before dispatching the 



V 



156 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

amendments to London, had presented them 
before the Throne." 

Obedient to my instructions I sent M. 
Matsui,^ Secretary of the Legation at London, 
to Russia to Marquis Ito. M. Matsui arrived 
in St. Petersburg on December 3d, and having 
deciphered them showed all the telegrams to 
Marquis Ito. The latter did not at that time 
make any particular comment on the amend- 
ments, but it was stated to me afterwards 
that he was very pleased indeed with the 
telegram in which it was stated that his 
Majesty had asked for his advice. 

Marquis Ito thought that it was rather 
hasty of Count Komura to have communicated 
with Sir Claude MacDonald with regard to 
the amendments, and he was rather displeased 
about this. He told M. Matsui that he would 
study the amendments very carefully, and 
let him know his opinion on them when he 
should arrive in Berlin from St. Petersburg. 

He then asked M. Matsui whether he knew 
that there was a telegram from Count Inouye. 

M. Matsui replied that he had not heard 
of such a telegram in London. Marquis Ito 
then showed M. Matsui a telegram from Count 
Inouye to the Marquis in which he advised 
the latter to make a careful study of the rela- 

^ Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, 19 13. — Ed. 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 157 

tions between Germany and Russia before he 
should send home any opinion about the 
Government's proposed amendments. 

Before the Marquis left the Russian capital 
he applied for an interview with Count Lams- 
dorff, and this he received on December 4th. 
That same night he left Russia for Berlin. 
M. Matsui, so as not to attract attention, 
left St. Petersburg one day later and rejoined 
the Marquis in Berlin. He remained in 
Berlin with the Marquis for three days and 
returned to London on December nth. 

In Berlin M. Matsui heard for the first 
time of the objections which Marquis Ito 
had not only to the amendments but also to 
the alliance itself. They were as follows: 

''In both the British draft and also in the 
Japanese amendments to it," said the Marquis, 
''there are words to the effect that the absorp- 
tion of Korea by a foreign country shall be 
prevented. But in Korea only Japan and 
Russia have interests of any importance. 
England has no interests there. In regard to 
Korea the proper thing to do is to make a 
convention with Russia, and settle the pro- 
blem of that country. Even if we make an 
alliance with England it is not certain that 
we shall reap much benefit from it. 

"Besides this, according to the draft, Eng- 



158 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

land will attain the same position in Korea 
as Japan has already. It really means giving 
sJ\ to England a position in that country which 
she has not now got. From this point of 
view I consider that the proposal is unreason- 
able. 

*' Again, even if we have another country 
joining in the alliance, as Germany, we shall 
only be giving to that country the same as we 
are giving to England. That country also 
will obtain a new position in Korea which she 
had not got before. Consequently the pro- 
posed instrument would be doubly bad. 

^'The Japanese Government certainly ought 
to make some proper amendments with regard 
to all that touches Korea. The Government 
at Tokio may have been led to propose such 
hasty amendments by promptings of the 
British Government, but nevertheless such a 
serious matter ought not to be concluded 
without very careful consideration. We ought 
also to study carefully the whole question 
of the international relations between the 
European nations. Count Inouye's telegram 
shows that whilst all the members of the 
Cabinet have agreed, he himself has not 
hastily thrown himself on the side of the 
proposed alliance. According to his opinion, 
first, it is difficult to understand why England 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 159 

has broken her record in foreign politics and 
has decided to enter into an alliance with us; 
secondly, the mere fact that England has 
adopted this attitude shows that she is in 
dire need, and she therefore wants to use us 
in order to make us bear some of her burdens ; 
thirdly, Germany in Count Inouye's view 
may not enter the alliance. It is for these 
reasons that the Count has telegraphed to me 
asking me to reconsider the relations between 
the European Powers and only then to form 
my opinion3. 

"Now, my views coincide with Count 
Inouye's, and I have therefore telegraphed 
home to the Count that such a serious matter 
as the Anglo-Japanese AlHance should not be 
decided hastily, and also I have telegraphed 
my opinions on the proposed amendments, 
just as I have expressed them to you, M. 
Matsui. 

"Now," continued the Marquis, "what we 
ought to pay special attention to in connexion 
with this problem is, in my opinion, the atti- 
tude of Russia. I think that all negotiations 
for an Anglo-Japanese Alliance ought to be 
suspended until we are quite sure that it is 
hopeless to attempt to conclude a convention 
with Russia. 

"I am convinced from what I have seen 



i6o Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

and heard in the Russian capital that the 
attitude of that country is at least rather 
conciliatory towards Japan, and it appears 
to me that she is sincerely desirous of co- 
operating with us to settle the Korean question. 
Count Witte, the very day after I arrived in 
St. Petersburg, came to call on me, and pro- 
posed to me to discuss Far Eastern affairs 
with an open heart. Count Lamsdorff was 
also very polite to me, but especially I was 
struck by the words used by the Emperor 
in the audience which he graciously granted 
to me. At the very beginning he spoke of 
the urgent necessity of Russia and Japan 
working harmoniously together, and he said 
that it was his wish that some sort of an 
agreement should be arrived at between the 
two countries. 

'*I met Count Witte again after the first 
interview, of which I told you. He then 
spoke in the characteristic diplomatic manner 
repeating the stereotyped declaration that 
Russia and Japan should work harmoniously 
together. 

'*I, however, cut him short and told him 
that vague generalities would not help matters, 
for the crux of the situation between the two 
countries lay in Korea. I said that if both 
countries were going on struggling for supre- 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded i6i 

macy in Korea the inevitable result must be 
friction. I said to him: 'If your country 
really wishes to work harmoniously with 
Japan you must give us a free hand in Korea, 
commercially, industrially, and politically. 
And more than that, if civil war breaks out 
in Korea we must have the right to send our 
troops over there to restore order. Without 
that there can be no question of Russia and 
Japan working in harmony. ' 

"Count Witte agreed with my views alto- 
gether. He said to me that Russia would 
recognize our privilege of sending troops to 
Korea, and would give us freedom of action 
in that country. But he said that if Russia 
did that then Japan must undertake not to 
maintain large forces in Korea, which would 
amount to an occupation of the country. 

*'When I met Count Lamsdorff I spoke 
about the same subject. He was not so well 
disposed to my views as Count Witte had 
shown himself. He said that what I wanted 
virtually amounted to a protectorate over 
Korea, from which Japan would gain every- 
thing and Russia nothing. He agreed, how- 
ever, to consult his colleagues on the matter 
and promised to send his reply to me at Berlin. 

"In addition to these conversations," Mar- 
quis Ito continued to M. Matsui, "I have 



i62 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

made an arrangement to communicate pri- 
vately both with Count Lamsdorff and Count 
Witte, and to write to them on the matter 
from time to time. As the result, therefore, 
of my informal conversations in St. Peters- 
burg we are in a position to commence formal 
negotiations with the Russian Government 
through the Japanese Minister at St. Peters- 
burg, and this we can now do at any time. 
That is the situation in regard to Russia at 
this moment, and in my opinion the prospects 
of our being able to make a satisfactory 
convention with Russia are very favourable. 

*'I think that the time is premature for 
making a co-operative agreement with Eng- 
land. I have, therefore, telegraphed in this 
sense to both Count Inouye and to Count 
Katsura, giving them full details of my con- 
versations with the Emperor and the Russian 
statesmen. Why, in the Council of Elder 
Statesmen before the Throne on December 
7th, it has been unanimously decided in favour 
of an Anglo- Japanese Alliance I do not know. 
But perhaps my telegram had not arrived in 
time. Anyhow, please convey my views to 
Baron Hayashi and tell him that I want him 
to let me know what he thinks before he 
presents the Japanese amendments to the 
British Government." 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 163 

The foregoing is a summary of what Mar- 
qms Ito said to M. Matsui and what M. 
Matsui reported to me. 

In the telegram of August 8th sent me by 
the then Acting Foreign Minister, Viscount 
Sone, it was stated that the Government had 
decided favourably with regard to the British 
proposal for a treaty. I had since been in- 
formed that this sentence had been inserted 
at the express request of Marquis Ito. And 
when I saw the latter in Paris he had in prin- 
ciple approved the Anglo- Japanese Treaty, 
and had promised to confine his conversation 
in St. Petersburg to generalities. He had 
again repeated this promise in his telegram 
to me after my return from Paris, and again 
in his reply to my telegram reporting Lord 
Lansdowne's suspicions with regard to his 
visit to Russia. Yet, in spite of all these 
promises, as soon as ever he met the Russian 
statesmen he had plunged into conversations 
on the most delicate of matters. It was 
indeed most inconsistent of him. Just where 
his mind really dwelt it is impossible to say. 
I could not comprehend his views on the 
Japanese Government's amendments to the 
draft treaty, which he had telegraphed to 
Tokio and which were sent to me. 

I came to the conclusion that they con- 



i64 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

tained nothing which should affect the desira- 
bility of the alliance, and that the Govern- 
ment, also taking that view, had passed them 
by. 

The truth with regard to the Marquis was 
that he just changed his mind, which was not 
uncommon for him. In Tokio he was amongst 
persons of conflicting views, some for and 
some against the alliance. When he saw me 
in Paris I had persuaded him to my view. 
When he got to St. Petersburg the statesmen 
told him in diplomatic language how easily 
the Korean question could be settled if he 
had charge of the negotiations, and so he 
changed his mind again. Perhaps he is not 
so much to be blamed. 

I was even more puzzled about Count 
Inouye's telegram to the Marquis to study 
German-Russian affairs. As far as I could 
see it had nothing to do with the matter, 
nothing on earth. It raised from the very 
beginning the whole question of the general 
advisability of the alliance, and the time for 
considering the broad general desirability 
of the alliance was long past. So worried 
was I at Marquis Ito's attitude that I tele- 
graphed a statement of the whole matter to 
Count Komura, the Foreign Minister. 

Before, however, my telegram was received 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 165 

or even dispatched the Government had 
already obtained the consent of the Elder 
Statesmen, assembled in Council (i. e., Council 
before the Throne on December 7th'), and on 
December loth Count Komura had tele- 

^At the time of the publication of the summary of these 
Memoirs, by Reuter's Agency, the following note was attached: 
In connection with the Council before the Throne on December 
7th, Reuter's Tokio correspondent recently heard from an authen- 
tic source an account of that Council. 

His informant said: "Ito in Europe and Inouye in Tokio had 
been working hard for a Russo-Japanese agreement. Ito was 
dispatching furious telegrams daily to the Government and to 
Inouye on the matter. Finally a Council before the Throne was to 
be held to decide the question. 

"The Cabinet were all in favour of supporting Hayashi in 
London, and indeed so strong was the sentiment that both 
Katsura and^Komura informed their colleagues that in the event 
of the Emperor deciding against them and in favour of Ito they 
would resign office. 

"At the Council, reports were submitted to his Majesty with 
regard to the Anglo-Japanese negotiations and then with regard 
to Ito's Russian negotiations. After reading them and studying 
them His Majesty turned to a Secretary and said: 'Go to the 
Imperial Cabinet and get Marquis Ito's report on a proposed 
Anglo- Japanese Alliance when he was Prime Minister.' When 
the report was brought the Emperor looked through it, and then 
turning to the Council said: 'In this report Marquis Ito, when 
Prime Minister, most strongly advised that an Alliance be made 
with Great Britain, and nothing has happened to change the 
situation during the last few months.* The Mikado then ordered 
Komura to instruct Hayashi to go ahead with the negotiations 
and then to telegraph to Ito to stop all negotiations with Russia. 

"The Cabinet were really against Ito's proposals from the 
very beginning, but were willing to use him as a lever on England 
in order to hasten the negotiations; besides this, Ito and Inouye 
were far too powerful to be estopped from their attitude by 
anything less than an Imperial command." — Ed. 



i66 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

graphed to me instructing me to present the 
amendments to Lord Lansdowne. At the 
same time I received a further telegraphic 
explanation of the amendments. 

Marquis Ito having asked me to communi- 
cate with him before presenting the amend- 
ments, I communicated with him, and at the 
same time telegraphed as stated above to 
Count Komura, also asking the Government's 
views on Marquis Ito's representations. 

The answer which I got from Count Komura 
was as follows: 

*'The instructions which you have received 
to present the amendments to the British 
Government were sent to you after a consulta- 
tion of the Cabinet with the Elder Statesmen, 
and after careful consideration of Marquis 
Ito's views, and with the sanction of the 
Emperor. You will therefore fulfil your in- 
structions immediately." 

The meaning of this telegram was very 
clear to me. It signified that the Cabinet 
and the Elder Statesmen had totally rejected 
Marquis Ito's opinions and that the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance was to be carried through, 
and I was of course very pleased. 

I therefore went to the Foreign OfQce on 
the next day, December 12th, and presented 
the amendments to Lord Lansdowne, and 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 167 

also explained to him the reasons of each 
amendment. On December i6th I met the 
British Foreign Minister again, and on Jan- /^ 
uary 30, 1902, the treaty was signed. 

In this manner the opposition of Marquis \ 
Ito to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance came to 
nothing, although even after his return to 
Japan he had hopes of the conclusion of a 
Russo-Japanese Treaty or Convention, as he 
had suggested in his conversations in St. 
Petersburg. 

On December 12th, after he had received my 
telegram, saying that I was ordered to present 
the amendments, he realized that his opinions 
had been rejected by the Emperor, for he 
telegraphed to Prince Katsura as follows: 

''My proposals appear to have been re- 
jected. I can now only hope that room will 
be left for the speedy conclusion of a Russo- 
Japanese Convention with regard to Korea. 
I hope that you will keep the treaty of alliance 
with Great Britain in strict secrecy. Should 
that instrument be published it would create 
a very bad impression amongst the continental 
nations." 

Now I shall tell a little about the negotia- 
tions between Lord Lansdowne and myself, 
after I had handed him the amendments to 
the draft treaty. 



i68 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

It would only be confusing to follow the 
proceedings chronologically, and it might be 
difficult to make quite clear the views of the 
two Governments if I proceeded by dates. I 
shall, therefore, take the completed text of 
the Treaty and shall tell you about the articles, 
taking each in turn.^ 

In the text of the draft treaty of Novem- 
ber 6th is the following: ''Desirous of main- 
taining the present state of affairs in the Far 
East, of preserving the general peace, and 
in especial of preventing the absorption of 
Korea by a foreign country, and of maintain- 
ing the independence and territorial integrity 
of China and of securing to every country 
equal commercial and industrial opportunities 
in China, etc." 

Now the cardinal principle of the alliance 
had been declared by both Japan and Great 
Britain to be that outlined in the above, and 
there had been no question raised on that 
principle during the negotiations. But in 
the wording of the above there was a very 
slight difference of opinion. In the original 
draft of the British Government there was the 
phrase about wishing to preserve Korea from 
being absorbed by a foreign Power. But 
this referred only to the possible occupation 

^ Appendix B. 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 169 

of the whole country, and so the Japanese 
Government, wishing to cover the eventuality 
that a portion of the country might be occu- 
pied on some pretext or other, asked that 
words to that effect should be inserted, as I 
related in telling of the first amendments sent 
from Tokio. 

Then in the British drafts stood the words 
''China" and ''Korea,'' which we asked to 
be changed into Chinese Empire and Korean 
Empire respectively, so as to cover the whole 
territories of each Empire. 

The British Government made no objection 
to these alterations, but as the original word- 
ing, "to prevent the absorption of Korea by 
a foreign Power'' and "to maintain the in- 
dependence and the territorial integrity of 
China," made some discrimination between 
the two countries, the British Government 
in January, 1902, presented us with a new 
draft, containing amendments with regard to 
these points, and we accepted their amend- 
ments. 

Article I. of the treaty said: "Japan has 
special interests in Korea, politically, com- 
mercially, and industrially," as proposed by 
the British Government. But we wanted 
Great Britain to give us a free hand in Korea, 
and therefore when we presented the first 



170 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

amendments in December we inserted, as a 
separate provision: "Great Britain recog- 
nizes Japan's privileges in Korea/' as I have 
told you. We considered this recognition 
to be most important. Indeed, it was for 
us the most important thing in the Treaty. 
The discussion of this amendment took up 
most of the time of the negotiations. 

On December i6th I saw Lord Lansdowne 
with regard to the amendments, and the 
following conversation took place. 

Lord Lansdowne said: "This is a very diffi- 
cult matter, because if we put in your special 
provision which you want to cover Japan's 
interests in Korea, it would mean that Japan 
would be virtually given a free hand in that 
country. You know that would mean friction 
with Russia and possibly end in a war between 
all the Powers." 

I replied that it was unthinkable that 
Japan would lightly engage in an armed 
conflict with Russia. If we were to lose it, 
then we should find it no easy task to recover 
from the losses which such a struggle would 
inflict. We wanted the British Government 
to trust to the common sense of the Japanese. 
Besides, according to the new draft a party 
to the alliance is not called on to help the 
other party unless a second or third party 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 171 

shoiild attack the ally. Even if Japan and 
Russia should engage in war we thought that 
it would be a little far-fetched to believe that 
it wotild lead to a general conflagration. 

To this Lord' Lansdowne said: ''Well, sup- 
pose now that we put it that Japan pledges 
herself to consult Great Britain with regard 
to any action she may take in Korea?'' 

I said at once that this would be quite 
impossible. ''Russia," I said, "acts spas- 
modically and it is quite impossible to foresee 
or know beforehand what she is going to do 
next. We, too, should have to act promptly, 
in order to be able to meet any emergency 
which might arise. If we had to consult you 
each time there was necessity of action, de- 
lays would ensue and the opportunity to do 
something effective might be lost. For ex- 
ample, a few years ago Russia tried to lease 
a strip of land at Masampo. We, however, 
beat Russia in the matter and leased that 
strip of land ourselves so that Russia could 
not have it. The same thing might happen 
again, and time would be the essence of 
success.'' 

Lord Lansdowne said that he was afraid 
there would be criticism of the sphere of 
influence of the alliance, for England would 
gain much less under it than Japan would. 



172 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

He said that the interests of England along 
the Yangtse were far less important than 
those of Japan and Korea. 

I replied to this: ''I do not agree to that. 
In the amount of trade done and also in the 
area of territory affected the interests of Great 
Britain are far greater. Besides, those dis- 
tricts are to-day at peace, but danger lies 
dormant there, and it should by no means 
be underestimated. If the present viceroys 
should be removed or die there might easily 
occur along the Yangtse a greater rebellion 
than that of the Boxers. In that case the 
alliance with Japan would be of inestimable 
value to Great Britain.*' 

Lord Lansdowne said that he would con- 
sult about it and let me know at our next 
meeting. 

When I left Lord Lansdowne I telegraphed 
this conversation to Tokio, for I felt very 
doubtful of what the British Cabinet might 
think about the proposal. I suggested that 
our Government should send the British 
Government some definite assurance that we 
did not want a free hand in Korea as a basis 
for future aggression. 

On December 19th, just before the meeting 
of the Cabinet at which the matter was to be 
discussed, I received the following assurance 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 173 

with instructions to hand it immediately to 
Lord Lansdowne: 

*^Even if Japan should have free action in 
Korea, the British Government may rest 
assured that the Japanese Government has 
no intention of using that freedom as a means 
of aggression. Until now Japan's policy in 
Korea has not only not been aggressive, but 
has been peaceful. The Japanese Govern- 
ment wishes to point out, however, that dis- 
turbances in Korea are liable to occur with 
great suddenness, and in consequence it would 
be necessary for Japan, in defence of her 
interests, to act equally promptly. Whilst 
the Japanese Government has every desire 
to consult with Great Britain it would not be 
altogether possible to do so, owing to the 
resultant loss of time, whilst communications 
were being exchanged. Japan realizes her 
responsibilities towards Korea, and her policy 
towards that country will be in strict con- 
formity with the Nishi-Rosen Convention." 

Using this assurance as a basis, I at once 
wrote a memorandum to Lord Lansdowne 
on the subject, and sent it over to him. He 
actually received it whilst at the Cabinet 
meeting. 

When I saw him afterwards, however, he 
said that there was still objection to the special 



174 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

provision which we had proposed. He said 
that the wording of it was not sufficiently 
clear, and some members of the Cabinet con- 
sidered that the wording might be construed 
as meaning that Great Britain was assisting 
Japan in aggression on Korea. He suggested 
that it might be better to insert some suitable 
words in the preamble and drop the special 
provision altogether. 

I telegraphed home about this, but our 
Government thought that it might be difficult 
to get the matter covered in the preamble and 
telegraphed to me: 

''InvStead of putting the provision in the 
preamble, which may be awkward, suggest 
to the British Government that there be an 
exchange of diplomatic notes, wherein it shall 
be declared that neither Japan nor Great 
Britain have any ambitions or designs on 
Korea, but that Great Britain recognizes the 
privilege of Japan to take the necessary steps 
in order to protect and promote her interests 
in Korea.'' 

I communicated this proposal to Lord Lans- 
downe, but he did not care for it, and he 
made a counter-proposal by means of an 
altogether new draft, which was communi- 
cated to me on January 14th, and which I at 
once telegraphed to Tokio. 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 175 
Text of the Second British Draft, 

'* Great Britain and Japan, desiring the 
present status maintained in the Extreme 
East, and considering that it is imperative 
to preserve the independence and territorial 
integrity of the Chinese Empire and of the 
Korean Empire, and to permit every nation 
to have equal opportunity in commerce and 
industry in China and Korea, hereby agree 
together as follows: 

*' Article I. Great Britain and Japan both 
recognize the independence of the Chinese 
Empire and of the Korean Empire, and declare 
that they have not any aggressive tendencies 
in those countries, provided, however, that 
since the Japanese Government has called 
the attention of the British Government to 
Japan's special commercial as well as political 
interests in Korea, and the British Govern- 
ment has drawn the attention of the Japanese 
Government to Great Britain's special inter- 
ests in China, in the case of those interests 
being jeopardized by other nations or when- 
ever there is danger of invasion by a foreign 
country, then the two nations shall have the 
privilege of taking the necessary steps for the 
protection of those interests. 

"Article II. If Great Britain or Japan 



17^ Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

shall engage in war for the protection of the 
interests mentioned in the foregoing article, 
the other ally shall keep a strict neutrality 
and shall try to prevent any other nation 
from joining the enemy. 

"Article III. In case the foregoing situa- 
tion arises and another nation should join 
the enemy, then the other ally shall imme- 
diately help its ally in war, and peace shall 
be concluded only by mutual agreement. 

''Article IV. The allies mutually agree 
not to conclude any agreement with any other 
nation, which might prejudice the mutual 
interests of the allies, without consultation 
between them. 

''Article V. Whenever Great Britain or 
Japan shall deem that the above-mentioned 
interests are jeopardized, then they shall 
freely and frankly without reserve communi- 
cate with each other. 

"Article VI. This treaty shall be effective 
immediately after its signature, and shall 
continue in force for a period of five years. 

"If neither of the allies should inform the 
other twelve months before the expiration 
of the treaty of its desire to cancel the same 
on its expiration, then the treaty shall remain 
in force for twelve months from the day of 
expiration, provided, however, that if the 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 177 

expiration should occtir during a war then 
the treaty shall remain in force until after 
peace be restored. 

^'Duly empowered by otir respective Gov- 
ernments, we hereby attach our signature 
and seal to this declaration/'^ 

When Lord Lansdowne handed me the 
second draft he said: ''This draft has been 
prepared in order to prevent any attack in 
Parliament on the Cabinet on the ground 
that the preservation of the territorial in- 
tegrity of China and the prevention of the 
absorption of Korea are two things which 
cannot be considered as of equal importance. 
In addition to this, the actual purport of the 
notes you have handed me at various times 
embodying the views of the Japanese Govern- 
ment, has been embodied in these articles. 
I hope, therefore, that your Government will 
agree to thi^ draft. With regard to the 
signature and publication of the treaty we 
propose to make a public announcement 
after consultation with the Japanese Govern- 
ment. I may add that various members of 

* It has to be remembered that the drafts given in this volume 
probably differ from the official drafts at the Foreign Office in 
wording, owing to their being translated from the Japanese. As, 
however, Count Hayashi declares that they are based on the 
official records, there can be no reasonable doubt of their sub- 
stantial accuracy as regards tenor. — Ed. 



178 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

the Cabinet raised objections to the special 
provision in Article I., and I hope you will 
give me credit for having got it put in." 

When I received this draft I thought that 
it embodied all the concessions which the 
British Government was likely to make, and 
as it contained all the points raised by my 
Government, I expected that the Japanese 
Government would agree to it. I, therefore, 
immediately telegraphed it to Tokio and 
asked for the Government's approval. 

To my surprise, however, my Government 
sent me the following protest: 

"Everything in the new draft is satisfactory 
except Article I. According to the wording 
in that article, 'Japanese Government . . . 
in Korea' and 'British Government . . . 
in China,' it appears as though Japan is to 
abandon her interests in China. Delete, 
therefore, the sentence after 'the Japanese 
Government' and substitute the following: 
' Taking into consideration the fact that Japan 
has special political and commercial interests 
in Korea, and also the fact that Great Britain 
and Japan have special interests in China, \ 
the British and Japanese Governments allow j 
each other to take the necessary steps to ! 
protect the interests of each, in case there is 
any danger of those interests being jeopard- 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 179 

ized/ In explaining the reason of the 
amendment to the British Government you 
will say that Japan has at least as many 
interests in China as Great Britain has, and 
you should remember that the Japanese 
Government cannot agree to any clause or 
article setting aside Japanese interests in 
China." 

I showed this amendment to Lord Lans- 
downe and explained to him what my Gov- 
ernment had telegraphed about Japanese 
interests in China. 

The Marquis said: "That is of course true, 
but we want to make it as unnoticeable as 
possible, as otherwise the treaty may meet 
with opposition in Parliament. We shall 
have to consult further about the point.'* 

The Marquis then continued: ''According 
to the Japanese amendment the phrase ' when- 
ever there is danger of invasion by a foreign 
country' is deleted. This phrase was inserted 
by Lord Salisbury with the special object of 
preventing Great Britain from being dragged 
into the maelstrom in case of Japan, on ac- 
count of an aggressive policy in Korea, being 
involved in war with a foreign country. It 
was approved by the Cabinet, and if we try 
to alter it now, it might prove very difficult 
to secure the approval of the Cabinet." 



i8o Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

I refuted this argument by saying that 
there was sufficient safeguard against it in 
the first words of Article I., by which both 
nations denied having any aggressive inten- 
tions. 

Still the Marquis would not agree. He 
said: ''If the words at the beginning of Article 
I. really and truly express the desires of the 
Japanese Government, then I think that the 
Japanese Government ought not to raise any 
difficulties with regard to the insertion of the 
words desired by the British Cabinet. I will 
be very pleased if you will inform the Japanese 
Government of our view and obtain their 
opinion about it before the next meeting of 
the British Cabinet." 

I telegraphed to Tokio exactly what the 
British Foreign Minister had said and re- 
ceived the following reply: 

''The reason why the phrase regarding 
the danger of invasion by a foreign country 
has been struck out is because we are appre- 
hensive of the interests of Great Britain and 
Japan being trampled on in the event of in- 
ternal disturbances in China and Korea. In 
that case we are bound to consider the situa- 
tion created as being the same as if our interests 
were attacked by a foreign country. If, 
however, the British Government is willing 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded i8i 

to agree to the insertion of a phrase covering 
the possibility of internal disturbances, we 
shall be able to agree to the phrase about 
danger of invasion/' 

I at once conveyed the sense of this instruc- 
tion to Lord Lansdowne. He said that there 
would still be a good deal of opposition in the 
Cabinet to a phrase covering internal disturb- 
ances, for such a phrase might be taken to 
signify interference with the internal affairs 
of an independent country, which was an 
attitude entirely foreign to British policy and 
interests. 

I said, however, that China and Korea 
could hardly be considered as being in the 
same category with other countries, and 
history had shown that internal disturbances 
were a frequent and peculiar condition of 
those coimtries. I narrated to Marquis Lans- 
downe the numerous instances of revolution 
in Korea in the 15th and i6th years of Meiji 
(1882-3) ^^d the instances of trouble in China 
from the time of Tung Shue Tong right down 
to the Boxer Rebellion. 

I said to Lord Lansdowne: ''These dis- 
turbances may occur at any moment, and if 
Great Britain and Japan are going to make 
an alliance we might as well arrange in it for 
all eventualities." I pointed out, too, that 



i82 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

though the words in the draft, ''invasion by 
a foreign country/* appeared to be quite 
plain, yet in practice they would not prove 
to be so, and it might be very difficult to 
decide whether a certain action by a foreign 
country was or was not invasion. I said: 
''Consider the ancient histories, wherein there 
are many instances in which nations at war 
call the enemy invaders, yet the onlookers 
could not really tell, as we say, 'which crow 
was male, and which female,' and only his- 
torians, hundreds of years afterwards, have 
been able to decide which combatant was 
really the invader. I think that if we do not 
make some such provision as that suggested 
we may not be able to accomplish the funda- 
mental object of the alliance.'' 

Nevertheless the Marquis was still obdurate 
and replied that he would carefully consider 
the matter. He showed me his private draft 
of the amendment, and said that he would 
send me another draft after he had consulted 
with Lord Salisbury. 

On January 24, 1902, he sent me another 
draft, which had been approved at the Cabinet 
meeting on that day. In the new draft the 
amended passage read as follows: 

"Whenever there is danger that these in- 
terests are jeopardized by other nations or 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 183 

there is need of intervention in order to pro- 
tect the lives and properties of the subjects 
of the allied countries, then the two nations 
agree that they shall allow each other to take 
the necessary steps." We had no objection 
to offer to this amendment, except with regard 
to one or two words. We had further con- 
versations with regard to these, and very 
quickly we came to a complete agreement, and 
cleared up all the difficulties of Article I. 

It was arranged that our interests in China 
should be covered by inserting this phrase: 
"On the part of Japan, in addition to her 
interests in China, her interests in Korea,'* 
etc., and so Article I. was agreed upon as it 
stood in the completed treaty. 

The question of Japan's interests in Korea 
had thus been completely settled. As for 
the points embodied in Articles II. and III., 
namely, that in case one of the allies engages 
in war with a third nation the other shall 
maintain neutrality, and if another country 
helps the enemy then the ally shall take up 
arms in defence of the first-mentioned ally, 
these points had been discussed and agreed 
on in my first formal negotiations with Lord 
Lansdowne, and so there was very little 
negotiation with regard to them. 

With regard to the article prohibiting the 



i84 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

negotiation of any special agreements during 
the continuance of the alliance there has been 
no serious difference of opinion. The sen- 
tence in Article IV. of the treaty and the sen- 
tence in Article V., namely, "The allies agree 
not to enter into any special agreement with 
any other nation, which might prejudice the 
interests mentioned in the foregoing articles 
without mutual consent,'* and, ''If Great 
Britain and Japan should agree that the 
above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, 
the two Governments shall communicate 
together fully and frankly,'* had been covered 
by my conversation with Lord Lansdowne 
at the opening of the formal negotiations 
when he had said that Japan and Great 
Britain should always maintain intimate 
friendship with each other, and in regard 
to the problems of the Extreme East shall ex- 
change views without reserve and shall take 
joint action in defence of their interests. As a 
result of this early understanding no objection 
to this point was raised. 

On the other hand, in the first British draft 
there was a phrase that in regard to China 
and Korea no agreement should be made 
with any other country. We, in our first 
amendments, changed it so as to read that 
no agreement should be made which might 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 185 

be prejudicial to the interests of the other 
party. The British Government offered no 
objection to this amendment. 

I think that the object of our amending 
the draft in this manner was that in the event 
of otu" entering into some agreement with 
another country, with regard to our interests 
in China or Korea, we should not be compelled 
to inform Great Britain at the time of nego- 
tiation. If we had been obliged to do so it 
might have been very inconvenient for us. 
For example, whilst I was actually negotiat- 
ing with Lord Lansdowne over the treaty of 
alliance, our Government, as already narrated, 
had sent Marquis Ito to St. Petersburg 
and had even appointed M. Kurino as our 
Minister to St. Petersburg with a view to 
negotiating a Russo-Franco- Japanese Agree- 
ment. That was the reason why we made 
the amendment. 

Regarding the term of the alliance, as set 
forth in Article VI., there had been no provi- 
sion for this in the British draft of November 
6th. I had telegraphed to my Government 
recommending it to make the term for five 
years, to be renewable for a further period 
of five years on the expiration of the first 
term. The Government practically adopted 
my suggestion. Thus this matter was settled 



1 86 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

and inserted in Article V. of the first draft 
amendments. 

Another point, that of continuing the alli- 
ance, in the event of its expiration during a 
period of war, was also satisfactorily settled 
at the same time. The British Government 
made no objections to either of our sugges- 
tions on these points, but in their second draft 
of the treaty they slightly changed the method 
of renewing the life of the treaty, by insert- 
ing a sentence that unless one of the allies 
should give a year's notice to terminate the 
treaty it should automatically remain in force 
indefinitely but subject to a year's notice 
from either party. The Japanese Govern- 
ment had no objection to that. 

I have previously narrated that the British 
Foreign Minister, as the result of agitation 
by some members of the Cabinet, wished to 
extend the scope of the alliance so as to in- 
clude the protection of British interests in 
India in case of necessity. 

The arguments advanced by Lord Lans- 
downe for this were, briefly, that Japan under 
the treaty obtained protection for her enor- 
mous interests in Korea, but Great Britain 
only obtained protection for her interests in 
the Yangtse Valley. If these were compared 
Japan's interests were far greater, for they 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 187 

were vital to her. In order, therefore, to 
obtain more equilibrium in the advantages 
which the treaty gave, Japan should agree 
to include Great Britain's interests in India 
and their protection among the mutual objects 
of the alliance. 

I believe that Mr. Chamberlain felt strongly 
on this point. 

Anyhow, when our Government considered 
the matter it was not willing to include India 
in the scope of the treaty, and it was for this 
reason that in the first British draft it amended 
the words ''Far East'' into ''Extreme East," 
and then there could be no doubt on the point. 
The argument which it sent to me for my 
instruction was as follows: 

"The original object of the alliance is to 
protect the mutual interests of Great Britain 
and Japan in the Extreme East, that is, in 
China and Korea. Judging from the declara- 
tions of other Powers on the subject in 
reference to China, they also feel that they 
have interests in that country. So, by de- 
claring otir intention of maintaining the ex- 
isting status in China, the alliance between 
Japan and Great Britain is a document of 
importance to all Powers, for not only does 
it protect the interests of Great Britain and 
Japan in China but also the interests of every 



i88 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

other country having interests in China. 
The alliance is, therefore, impartial to all 
nations. But if we now extend its scope to 
cover India then it would be going beyond 
the original intention of the two signatories, 
and it could no longer be regarded by other 
nations in the same impartial manner. For 
this reason we cannot agree to the British 
proposal." 

When I received this argument I thought 
that it looked very plausible, but on examina- 
tion I came to the conclusion that it was very 
feeble. I thought this because whilst the 
argument with regard to international inter- 
ests in China was correct, the introduction 
of the protection of Japanese interests in 
Korea was just as much outside the field 
of impartiality as the British proposal was 
supposed to be. I felt that if I were to attempt 
to argue the point with Lord Lansdowne on 
the lines laid down by my Government it 
would be just like ''poking a bush to produce 
a snake.'' 

When I discussed the point with the Mar- 
quis, therefore, I argued differently. I said: 
*'If we extend the sphere of influence of the 
alliance we may be obliged to meddle with 
various complicated interests, and thus we 
may be obliged to step outside the objects 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 189 

originally intended when the alliance was 
proposed. Our Government would much 
prefer to limit the application of the alliance 
to our interests in China and Korea/' 

Later in the negotiations Lord Lansdowne 
again referred to the Indian proposition. He 
said: ''I am afraid there will be criticism that 
the benefits derived by Japan and Great 
Britain are not proportionate/' 

To this I could only repeat what I had said 
before, namely, that British interests along 
the Yangtse were in no way behind those of 
Japan in Korea, and that should disturbances 
arise in those districts, then the benefit which 
Britain would derive from the alliance would 
indeed be very great. I told Lord Lansdowne 
that in the event of the development of neces- 
sity, the Japanese Government would certainly 
act in regard to India in the manner in which 
the British Government would desire, and 
the matter was left like that. 

A very important matter which had to be 
settled was the question of whether Germany 
should be invited to enter the alliance. This 
question had been in suspense since the begin- 
ning of the negotiations, and to tell the truth 
it had been rather worrying both the British 
and the Japanese Governments. Marquis 
Ito had been strongly of the opinion that we 



190 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

should not keep the negotiations secret until 
after the conclusion of the treaty, for he said 
that if we thus excluded Germany and merely 
gave her the chance to join in the alliance 
after the conclusion of the negotiations, we 
should get only very hard feelings from that 
country. 

On November 20th, the day after I had 
returned from my visit to Paris to consult 
with Marquis Ito, I asked Lord Lansdowne 
for his opinion on the matter. He said then: 
*' Germany certainly recognizes that the in- 
terests of Great Britain and Japan in China 
are very large and that her own interests do 
not bear comparison with those of the two 
nations; even if we do not inform her until 
the negotiations are concluded it does not 
necessarily follow that she will be vexed. 
Besides, if we inform Germany about the 
alliance too soon she may use it as an instru- 
ment to advance her own interests. I think 
■thsit it would be better to wait before we 
inform her of it.'' 

Later, however, the Marquis raised the 
question himself to me and asked: "What 
shall we do about letting Germany come into 
the alliance?'* 

I replied that I believed our Government 
had the intention of proposing to Germany 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 191 

after consulting the British Government on 
the matter, but only when the treaty_had 
been concluded. 

I telegraphed to Count Komura on the 
point and he replied : 

^'The Imperial Japanese Government de- 
sires that Germany should eventually enter 
the treaty. But, until either the treaty has 
been finally signed or until all the articles 
have been finally agreed on, we think that it 
IS better to keep the whole matter secret. It 
would, therefore, be advisable to postpone 
notifying Germany until later. We consider, 
however, that as Great Britain, in comparison 
with Japan, has far more important relations 
with the Powers and particularly with Ger- 
many, the matter of notifying Germany 
should be left to the discretion of the British 
Government.'' 

I agreed with this view, and I was also 
afraid that if Germany should be notified 
she might utilize her participation in thef\ 
treaty to obtain some special interest foi^, y 
herself under it. I, therefore, communicated'^ 
my views and those of my Government to 
Lord Lansdowne. He at once agreed to my 
Government's attitude, and was indeed very 
satisfied with it. Soon after that the negotia- 
tions were brought to an end and I received 



192 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

instructions from Tokio to sign the treaty 
and seal it. 

Then our Government seemed to recognize 
that there might be some necessity for invit- 
ing Germany to participate in the treaty 
and telegraphed to me: 

'*We have left the question of inviting 
Germany to the discretion of the British 
Government. However, we would like to 
have Germany come into the treaty, but if 
an invitation is to be extended to her it should 
be done by the British and Japanese Govern- 
ments simultaneously. Inquire from the 
British Government when notice is to be 
given to the British Ambassador at Berlin 
to notify the German Government." 

I communicated this message to Lord 
Lansdowne. 

It happened just at that time that the 
German Imperial Chancellor, Count von 
Bulow, had made a speech in the Reichstag, 
attacking Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, the Brit- 
ish Colonial Minister, and he had also used 
some derogatory language with regard to the 
British army. As a result, the British people, 
who had been getting very irritated with 
the German Press on account of its attitude 
in the South African War, now became seri- 
ously hostile to Germany. Lord Lansdowne 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 193 

thought that the moment was hardly propi- 
tious for approaching Germany, so it was 
decided to wait a little. Later, however, he 
thought it might be better to informally notify 
Count von Metternich, the German Ambas- 
sador in London, not giving him the text of 
the treaty but only an outline of the same. 
He consulted me about this, and explained 
that this step would prevent Germany from 
raising objections later on. He also thought 
that by this it would be possible to gauge 
the views of the German Government on the 
matter. 

I telegraphed to Tokio asking my Govern- 
ment's opinion, and as a result it was decided 
to notify the German representatives at Lon- 
don and Tokio in the same manner on the 
same day, February 3d. 

Well, on the night of February 26. Lord 
Lansdowne hurriedly sent me a messenger 
with a message that he had decided for certain 
reasons to postpone notifying the German 
Ambassador, and asking me to telegraph to 
Tokio to postpone the notification there. 

I calculated the difference in time between 
London and Tokio and the time necessary for 
drafting, coding, transmission, and de-coding, 
and found that indeed I had no time to lose 
if the message was to get to Tokio in time. 
13 



194 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

So I sent the telegram as an urgent official 
dispatch, but all was in vain. The Foreign 
Minister, Count Komura, before he had re- 
ceived my telegram had already informally 
notified the German Minister of the treaty. 
So the British Government had in its turn to 
notify informally the German Ambassador. 
Afterwards I heard that the postponement of 
the notification was desired on account of 
some wish expressed by King Edward. 

Anyhow nothing happened, for our notifi- 
cation to Germany was only a notification, 
and was not an invitation to join the treaty. 
It does not appear either that Germany really 
wanted to be a party to it. It may have 
been due to the strained relations between 
Great Britain and Germany at that time. Or 
it may be that the German Charge d'Afiaires 
who had been at one time so enthusiastic 
about the matter had felt only a temporary 
enthusiasm and the matter had been forgotten 
altogether. Or again it may have been that 
owing to the relationship between Russia and 
Germany the latter had decided that there 
[was no advantage in joining in the alliance. 

In 1899, after the Anglo-German Conven- 
tion about China had been concluded, and 
even whilst the ink was wet, Germany declared 
that Manchuria was to be regarded as outside 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 195 

the sphere of that Convention. That showed 
plainly the real feelings which Germany had 
at heart. On account of the strained rela- 
tions between Great Britain and Germany we 
certainly took no special vSteps to induce her 
to join in the alliance, but, on the other hand, 
if Germany had been really sincere in her 
earlier overtures and had proposed to come 
into the alliance, a triple alliance might easily 
have been concluded. It is not reasonable 
to suppose that Germany was purposely 
excluded by Great Britain and Japan. 

As I have said, the first article, that refer- 
ring to Japan's interests in Korea, took up 
most of the time of the negotiations. 

That article was agreed upon on January 
2S, 1902, and on the same day the remainder 
of the articles were also approved. On Janu- 
ary 29th I received a telegram from my Gov- 
ernment giving me authority to sign and seal 
the instrument. 

On January 30th, at 5 p.m., at the British 
Foreign Office, the Marquis of Lansdowne 
and I signed the treaty. 

There was a little difference with regard 
to the formalities observed. The British 
Government was of opinion that all those 
officials participating in the signature should 
be empowered to sign by power of attorney 



V 



196 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

from their respective Governments. Our 
Government, however, was of the opinion 
that as there were no ratifications to be ex- 
changed it was not necessary to obtain power 
of attorney, and the British Government 
accepted this view. 

After the signature of the treaty, the Tokio 
Foreign Office published the text of the treaty 
on February 12, 1902. This date had to be 
selected on account of the public holidays, 
otherwise it would have been published earlier. 
The British Government published the treaty 
on February nth. As a rule a treaty of 
alliance is kept secret. The British Govern- 
ment had not intended to publish the text 
of the treaty officially, but to let it leak 
out in an indirect method. Our Government 
maintained that since the treaty was not 
aimed at any one nation as an enemy, and 
that as its objects coincided with the policy 
declared by all the Powers in regard to China, 
namely, the maintenance of the principle of 
equal opportunity and the territorial integrity 
of China, no harm could be done by the pub- 
lication of the entire document. On the 
other hand, if it were kept secret, it might 
tend to create wild rumours as to the sphere 
of influence of the treaty, and this might be 
injurious to the mutual interests of the allies. 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 197 

We, therefore, thought that it was better to 
publish the document, and the British Govern- 
ment agreed to our opinion. 

Of course, once the treaty was signed and 
sealed it would have been much more difficult 
to keep it secret. Especially if Germany 
was to be notified it would be difficult. On 
the other hand, its publication could have a 
very salutary effect on the Manchurian situa- 
tion, which was then a very prominent 
question in the Extreme East. 

Our Government, when it had been decided 
to publish, proposed to do so on February 
1 2th. That day in England was a Wednesday, 
which was then private business day in the 
British House of Commons, and Government 
business could not be handled in consequence. 
The British Government proposed, therefore, 
to publish the treaty on February nth, and 
we would have done the same, but it was 
Kigensetsu, an important Japanese holiday, 
which made it impossible. It was, therefore, 
published on different days in England and 
Japan as described. 

Our Government, of course, sent to the 
Governments of the various Powers copies 
of the treaty, through our Ministers abroad. 

The different Governments were all satis- 
fied with the treaty, and replied to our notes 



198 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

that they considered the peace of the Extreme 
East would be more securely safeguarded 
by the conclusion of the treaty. 

Only the Russian Foreign Minister was 
astonished to see such words in the treaty as 
"war'' and ''engaged in war/' He thought 
that very extraordinary. He had never 
dreamed that there ever could be such a thing 
as a war in the Extreme East, and so he was 
much astonished to find that such an eventu- 
ality was provided for. 

By the way, there was a connexion between 
the contents of the treaty and its announce- 
ment. If the treaty were to be kept secret 
there was not so much need to make trouble 
about the wording of Article I. But if it 
were to be made public, then such expressions 
had to be chosen as would not invite the 
criticism of outsiders. That is why the nego- 
tiations over this clause took such a long time. 

I have now written the history of the nego- 
tiations for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It 
was a great pleasure for me to sign this treaty, 
and it was a great success for Japan. But I 
do not think that our Government behaved 
well over it, especially in regard to sending 
Marquis I to to St. Petersburg whilst I was 
negotiating with Lord Lansdowne. He ought 
not to have been sent whilst the negotiations 



Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 199 

with Great Britain were in progress. Besides 
the embarrassment which it caused me in my 
negotiations, as the conversations with Lord 
Lansdowne and Mr. Bertie showed, such a 
lack of faith and breach of honour put Japan 
in a very bad predicament. She has indeed 
won the support of Great Britain, but she 
lost the respect of Russia and of other Euro- 
pean countries.^ 

* With regard to the publication of the treaty, Count Hayashi 
makes no reference to perhaps its most extraordinary incident. 
Three days before the treaty was officially published, the Yorodzu 
Choho, a very sensational Tokio evening paper, came out with the 
full text of the treaty. It created a considerable stir in Tokio, 
but it was denied by the authorities, whilst amongst others who 
were interviewed by the journalists, Baron v. Rosen, the Russian 
Minister, vehemently denied the possibility of such a treaty being 
entered into. The full story of how the treaty leaked out has 
never been published, but I have heard that the German Lega- 
tion gave hint of it to a certain Akimoto, who was connected with 
the Yorodzu, and he obtained the full text from a clerk in the 
Foreign Office. — Ed. 



CHAPTER V 
Later Notes on the Alliance 

[The following additional notes on the Anglo- 
Japanese Treaty were written by Count Hayashi 
in 1907 or 1908. — Ed.] 

As has been stated elsewhere, the visit of 
Marquis Ito to Russia was apparently an 
ordinary pleasure trip. Nevertheless, the vari- 
ous Governments must have at once conjec- 
tured the true object of the journey, and no 
doubt his arrival was impatiently awaited in 
Russia. 

The proposal of the Marquis to proceed to 
Russia (after my interview with him in Paris 
on November 14th) but to do nothing to 
prejudice the negotiations for the Anglo- 
Japanese Treaty was a difficult one to carry 
out. I saw that it was necessary to sound 
the depth of the Marquis's resolution on the 
point, and, therefore, I wrote to him on 

November 21st to Berlin, where he was then 

200 



Later Notes on the Alliance 201 

staying. He replied to me on the 24th, con- 
firming his opinion of the necessity of an alli- 
ance with Great Britain, and enclosing a copy 
of a telegram, endorsing the alliance, which 
he asked me to, send on to the Japanese Gov- 
ernment, if I approved of it. This telegram 
was at once dispatched to Tokio. 

When the Marquis arrived in St. Petersburg 
the Russian Government, as might have been 
anticipated, at once proposed a Russo-Japan- 
ese Agreement. The Marquis was now placed 
in a dilemma and seems to have experienced 
a very real hardship in the matter. 

In Japan a Genro Council was held in this 
connexion early in December. At this Council 
Marquis Inouye was reported to have op- 
posed bitterly the proposal for an Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance on the ground that its 
conclusion would place Marquis Ito, who had 
gone to Russia for very different purposes, 
in a most difficult position. At the time I 
received a report to the above effect from 
indirect sources, but there is no doubt now 
that such was the position taken up by Mar- 
quis Inouye. Anyhow, various opinions were 
raised at this Council for and against the 
alliance. 

Marquis Ito, as I have related, left St. 
Petersburg and arrived in London on De- 



202 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

cember 24th. He left London for Paris on 
January 7, 1902, and started on his homeward 
journey (via Suez). 

Meanwhile M. Kurino, the new Minister 
to St. Petersburg, had arrived in Paris, where 
he had already been accredited. As he had 
so many friends in France, such as M. Hano- 
taux, the ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
and others, he seems to have exposed his own 
political views to certain persons in official 
circles. When Marquis Ito arrived in Paris, 
M. Kurino met him and Baron (then M.) 
Tsusuki, and was greatly surprised to hear 
from the latter about the negotiations for an 
alliance with Great Britain. This was the 
first he had heard about it. He seems to 
have been quite unaware of any such nego- 
tiations having been in train previous to his 
departure from Japan. Yet the draft of the 
proposed treaty of alliance must have reached 
the Foreign Minister prior to his departure 
for Paris, and the Foreign Minister, perhaps 
as the result of certain circumstances which 
then existed, had evidently told him nothing 
about the matter. 

The Anglo-Japanese Treaty was signed on 

January 30th, and it was published in London 

and Tokio on February nth and 12th. The 

Ni enthusiasm shown in both countries at the 



Later Notes on the Alliance 203 

publication was good evidence that the alli- 
ance accorded with public opinion both in 
England and Japan. 

According to what we learned indirectly, 
the Russian Government believed that Mar- 
quis Ito had been sent to St. Petersburg to 
sound the intentions of the Russian Govern- 
ment in regard to a Russo-Japanese Agree- 
ment, and that having ascertained the views 
of the Russian Foreign Office, he had to go 
to Paris to confer with M. Kurino, who, on 
his arrival in St. Petersburg, would be author- 
ized to commence the formal negotiations. 
Consequently the Russian Government was 
very much disappointed at the publication 
of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, which occurred 
just prior to M. Kurino's arrival in St. Peters- 
burg. Though Japan had never officially 
declared her intention of opening up negotia- 
tions for an agreement with Russia, her 
actions diu:'ing the past year had naturally 
induced Russia to anticipate negotiations. 
The failure to realize these anticipations 
must certainly have caused Russia to resent 
deeply the alliance, and, indeed, to resent 
the whole Japanese attitude, assuming that 
that country had insulted her with a lie. 
Being a great country she naturally did not 
publicly display this feeling, but undoubtedly 



204 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

the Russian dislike of Japan deepened more 
and more. 

The statements made by M. Kurino to the 
authorities in Paris, previous to his learning 
of the Anglo- Japanese negotiations from Baron 
Tsusuki, must also have been transmitted by 
her ally to Russia. The result of this must 
have been to convince the St. Petersburg 
authorities either that the new Japanese 
Minister was a person with an extraordinary 
capacity for intrigue or that he was entirely 
unreliable and even uninformed as to his own 
Government's intentions and policy. 

Anyhow, the Anglo-Japanese negotiations 
had reached by that time such a point that 
their suspension would have meant a loss of 
confidence throughout the world. 

By the alliance the confidence of Russia 
and France in Japan was diminished to a 
considerable extent. She was discredited by 
them. 

Even in the most critical moments of a 
country's history it is most important to 
maintain the confidence reposed in a country 
by friendly Powers. In international rela- 
tions faith is the most essential element. 

The principles of the Anglo- Japanese Alli- 
ance were decided in August, 1901 ; the nego- 
tiations were already commenced when in 



Later Notes on the Alliance 205 

September negotiations were put forward 
to Russia, Japan's erstwhile enemy, with a 
view to the conclusion of a Russo-Japanese 
Agreement. The danger of such a course 
lay not only in the loss of confidence abroad 
in Japan, but in the risk of wrecking the 
negotiations with England. Fortunately these 
latter had practically come to a close be- 
fore the overtures to Russia had resulted 
in anything serious. But, suppose Marquis 
Ito had not delayed so long in, and on his way 
from America, what would have been the 
result? Or suppose the Russian negotiations 
had been conducted in Japan, instead of in 
St. Petersburg! Then certainly Japan would 
have lost the confidence of both the great 
Powers (England and Russia). It is horrible 
even to think of what might have happened. 

In reference to the relations of the alliance 
with Germany, it is desirable to say something 
more. After my first conversations with 
Baron Eckardstein, the Councillor of the 
German Embassy in London, he never re- 
ferred to the matter again. On our side we 
felt under no necessity to induce Germany to 
participate in the alliance, and consequently 
we never invited Germany to come in. Of 
course if such a step had been suggested from 
the German side, it would have been a differ- 



2o6 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

ent matter. Owing to the subsequent un- 
pleasant relations between Great Britain and 
Germany, no inducement was offered to 
Germany from that side either. 

Having regard to the circumstances which 
then existed, and in particular the relations 
between Germany and Russia, it is plain that 
Germany never seriously thought of partici- 
pating in the treaty. This was clearly shown 
by the German declaration excluding the 
whole of Manchuria from the scope of the 
Anglo-German Agreement, a course Germany 
took soon after the conclusion of that con- 
vention. 

The editor of a certain influential magazine 
in London wrote to me saying that Baron 
Eckardstein claimed that the British and 
Japanese Governments had of malice prepense 
excluded Germany from participation. But 
really what I have said about the origins of 
the alliance testifies that if Germany had 
wanted to join the alliance she would have 
been admitted. From the outset, however, 
nothing was proposed by Germany nor was 
any wish to join expressed by her. 

Naturally, as the result of the subsequent 
victory of Japan over Russia, Germany must 
have felt more or less inconvenience in the 
Far East, even though the exposure of Russian 



Later Notes on the Alliance 207 

weakness might have been a great satisfaction 
in other ways. The recent successes of Ger- 
man policy in the Balkans has probably been 
a consequence of this exposure. 

In the present day, now that the Russo- 
Japanese War has been so happily terminated 
and the Second Alliance Treaty has been 
concluded, no one in Japan would dream of 
opposing the alliance. 

The x\nglo-Japanese Alliance is the estab- 
lished policy of Japan. It is the basis of the 
country's foreign policy. It was concluded 
owing to the common interests of the two 
countries demanding it, a demand supported 
by the traditional relations of the two coun- 
tries. The alliance may, therefore, be re- 
garded as resting on the most solid foundation. 
Every effort and every mischievous trick 
having for its object the splitting of the tie 
cementing the two countries must end in 
failure. 

My story of the alliance is now finished, 
and in other chapters I will treat of other 
ancient histories. Before actually conclud- 
ing this chapter, however, I will pen the 
following incident, which is not without much 
interest. 

On January 8th of this year a certain Fuku- 
shima contributed an article to the Hochi 



2o8 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

Shimhun (organ of Count Okuma), entitled 
*' A Reminiscence of the Chounkaku," claiming 
that it was told him by Marquis Katsura. 

It ran as follows: "Origin of the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance. It was a very hot day 
(August 4th) in 1 90 1, when Prince (then 
Marquis) Ito arrived here (Chounkaku, Mar- 
quis Katsura's villa) from Kanazawa, Prince 
(then Marquis) Yamagata from Oiso, Marquis 
(then Count) Inouye from Okitsu, and Mar- 
quis (then Count) Matsukata from Kamakura, 
and in this very room conferred on the pro- 
posed alliance, the necessity for which was 
deeply felt. These statesmen fell to discus- 
sion of the clauses of the Alliance Treaty and 
other matters. So was the alliance truly 
originated. At that moment Marquis Ito 
took his 'fudo' (pen brush) and wrote on this 
'kakemono/ naming the house 'Chounkaku' 
or 'dome of a long cloud.' This Council was 
quite unknown to the public, as all the states- 
men assembled here from their respective 
country villas, and this house is qtiite distant 
from Tokio.'' 

The Opinion for a Russo-Japanese Alliance, 

"Subsequently Marquis Ito proceeded to 
Europe and returned to Japan after visiting 



Later Notes on the Alliance 209 

Russia. After his return he maintained an 
opinion that a Russo-Japanese Alliance was 
necessary. If Prince Ito had been in power 
it might have been necessary to regard such 
an alliance as essential. But the relations 
between Japan and Russia were steadily 
worsening, and it was clear that the situation 
might sooner or later culminate in a war. 
Besides, the negotiations with Great Britain 
had reached a point at which the clauses had 
been drafted, whilst the idea of a Russian 
Alliance, as Marquis Ito desired, had not 
even got so far as being ofScially approved. 
The Marquis, however, pressed his views so 
insistently that we were finally compelled 
absolutely to reject the proposal. However, 
Marquis Ito ever after appeared to entertain 
great displeasure about it. 

"The result of the conference at the Choun- 
kaku on August 4th was reported to Count 
Hayashi by telegram on August 8th." 

In spite of the statement credited to the 
Premier, Count Katsura, that the public was 
then ignorant of the conference, I, as has 
already been related, was informed about the 
conference. If Count Katsura had made up 
his mind for the Anglo- Japanese Alliance at 
that time it is incomprehensible to me how 
he could have dispatched Marquis Ito to 
14 



2IO Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

Russia and thus run a great risk of rupturing 
the negotiations with England. It is incred- 
ible that Ito agreed to the proposed alliance 
at the Chounkaku and afterwards proceeded 
to Russia to open negotiations without hav- 
ing a previous agreement with the Premier. 
Even admitting that Ito went to Russia on 
his own initiative, he could not have entered 
into formal negotiations with Russia with- 
out the Premier's approval. This hypothesis 
must, therefore, be excluded from considera- 
tion. It is clear that the Premier, on the one 
hand, decided to negotiate an alliance with 
Great Britain, and, on the other, dispatched 
Marquis Ito to Russia to negotiate an agree- 
ment, and in so doing dangerously risked the 
credit of the State. 

With regard to the statement in the Hochi 
Shimhun that after Ito's return from Europe 
he still held out stoutly for a Russian Alliance, 
it is to be noted that the alliance was published 
on February 12, 1902. According to a report 
which I subsequently received from Mr. Hisa- 
mizu, I.J. Consul at Singapore, Marquis Ito 
arrived at that port on that date. The Consul 
immediately went aboard to pay his respects 
to the Marquis and took with him a clipping 
from the local paper reproducing the text of 
the alliance, and congratulated the Marquis 




-i 



'^>'A 



Nadar, Paris 



THE LATE PRINCE HIROBUMI ITO 



JAPAN'S GREATEST STATESMAN, ASSASSINATED BY A KOREAN FANATIC, 
OCTOBER 26th, 1909 



Later Notes on the Alliance 211 

on its conclusion. Anyhow, the alliance was 
signed long before the Marquis arrived back 
in Japan from Europe. Even if on his return 
he had been ignorant that the alliance had 
been actually signed I cannot believe that he 
would have still pressed for an alliance with 
Russia. 

The "Reminiscence" which I have quoted 
from the Hochi Shimhun contains a good deal 
more about the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, but 
much of what is related is contradictory to 
the facts and entirely at variance with the 
official documents. Such statements as that 
attributed to Marquis Katsura are confused 
and wrong. As the Premier was not the sort 
of man to circulate baseless utterances through 
the Press, it may be that the printers have 
made many mistakes. ^ 

^The only portion of the "Reminiscence" from the Hochi 
Shimhun, quoted above, which does not tally is the statement 
that I to, on his return from Europe, still pressed for a Russian 
Alliance. If the "Reminiscence" read, "Ito after leaving St. 
Petersburg still pressed for a Russian Alliance," the facts would 
be truly represented, for as Count Hayashi himself relates, he 
did this both directly to Hayashi and through Matsui at Berhn 
and at Tokio through Marquis Inouye. When Ito arrived back 
the Cabinet were so afraid of his criticism that M. Kate was sent 
to Nagasaki to appease him. — Ed. 



CHAPTER VI 
The Franco-Japanese Agreement 

The Franco- Japanese Agreement had its 
origin in Paris. I have in the chapter deal- 
ing with the Anglo- Japanese Alliance related 
that M. Kurino, formerly the Japanese Min- 
ister in Paris, and later in St. Petersburg, 
was a person of marked pro-French sentiment, 
and there were also at that time in France 
many important people of pro-Japanese sen- 
timent. Amongst the most noteworthy of 
these were M. Lanessan, who had formerly 
held the post of Governor-General of Annam 
and Cochin-China and later the post of 
Minister of Marine. He was one of the 
most earnest advocates of a Franco- Japanese 
rapprochement. 

As has been related earlier, M. Kurino^ 
and other persons who held the same view 

' Kurino, Viscount Shin-ichiro, b. 1852. Minister at Washing- 
ton, 1894; at Rome, 1896; at Paris, 1897; at St. Petersburg, 1901 
until February, 1904; at Paris, 1906-1912. 

212 



The Franco-Japanese Agreement 213 

as he did expected at first to sign a Franco- 
Japanese Treaty. But the negotiations be- 
tween Great Britain and Japan having 
culminated in an Anglo- Japanese Alliance 
the proposals for an arrangement with France 
fell into the background. 

Then followed the Russo-Japanese War, 
which was itself followed by an Anglo-French 
rapprochement. As the result of the Treaty 
of Portsmouth the last barriers to a Franco- 
Japanese entente were removed, and ideas 
with regard to a formal convention were 
revived. 

In general the French people were friendly 
to Japan, but as the result of the Russo- 
Japanese War and the previous incidents of 
the three-Power intervention with regard to 
the retrocession of Port Arthur, and owing 
to the close relations which existed between 
France and Russia, which resulted in the 
flagrant disregard of international law and 
neutrality by France in regard to her actions 
at Madagascar and Kamranh Bay, the idea 
was prevalent in France that although the 
French were in themselves amicably inclined 
to Japan, yet the Japanese were not desirous 
of being friendly to France. The majority 
of French people believed that the Japanese 
deeply resented the French course of action, 



214 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

and were sincerely afraid that one day the 
French colonies in Annam would be attacked 
by the Japanese. There is good reason to 
believe that the breach of neutrality com- 
mitted by the French during the war might 
have seriously affected the feelings of the 
Japanese people, and if the Japanese had 
been defeated in the naval battle of the Straits 
of Tsushima then indeed the Japanese hos- 
tility towards the French would have been a 
permanent one. As things turned out, how- 
ever, the Japanese victory was overwhelming, 
and the excitement and satisfaction of the 
Japanese nation entirely overshadowed any 
resentment they felt against France on account 
of the breaches of neutrality. In their tri- 
umph after the war they entirely forgot the 
affair. 

At the time when the idea was revived in 
Japan for an agreement with France to be 
made, the French people still felt considerable 
anxiety on the point. Such being the cir- 
cumstances, pro-Japanese Frenchmen and 
pro-French Japanese made considerable exer- 
tions to try to remove the barriers and mis- 
understandings which existed between the two 
countries, and as the result their endeavours 
were crowned by the successful negotiation 
of the Franco-Japanese Agreement. 



The Franco-Japanese Agreement 215 

The True Significance of the Convention, 

Apparently the agreement seems to have 
no especial significance, but if it has been 
closely watched it will have been seen that 
Japan has for instance commercial rela- 
tions with the province of Fukien, which is 
situated on the mainland opposite to the 
island of Formosa. Japanese influence in 
that province dates from the time when the 
Japanese occupied the island of Formosa, 
which was formerly attached to the province 
of Fukien. 

The inhabitants of Formosa are mostly 
Chinese originally from Fukien, and they 
maintain the most intimate connexion between 
the island and the mainland, and in case of 
trouble in Fukien steps would at once have 
to be taken to prevent the disturbances 
overflowing to the island and affecting its 
inhabitants. 

Quite similar conditions might be antici- 
pated in the neighbourhood of Annam, and 
consequently it was a matter of the utmost 
importance and of great mutual benefit that 
France and Japan should take steps to avoid 
as far as possible incurring trouble such as 
I have suggested. There is, however, no 



2i6 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

intention nor idea, as has been suggested, 
that the one country should lend military aid 
to the other in case of necessity. 

The ''open door and equal opportunity" 
are quite ordinary principles, but where spe- 
cial relations and special interests exist then 
other means have to be considered. Great 
Britain was the first to realize this, and for a 
long time she paid very special attention to 
the protection of her special interests in the 
Yangtse Valley, in Canton, and in Kowloon. 
Similar efforts have been made by Germany 
in Shantung in the neighbourhood of the 
leased territory of Kiaocliow. 

Logically speaking, there is no special 
sphere of influence created in either case, but 
in principle special efforts have been made to 
protect and safeguard the points of greatest 
interest to the nation in question. 

In the preamble of the Franco- Japanese 
Treaty only the principle of the open door 
is mentioned, but in the succeeding articles 
something which very much resembles the 
significance of the sphere of influence is to be 
found. The introduction of this caused very 
great difficulties in the drafting of the treaty. 

As the Chinese were more closely interested 
in the treaty than the Japanese they naturally 



The Franco-Japanese Agreement 217 

gave much more careful consideration to the 
wording of the treaty. 

At the time of its publication the vernacu- 
lar papers in Shanghai made various com- 
ments on the treaty, but as a matter of fact 
there was no special meaning latent behind 
the wording of the published article guaran- 
teeing the peace and safety of the parts 
neighbouring on the territories of the high 
contracting parties. The whole policy of 
the Franco-Japanese Treaty did in fact aim 
at the avoidance of all trouble in the provinces 
neighbouring on the French and Japanese 
possessions. 

There is no reason whatsoever for any fear 
from the side of the Chinese. In certain 
cases of comment on the Japanese side it 
was claimed that the sphere of influence was 
restricted, and a certain Japanese who spoke 
to me on the matter said that the treaty 
would not prove so simple a one as it 
looked. 

Another advantage which we have gained 
by it is an improvement of our commercial 
position in Annam. Before the treaty was 
signed the Japanese were not very favourably 
considered in that country, but by virtue of 
the declaration attached to the treaty they 
will be able to receive the most favourable 



2i8 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

nation treatment, and obtain thereby very 
considerable benefits. 

In addition to the above advantage, the 
treaty has already had and will continue to 
have good fruit in dissipating the suspicions 
of the French people. Already we have expe- 
rienced material benefits from it in connexion 
with the floating of Japanese bonds on the 
French market. 

In reference to the conclusion of the treaty 
I may admit that it was most earnestly advo- 
cated by Marquis Inouye, whilst Princes Ito 
and Yamagata and Marquis Katsura gave 
it strong support. In fact, these statesmen 
were consistently consulted on phases of its 
policy by the late (vSaionji) Cabinet, and 
therefore the present (Katsura) Cabinet has 
no good grounds for attacking its predecessor. 

The treaty with France was signed on 
June 10, 1907. 

Note. — The text of the Franco- Japanese Agree- 
ment will be found in Appendix C. 

The Franco- Japanese Agreement is worth a good 
deal more attention than Count Hayashi gives it in 
his Memoirs^ although, reading between the lines, 
the reasons for his somewhat curt dismissal of it are 
fairly obvious. In his statement the Count puts on 
record that the Japanese Foreign Office, whilst openly 
supposed to be supporting the policy of the open door, 



The Franco-Japanese Agreement 219 

was in fact maintaining the old policy of the "sphere 
of influence." In doing so the Count entirely sub- 
stantiates the charges of bad faith that have again 
and again been brought against the Japanese Foreign 
Office by all classes trading in China, and especially 
with Manchuria and parts where Japan has obtained 
a special hold. 

The Franco- Japanese Agreement, looked at from 
another point of view, was a natural corollary of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance and a complement of the 
Russo-Japanese Convention, signed in the same 
year. These three agreements practically closed 
the ring round China for the exclusive benefit of 
what has been described as the China Pooling 
Syndicate. This consisted of Great Britain, Japan, 
Russia, and France, and excluded Germany and the 
United States. Nevertheless, highly satisfied as 
Count Hayashi was with the result of his labours 
and confident as he was of the approval the agree- 
ment should receive, it did not in fact find as warm 
a welcome as he hoped. In Japan a considerable 
party, unfavourably inclined to the general policy 
of the Cabinet, considered it not only as superfluous, 
but as actually introducing into the China situation 
a fourth party, whose interests had hitherto been 
looked after by Russia. A writer in Kokumin Shim- 
bun, the organ of the Katsura faction, said: "France 
is not nearly so interested in China as Japan, yet 
the new treaty elevates her to an equal position with 
Japan as a guardian of the integrity of China." 

The Spectator, in a long and truly remarkable 
criticism, which is quoted at length by Mr. Putnam 
Weale in The Coming Struggle in Eastern Asia, pointed 
out that a ring composed of Britain, France, Russia, 



220 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

and Japan to control China, would prove ineffective 
so long as Germany and America were excluded. 
The weekly review pointed out that Japan's policy 
of ignoring Germany and keeping that country out- 
side the charmed circle was wrong and stupid. 
*' China," said the writer of the article, "interests 
the traders of Berlin as much as those of London. 
If the other Powers deliberately excluded Germany 
it was not impossible that that country might find 
the means of posing to China as a disinterested adviser. 
When Germany holds aloof from any great arrange- 
ment the arrangement can hardly be accepted as 
being final." 

Those who followed the Quintuple Loan negotia- 
tions in Peking will realize that this prophecy was 
then fulfilled. Even to-day, in spite of the fall of 
Tsingtau, Germany is more respected in Peking than 
any other European Power, because she was the 
only one which appeared to have no political axe 
to grind as the price of her participation in the loan. 
It will be an interesting study for the historian of 
the future to resolve to what extent German dislike 
of Great Britain has been due to her considered exclu- 
sion from the international agreements intended to 
settle the fate of China. It does not make very 
much difference to the problem that these agreements, 
as the Revolution has shown, have but little real 
influence on the ultimate fate of the country. The 
exclusion of the United States referred to in the 
article quoted was to some extent remedied by 
the Root-Takahira Agreement mentioned in another 
chapter. 

The policy advocated by the Spectator was as ill- 
advised as that which it condemned. It was simply 



The Franco-Japanese Agreement ^21 

to get all the Powers without exception into a ring 
and then to force China to accept the domination 
of the West, whatsoever form it might take. The 
very idea of dominating a nation of 400,000,000 is 
humorous. A Mohammedan is reported to have 
once said to an Indian official: "If we were really 
to rise against the British we should only have to 
throw our turbans on top of you to stifle you all." 
When the Chinese Revolution broke out in 191 1 
the writer was on his way to the Far East. A mis- 
sionary in the train said: "Well, if they really rise 
against the foreigners and only march on us with 
sticks in their hands, no power on earth could save 
us." 

The Chinese vernacular Press was able to see be- 
hind the wording of the treaty as clearly as its author. 
To them it was nothing but a revival of the spheres 
of influence and of the policy of grab. The following 
passage from the Nan Fang Pao is eloquent of dis- 
trust and disgust: "The publication of the text of the 
Franco-Japanese Agreement has naturally created a 
stir in the Chinese world, but the effect produced, 
if the pronouncements of the Chinese Press are any 
indication, is quite the reverse of that on foreigners, 
as expressed by the tone of the British Press. Our 
newspapers can see nothing to congratulate China 
on in the agreement, and cannot say with any show 
of unction that the integrity of our country is more 
strongly assured by the consummation of the entente 
or that the peace of the Far East is rendered more 
secure. 

"Nearly all the papers realize the importance of 
the agreement in its effect on China, though that 
such an agreement could be effected at all came 



222 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

somewhat as a surprise to them. The traditional 
and innate contempt of the white race for the yellow 
race would seem to be an insurmountable obstacle 
to bring about any understanding; and the world 
is now treated to the spectacle of first an Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance and now a Franco-Japanese Agree- 
ment — an agreement which further receives the moral 
support of Great Britain and Russia. By the con- 
clusion of the agreement, two nations, if we exclude 
the contracting parties, are directly or indirectly 
affected by it, namely, Germany and China. The 
former is made to feel her isolated position, while the 
interests of the latter are placed in greater jeopardy 
than before. 

"What strikes the Chinese Press as somewhat 
meaningless is the eternal reiteration on the part of 
certain Powers of their intention to respect the in- 
dependence and integrity of China. As one of the 
papers said, such a settlement can only tickle the 
ears of our effete and blind Government, but it has 
not a sufficient ring of sincerity about it to deceive 
the people. By the terms of the agreement the 
influence of Japan and of France in the Chinese 
Empire is greatly strengthened. Whatever has been 
leased by the Chinese Government is now almost 
invested with the rights of occupation, and whatever 
has not been leased, but is bordering on the leased 
territory, is in danger of being enclosed in the same. 

"After the Chino- Japanese War the Japanese 
sphere of influence in China was confined to the 
Province of Fukien, and now we are informed that on 
account of the Japanese interests in the Liaotung 
Peninsula both Chihli and Shantung have been in- 
cluded. The sphere of France is also greatly extended 



The Franco-Japanese Agreement 223 

by the terms of this agreement. At first it was only 
her vague ambitions that the provinces of Yunnan, 
Kuangtung, and Kuangsi, should be her share in the 
despoiling of China, but in the past few years we 
have seen the gradual growth of her ambition, till 
now the provinces are to become in reality the reward 
of her many years of scheming. It is to be noted 
that the tactics of France and Japan in their under- 
mining of China's integrity and independence have 
been almost identical. The former first detached 
Annam from China's suzerainty, then seized the 
region itself, and gradually encroached on the borders 
of Yunnan and the two Kuangs till now she is stretch- 
ing her arms even to the interior of those provinces; 
while with Japan Korea was her first object, from 
which she directed her attention to Manchuria, and 
now Chihli and Shantung are to be enclosed within 
her grasp. 

''The Anglo- Japanese Alliance was claimed to be 
concluded to preserve the peace of the Far East, but 
the devastated condition of Manchuria bears eloquent 
witness to the validity or otherwise of the claim. 
Let us hope and pray that the Franco- Japanese 
Agreement, which starts out with language of similar 
strain of function, may not end as disastrously for 
our Empire." 

With the above may be compared the following 
passage from the Memoirs of Li Hung- Chang (Foster) : 

"Foreigners say that they lease our lands. We^ 
know that they are gone for ever." — Ed. 



CHAPTER VII 

The Russo-Japanese Convention 

1907 

Last year when the Saionji Cabinet col- 
lapsed and the present second Katsura Cabinet 
was formed, financial re-adjustment and the 
improvement of our foreign policy were de- 
clared to be the principal planks in the plat- 
form of the new Ministry. These two reforms 
which we, the Saionji Cabinet, were declared 
to have essayed so badly, will only be prop- 
erly carried through by the successes which 
we attained. 

At the time that the Budget of 1908- 1909 
was formulated the ex-Premier Marquis Kat- 
sura was closely consulted by the Ministry, 
and to a certain extent he was morally respon- 
sible for that Budget. 

With regard to the Budget of 1909-1910, 

the Saionji Cabinet had fallen before any 

steps were taken to prepare it, and as a con- 

224 



Russo-Japanese Convention, 1907 225 

sequence is in no way responsible for any 
part of it. It was drawn up by the present 
Cabinet, who alone are answerable for its 
unexpected and unsatisfactory nature. We 
could certainly have drawn up as good a 
Budget and perhaps a better one. 

As financial matters were not under my 
control when I was a Minister of State, and 
as, further, I am not well acquainted with 
matters of finance, I had to content myself 
with the explanations offered to the Cabinet 
by the Minister of Finance, and as long as 
those explanations seemed satisfactory to the 
Cabinet I gave my approval also. 

I do not think, however, that such a con- 
dition of affairs is very satisfactory. The 
financial policy of the Government must 
affect very closely the foreign policy. The 
financial policy of a country, especially if it 
is a creditor country, directly affects foreign 
countries. The Minister of Finance ought, 
therefore, to be a real financial expert, capable 
of properly explaining the true conditions of 
Japanese finances, so as to carry weight with 
the investing public, both Japanese and for- 
eign. With regard to foreign affairs, I would 
even go so far as to advocate a similar course 
being adopted. 

I held in the Saionji Cabinet the responsible 

IS 



226 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, and 
on account of holding that important port- 
folio I was compelled to refrain from public 
utterances and from comment on current 
events. Now, however, I have been relieved 
from my post as a Minister I believe that the 
time has come for me to review the charges 
brought against Marquis Saionji*s Ministry 
with regard to its management of foreign 
affairs. 

It is natural that as the present Ministry 
has attacked our so-called diplomatic in- 
activity one should hear occasionally from 
Marquis Katsura complaints on the same 
score. Two or three newspapers, taking their 
cue from the Ministerial party, have also 
attacked us. The object, however, of the 
different papers varies. Some newspapers 
attack any Government indiscriminately, and 
for the reason that they are always against 
the Government have attacked us also. Other 
papers seem to have a more definite motive 
and confine their criticism to definite points, 
as China. 

The public in Japan is rather cool in its 
interest in foreign affairs, indeed I could 
almost say that it is indifferent. When, 
however, something happens that forces the 
public to pay some attention to foreign affairs, 



Russo-Japanese Convention, 1907 227 

then at once the public seems to get intoxi- 
cated, as though drunk with alcohol, and it 
behaves as if it were not able to discriminate, 
just as an intoxicated person cannot tell the 
difference between sake and water. 

In just the same manner the public, when 
its interest is awakened on matters of foreign 
policy, is totally unable to discriminate be- 
tween diplomatic activity and diplomatic in- 
activity. Directly someone raises a charge 
against the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
public commences a virulent attack on the 
Ministry for what it calls diplomatic inactiv- 
ity, and amongst the accusers may even be 
found many members of Parliament, who 
ought to know better. And, in addition, 
many people who really know the true con- 
ditions of affairs are inclined to hold back for 
private reasons, when by stating the truth 
they could assist the Ministry. 

It would be childish to deal with the irra- 
tional and indiscriminate attacks of which 
there have been many. Against these it is 
better to maintain a dignified silence. But 
even irrational attacks, if originated for pur- 
poses of effecting a Ministerial change, must 
be dealt with and answered if only for the 
reasons of self-defence. 

The most important items of the late 



228 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

Cabinet's foreign policy which were the sub- 
jectvS of bitter attacks were the Russo-Japanese 
Convention, the Russian commercial and 
fishery questions, the Franco- Japanese Agree- 
ment, as-well as the less definite question of 
the Japanese post-bellum policy in Manchu- 
ria, Japanese policy in China and Korea, and 
the American immigration question. 

With regard to these various matters a 
distinction should be drawn between those 
for the settlement of which both the late 
Saionji and the present Katsura Cabinets 
were jointly responsible, and those for which 
we alone were responsible. If this distinc- 
tion is properly drawn it will at once be seen 
that the attacks of the present Ministry on 
its predecessors are rational or irrational 
according as the late Ministry was or was 
not alone answerable for each subject of 
attack. 

To draw such a distinction is also desirable 
for the disarmament of the hasty critics of 
foreign affairs, and also to give some encour- 
agement towards the proper study of foreign 
affairs by the public at large. If the result 
of answering the charges which have been 
made against us, many of them absurd, is to 
stop further irresponsible criticism of a Gov- 
ernment, then much good will have been 



Russo-Japanese Convention, 1907 229 

done and the free action of diplomacy in the 
future will have been much facilitated. 

I intend to treat of the post-bellum policy 
of Japan in Manchuria and China in a fol- 
lowing chapter. But I have a special reason 
for making this statement now, because the 
venom of the Katsura attack on us has been 
concentrated on our post-bellum conduct in 
China rather than on the Russo-Japanese 
Commercial and Fishery Conventions, al- 
though in those conventions we made more 
or less concessions to the other side. The 
reason why the Katsura party has carefully 
avoided the Russian Conventions is because 
they were provided for in the Treaty of Ports- 
mouth and were the natural outcome of that 
treaty. Consequently, the persons who were 
responsible for that treaty could not possibly 
attack the supplementary treaties, which were 
so necessary to complete the work which they 
had commenced. 

Certainly minor points might give rise to 
discussion, but in concluding treaties mutual 
concessions are necessary in order to arrive 
at a result that is agreeable to both sides. 

A great Italian statesman once said that 
the only satisfactory treaty would be one 
which should be unsatisfactory to everybody 
concerned. 



230 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

Even granting that our new treaties with 
Russia contain some imperfect points, that 
is not a sufficient reason to condemn us for 
this so-called diplomatic inactivity. As a 
matter of fact, in all the attacks which have 
been made on us no one has claimed that 
any clause of those treaties is unfavourable. 
It may, therefore, be presumed that they are 
satisfactory. 

With regard to the Russo-Japanese Agree- 
ment, this was the result of the imperfections 
of the Treaty of Portsmouth, which was con- 
cluded by the first Katsura Cabinet. In my 
opinion the present Cabinet, in attacking our 
conclusion of the convention, is entirely 
lacking in discrimination of the rights and 
privileges of the two contracting parties. The 
agreement was really only a corollary to the 
Treaty of Portsmouth, which was made by 
the first Katsura Ministry. Although a great 
deal of criticism has been published about 
the unsatisfactory conditions of peace signed 
at Portsmouth, those who know the real cir- 
cumstances recognize that at the time the 
negotiations were in progress it was abolutely 
necessary for us to make peace. 

There were similar reasons for the conclu- 
sion of the convention under discussion, and 
it is in such circumstances, when explanations 



Russo-Japanese Convention, 1907 231 

to the public are obviously impossible, that 
diplomatists find themselves in the greatest 
embarrassment . 

Of course the negotiations between Russia 
and Japan at Portsmouth cannot be compared 
with, for example, the negotiations between 
Germany and France for the capitulation of 
Paris. The circumstances were very different. 

It was absolutely impossible for any one 
who knew the real facts of the internal con- 
ditions and of the military situation to expect 
us to reap much advantage from the Treaty 
of Portsmouth. It was natural that that 
treaty should have many imperfections. 

Knowing the true facts and then recalling 
the famous Hibiya Park disturbances, one 
cannot but consider these latter as an over- 
whelming proof of the rudimentary state of the 
Japanese mind in relation to foreign affairs. 

One must admit, of course, that the Treaty 
of Portsmouth, although it ended the war 
with Russia, was from the Japanese point of 
view insufficient and unsatisfactory. It was 
owing to their recognition of this that Prince 
Yamagata and Prince Ito, as soon as the treaty 
had been concluded, commenced working for 
the conclusion of a Russo-Japanese Conven- 
tion which should supplement the Treaty of 
Portsmouth. 



232 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

In the beginning of 1907, Dr. Dillon contri- 
buted two articles to reviews in England, 
urging the necessity of a Russo-Japanese 
rapprochemenL These articles were shown to 
M. Motono, our Ambassador at St. Peters- 
burg, by M. Iswolsky, who was at that time 
the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
These articles were evidently written after 
conversation with some high person in the 
Russian Government, and M. Motono be- 
lieved that they indicated the undoubted 
intention of the Russian Government of 
entering into an agreement with Japan on 
the lines laid down in the articles. M. 
Motono drew the attention of the Japanese 
Foreign Office to the articles and asked for 
an opinion on them. 

I should say something about Dr. Dillon. 
His father was an Englishman and his mother 
was Irish. He was educated at various con- 
tinental universities and he possessed several 
high diplomas of learning. For some time 
he was professor at various Russian univer- 
sities and also had been the proprietor of a 
newspaper at Odessa. 

He married a Russian lady and resided 
in St. Petersburg. At the time that I was 
Minister and Ambassador in London, Dr. 
Dillon was the St. Petersburg correspondent of 



Russo-Japanese Convention, 1907 233 

the Daily Telegraph, and probably is so to-day. 
He certainly was most extraordinarily well 
acquainted with all Russian affairs, and any 
statement made by him in the Daily Telegraph 
having reference to Russia was always re- 
garded as being based on the highest authority. 

I met him two or three times whilst I was 
in London. When Count de Witte proceeded 
to America as the chief Russian plenipoten- 
tiary to negotiate the terms of peace at Ports- 
mouth, Dr. Dillon paid me a visit in London 
and I had a long conversation with him 
on various subjects. The principal object of 
his visit to me was to request me to do every- 
thing which I could to induce the Japanese 
Government to dispatch Marquis Ito to 
America as the principal Japanese Peace 
Commissioner. 

When the negotiations were proceeding at 
Portsmouth it was Dr. Dillon who controlled 
the American Press for the benefit of de Witte. 
At that time most of the prominent British 
and American correspondents who had col- 
lected at Portsmouth had gone there inclined 
to be in favour of Japan. 

Dr. Dillon used these men to publish the 
real existing state of affairs without any re- 
serve whatsoever, and was unrivalled by 
anybody on the Japanese side in creating a 



234 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

favourable public opinion. He did it almost 
entirely by relying on the influence of the 
American papers, to whose correspondents 
at Portsmouth he always stated the exact 
position of affairs. On the Japanese side, 
on the other hand, nothing was done like 
this. True, there was a member of the Japan- 
ese Foreign Office staff attached to the Peace 
Commission, and it was supposed to be his 
duty to receive the newspaper men. In 
fact he had nothing else to do but that. But 
he made his principal task the denying of 
every statement which might appear. 

In view of my experience in diplomacy I 
considered that such a course was a matter 
of the greatest regret. Comparing the action 
of the two sides at Portsmouth as regards the 
Press, it was only natural that the umpire's fan 
was pointed at Japan from the very outset of 
the negotiations, and she was never able to re- 
cover from the unsatisfactory Press position 
into which she allowed herself to fall, a position 
which was principally due to the fact that the 
Japanese authorities preserved far too much 
silence as to the progress of the negotiations. 

With regard to the Russo-Japanese Agree- 
ment,^ about which I commenced to speak, 
Prince Yamagata and Prince Ito, as well as 

* For text see Appendix D. 



Russo-Japanese Convention, 1907 235 

M. Iswolsky, recognized the absolute neces- 
sity of concluding an agreement such as had 
been outlined by Dr. Dillon in his articles 
to which I have referred. 

A conference was held with the principal 
members of the previous Cabinet and no ob- 
jection was raised on their side to the proposal. 
Instructions were, therefore, given to M. 
Motono to sound the Russian Government 
and find out if it were seriously desirous of 
making an agreement. When he reported that 
this was the case I telegraphed him formal 
power to negotiate a convention. From the 
very beginning there was no hitch, and the 
negotiations made such steady progress that 
the agreement was signed on July 30, 1907. 

In reference to this agreement conferences 
were held from time to time with the Elder 
Statesmen, and Prince Katsura attended 
these meetings and never once raised any 
opposition to the proposed convention. 

Prince Yamagata interested himself very 
deeply in the matter and expressed himself 
with the deepest satisfaction when it had been 
successfully concluded. In fact, it was said 
that Prince Yamagata felt as proud of the 
agreement as if he alone had had the merit 
of concluding it. 

Although Marquis Katsura did not express 



236 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

such deep satisfaction he never showed any 
opposition to it, and there is no reason why 
his Cabinet should now attack it or us, unless 
a certain report that he considered the agree- 
ment to be a reflection on his conduct of the 
war and peace may be credible. 

Note. — The Russo-Japanese Convention, which, 
like the Franco- Japanese Convention, was a platitudin- 
ous instrument supposed to ensure the maintenance 
of the status in the Far East, had been preceded in 
the previous month by the conclusion of the railway 
and other Russo-Japanese Conventions stipulated in 
the Treaty of Portsmouth. 

The convention itself, on the Russian side at least, 
does not appear to have been considered as more 
than a piece of diplomatic courtesy. On the Japan- 
ese side it was intimately connected with internal 
politics. The first Saionji Cabinet was only a make- 
shift affair. Almost from the day of its appointment 
it was the object of severe criticism, especially from 
the military party, which was strongly opposed to the 
evacuation of Manchuria, and which did actually 
succeed in prolonging the same for about a year 
beyond the agreed date. Principally owing to Count 
Hayashi, the Cabinet was in constant conflict with 
the army, not that the Count was opposed to the goal 
aimed at by the soldiers, namely, the permanent 
occupation of Manchuria, but because he realized 
what a serious loss of credit would accrue to Japan by 
failure to implement such an important condition 
of the peace terms. 

The mistake which Count Hayashi seems to have 



Russo-Japanese Convention, 1907 237 

made was in thinking that because the Saionji Cabinet 
was in power that it was, therefore, going to govern 
the country. The poHcies of Japan are made by the 
Genro and merely executed by the Ministry for the 
time being. With a majority of the Genro belonging 
to the militarist faction it is easy to realize the difficult 
position in which a Minister bent on curbing the 
ambitions of the army would find himself. 

The Saionji Cabinet got enough rope to hang itself, 
and then Marquis Katsura came back to power. 

Although from time to time the Gwaimusho referred 
to the Russo-Japanese Convention as one of the 
instruments on which the peace of the Extreme 
Orient hinged, it was generally considered in diplo- 
matic circles as being unimportant. It has since 
been amply proved to have been merely the vain 
repetition of phrases in which neither side had any 
trust. Count Hayashi was undoubtedly glad to 
negotiate it as being something to put forward in the 
Diet in answer to the inevitable bogey of every 
Japanese Foreign Minister, the charge of a ''negative*' 
policy. It would have been of considerable impor- 
tance if the treaties, conventions, and contracts with 
China, mentioned in the instrument, had been at- 
tached and published. In that case it would have 
been good evidence whether Russia was at the back 
of Japan in connexion with the Fa-ku-men Railway 
affair and also whether it was on this occasion that 
Russia and Japan agreed on that extraordinary 
interpretation of the Chinese Eastern Railway Agree- 
ment which gave the two Powers administrative 
rights over the settlements along the line to the 
abrogation of Chinese sovereignty. On neither of 
these two points does Count Hayashi say anything, 



238 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

so that one is forced to the deduction that they were 
not discussed, as otherwise he could not have re- 
strained himself from displaying such a considerable 
diplomatic success as agreement on these points 
would have been. As regulating the Far Eastern 
relations of Japan and Russia, the 1907 Agreement 
has been completely displaced by the 1910 Convention 
and subsequent unpublished but well-known instru- 
ments. — Ed. 



CHAPTER VIII 

The American-Japanese Agreement 
1908 

[The Agreement was in reality an exchange of notes 
between Mr. Elihu Root and M. Takahira, Imperial 
Japanese Ambassador at Washington.^ — Ed.] 

The next matter which I want to consider 
is the convention or agreement made between 
Japan and America in 1908, by the second 
Katsura Cabinet. 

This convention had been proposed to the 
previous Cabinet (the first Saionji Cabinet) 
by Viscount Aoki, the Japanese Ambassador 
at Washington. The Saionji Cabinet had 
not, however, approved of the conclusion of 
the proposed agreement, but it has suddenly 
been concluded by the present Cabinet (the 
second Katsura Cabinet). 

From the point of view of the statesman 
now in power (Prince Katsura), the signature 

^ See Appendix E. 

239^ 



240 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

of the agreement with America might be 
regarded as a diplomatic success and as an 
indication of the renewal of energy in our 
foreign policy, in contra-distinction to what 
people describe as the diplomatic inactivity 
of the last (Saionji) Cabinet. 

No doubt the present Cabinet has had 
good reasons for signing the agreement, but 
equally without doubt the late Cabinet had 
good reasons for regarding the agreement as 
unnecessary. Further, there is good proof 
that the present Premier (Prince Katsura) 
recognized as proper the reasons of his pre- 
decessor for refusing to consent to the agree- 
ment, and consequently it is improper for him 
now to claim that our failure to conclude the 
agreement was due to diplomatic inactivity. 

Likewise it is premature to contend that 
the conclusion of the agreement is due to a 
renewal of energy in our foreign affairs. It 
would be fairer to let readers draw their own 
conclusions from the facts. 

Towards the close of the spring of 1907, 
Viscount Aoki, Japanese Ambassador at 
Washington, suddenly dispatched a telegram 
to the Foreign Minister at Tokio (myself) 
reporting that he, in his individual capacity, 
had suggested an Americo-Japanese Treaty 
to the President of the United States (Mr. 



American-Japanese Agreement, 1908 241 

Roosevelt), who had accepted the suggestion. 
He reported further the terms of the proposed 
convention, which were identical with those 
of the diplomatic communique of 1906. The 
President had agreed to these terms. 

When this telegram was received at the 
Foreign OfBce, the opinion was firmly held 
that such conditions as those proposed, 
namely, to respect the mutual privileges of 
friendly Powers, ought to be regarded as the 
ordinary etiquette of international affairs. As 
to concluding special conventions amongst 
all the Powers to ensure such respect, there 
would never be time enough, even if it were 
a necessity. 

Moreover, there was no question likely to 
arise which could impair the friendship be- 
tween America and Japan, except the immi- 
gration question — and our Ambassador added 
in his telegram that he had specifically omitted 
the immigration question from the treaty. 

In such case Viscount Aoki's proposed 
treaty could only be regarded as superfluous. 
And if it were concluded it would only arouse 
suspicion that some question had existed of 
a nature to cause friction between the two 
countries, and necessitating the conclusion 
of a treaty which otherwise would have been 
without a definite object. 

x6 



242 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

An opinion of this tenor was drawn up 
and presented to the Cabinet by the Foreign 
Office, and approved by the Cabinet. 

At the same time, however, a copy of Vis- 
count Aoki's telegram was transmitted to 
Prince Ito, at that time Imperial Japanese 
Resident-General in Seoul (Korea). It hap- 
pened that Prince Katsura was also at the 
moment in Seoul, and the two entered into 
a minute discussion of Japan's diplomacy 
towards America. They condemned the at- 
tempt made by Viscount Aoki to carry on 
diplomatic negotiations without having first 
either learned the intentions or obtained the 
consent of his Government. They said that 
a hundred such declarations (as that proposed) 
would be ^'vain letters" without a solution 
of the labour and immigration questions, 
which would remain obstacles to Japanese 
friendship with America. The opinions of 
Princes Ito and Katsura coincided with that 
of the Foreign Office and of the Cabinet. 

So it is clear that whatever different reason 
the present Cabinet may have had for con- 
cluding the treaty, the failure of the late 
Cabinet to conclude it cannot be alleged to 
be a sign of diplomatic inactivity. 

It is a diplomatic usage to believe that if 
an Ambassador in his private capacity puts 



American-Japanese Agreement, 1908 243 

forward a proposal to the Government to 
which he is accredited, he is sounding the 
intentions of that Government, acting on the 
instructions of his own. In the event of 
the Government to which he is accredited dis- 
agreeing with the views set out in his proposal, 
it can decline the same without in any way 
injuring the feelings of the proposer. Or he 
can withdraw his proposal without affecting 
the dignity of his own Government. 

But if an Ambassador puts forward on his 
own initiative, even in his private capacity, 
a proposal without having learnt the views 
of his Government, and this proposal is 
accepted by the party to whom it is offered, 
but rejected by the Ambassador's Govern- 
ment, serious consequences will result. The 
home Government has taken into considera- 
tion matters not within the purview of the 
Ambassador, and cannot approve of such 
Ambassadorial proposals. Otherwise the Am- 
bassador would seem to be Foreign Minister 
and the Foreign Minister would be taking his 
instructions from the Ambassador. 

If a Government is in the position of having 
to disapprove of a proposal put forward by 
its Ambassador, in the manner described, the 
foreign Government concerned can no longer 
repose confidence in any statement emanating 



244 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

from that Ambassador, with the result that 
both the dignity of that Government and 
the confidence in that Ambassador must be 
injured. 

In ancient days, when the means of com- 
munication were less perfect, Ministers abroad 
necessarily had often to act arbitrarily. In the 
present day the least event in Eastern Asia 
penetrates to the furthest corners of Europe 
and America. With the modern inventions 
in telegraphy, Ministers stationed abroad can 
easily avoid all risks of impairing the friendly 
feelings between States. There is no longer 
necessity for them to risk a loss of confidence 
by arbitrary action on their own parts. 

The text of the treaty concluded by the 
present Cabinet closely resembles the draft 
prepared by Viscount Aoki when Ambassador 
at Washington under the preceding Cabinet. 
What was the reason which made Prince 
Katsura regard its conclusion as a necessity, 
when last year he opposed it, is unknown. 
It is clear, however, from the statements of 
the American Press, that the conclusion of the 
treaty had far less influence in affecting Ameri- 
can sentiment towards Japan and creating a 
pro- Japanese feeling in America than the 
receptions accorded to the American Fleet 
and the American Business Men's Delegation. 



American-Japanese Agreement, 1908 245 

As a matter of fact, both these receptions 
had been arranged by the Saionji Cabinet, 
although they actually matured under its 
successor. From what I have said it is clear 
that the present Cabinet has no good reason 
to attack the late Cabinet in regard to the 
Americo-Japanese Treaty. As regards the 
immigration question, the Katsura Cabinet 
has adopted the policy of its predecessor, so 
there is nothing to say about it. I intend 
to treat of the immigration question in a 
separate chapter. 



The American Question 

[Count Hayashi appears never to have written 
the proposed chapter on "The American Immigra- 
tion Question." His views on the matter may, 
however, be gathered in part from the following 
passages in the MSS., presumably contributed to 
the vernacular press and intended to be embodied 
in his completed work, — Ed.] 

With reference to the anti- Japanese out- 
break in California, some Americans were 
responsible for rumours that a war must 
occur in the future between the United States 
and Japan. These Americans support their 
views by saying that Japan is casting a long- 
ing eye on the Philippine Islands and on 
Hawaii, that the naval supremacy of Japan 
over America in the Pacific is so great as to 
make war inevitable, and even that Japan is 
secretly dispatching disbanded soldiers to 
Hawaii, with the result, as they allege, that 
America also is secretly preparing for war. 

These rumours do not represent facts. 

They are only flights of imagination on the 

246 



The American Question 247 

part of insignificant local newspapers, whose 
character is very indifferent. The truly re- 
putable American newspapers repudiate such 
rumours, showing that there is really no 
serious difference between the two countries. 

Unfortunately, these groundless rumours 
of war have not only provided a topic of 
conversation in America but have also given 
rise to anxiety in Europe. 

But if we reflect coolly on the cordial 
relations which have for so long past existed 
between America and Japan, we shall find 
that they remain unchanged. It is true that 
small differences have arisen, and the Japanese 
Government has urged on the American 
Government the advisability of her securing 
to Japan her proper rights. The anti- Japan- 
ese agitation in San Francisco is but a small 
thing and has nothing to do with the principal 
question. As regards that affair, everything 
possible is being done to secure its settlement 
as speedily as possible. The immigration 
question is a very simple one to settle. There 
have been misunderstandings on both sides. 
The school question was a breach of our 
treaty rights, but the immigration question 
was only a matter of faulty police adminis- 
tration in San Francisco, so far as the Ameri- 
can authorities are concerned. They have 



248 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

recognized their liabilities toward Japan and 
have given assiirances that similar incidents 
shall not occur again. 

On the Japanese side the situation has been 
complicated by the action of those Japanese 
who have emigrated to Hawaii. Under the 
treaty of 1894 (negotiated when I was Vice- 
Minister of Foreign Affairs ) , America could 
impose restrictions on the immigration of 
Japanese into America. We strongly ob- 
jected to this clause, which America tacked 
on to Article II., but our objections were of 
no avail. Mr. Griscom, the American Secre- 
tary of State, absolutely refused to agree to 
revise the treaty at all unless the clause was 
admitted. We were loath to agree, but did 
so because the revision of the English treaty 
was problematical on account of the proba- 
tionary clause, and it was necessary to make 
a start. 

Under the treaty, America could enforce 
restriction of Japanese immigration, and we 
can and do enforce similar restrictions. ^ 

Before Hawaii became American territory 
there were many Japanese there. When the 
island was annexed by the United States the 

^ This did not practically affect America, as the only foreign 
labourers desirous of entering Japan were Chinese, who were 
prohibited. — Ed. 



The American Question 249 

Japanese living there transmigrated from 
Hawaii to California, several thousands each 
year. The United States authorities have 
prohibited this transmigration. We believe 
that our countrymen can so transmigrate, as 
once they were in Hawaii they were in Ameri- 
can territory, where under treaty rights they 
have freedom of travel. 

The Americans refuse to allow this, though 
by treaty we think that they have no right 
to do so. On the other hand, if we protest ^ 
too much, then the United States threaten 
to close Hawaii to Japanese immigration alto- 
gether, which would even be more disadvan- 
tageous than the prohibition for Hawaiian 
Japanese to travel to America. 

The American Government has proposed 
to make a treaty with Japan granting recip- 
rocal rights of immigration. We refused to 
agree to this and have no intention of giving 
way. The Cabinet has decided that the 
only way to settle the immigration question 
and cognate questions is by the total deletion 
of the clause at the end of Article H. of the 
present treaty. In a few years the time will 
come for the denunciation of that treaty, and 
a new treaty will be made, which will have 
no restriction on the freedom of the Japanese 
to immigrate to America. 



250 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

It is no good trying to rush matters now, 
and it is of no value to make a serious ques- 
tion of the damage to Japanese property in 
San Francisco during the recent riots. When 
racial prejudices are involved neither side 
can argue properly, and we must therefore 
wait till we can discuss the matter in a friendly 
manner. 

In the Hibiya Park riots in 1905 the Japan- 
ese destroyed foreign property. But would 
the Japanese have listened to complaints 
made at that time? The circumstances are 
similar. 

Racial prejudice, anti- Japanese sentiment, 
are at the bottom of the San Francisco trouble. 
All respectable Japanese and Americans are 
agreed on this matter, but, of course, it is a 
most difficult thing to sweep away racial 
prejudice and dislikes. 

The matter will be settled satisfactorily. 
Both Japanese and American statesmen are 
agreed thereon, and so people can rest quietly. 
The irresponsible inflammatory language of the 
newspapers can only complicate the question. 

There is no question of Japan being under 
the dictation of America. We have not 
agreed to the classification of the Japanese 
as Mongolians. If the American Government 
classifies Japanese so, that is its own affair. 



The American Question 251 

As regards the school question we believe 
this involved a breach of our treaty rights. 
The matter is, however, very difficult and 
complicated, and will probably be left for 
adjustment with- the revision of the treaties. 
Both the Japanese Government and the 
people remember the long friendship of Amer- 
ica for Japan, and are confident that the 
future will see a satisfactory settlement of it. 

We have been greatly helped by the atti- 
tude of President Roosevelt. He has done 
everything possible to obtain a just and wise 
solution, but naturally he cannot go beyond 
the powers allowed him by law. He has 
always set great value on Japanese friendship, 
and we hope that the evidence he has given 
of this will strengthen the relations between 
the two countries. He beKeves, as we do, 
that a future war between America and 
Japan is only journalistic talk, and that a 
war between the two countries can never 
take place under any circtimstances. 

The three questions between Japan and 
America are the immigration question, the 
school question, and the problem of China. 
Not one of these can possibly lead to a war 
between Japan and the United States. 

War can only result from a conflict of inter- 
ests or of personal feelings or both. Between 



252 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

America and Japan there is no conflict of 
either interests or personal feelings which 
could make war justifiable. 

The feelings between the two countries 
are cordial. Japan regards America as her 
benefactor, and she is deeply indebted to her 
for much help and for many improvements. 
In reality the feelings of Japan for America 
are as cordial as they were fifty years ago. 

There are some people who assert that 
Japan has ambitions on the Philippines and 
on Hawaii. Any person possessing common 
sense can realize what madness it would be 
for Japan to attempt to deprive so powerful 
a nation as America of her valuable posses- 
sions. There is a tendency, even among 
persons who ought to know better, to despise 
America, and to say that she is not a military 
nation and that her fleet is insignificant. 
This is a great mistake, for America is a 
naturally strong country, of immense re- 
sources and very rich, and her people are 
very energetic. 

The real problem of the Pacific has nothing 
to do with Japanese ambitions on the Philip- 
pines or any such nonsense. It is the main- 
tenance of the principle of the open door and 
the territorial integrity of China. On the 
necessity of maintaining these principles all 



The American Question 253 

Powers are agreed, and the United States is 
making great efforts to help us to effect them. 

Japan fought Russia to maintain the open 
door in China, and Japan has been the means 
of ensuring the territorial integrity of China 
and of opening China to the commerce of the 
world. She is now beginning to reap the 
rewards of her labours. The assistance of 
the United States towards carrying out her 
objects would be very valuable, and the 
United States ought to be assured that Japan 
has no intention of not keeping the pledges 
that she has given. 

The business of diplomacy is not only the 
conduct of affairs of immediate importance, 
but should also look to the future. Diplo- 
macy cannot be conducted like a law case 
and the matter settled in a few days. The 
opening of China is not a matter of to-day 
or to-morrow, but a matter of many years. 

That is why when we discuss affairs with 
America we want to discuss all questions 
together. On the most important question 
we are agreed. The immigration and school 
questions which give rise to differences of 
opinion must be settled by friendly conver- 
sations. 

To talk of war in such connexion is foolish. 
There is no particle of cause for a war between 



254 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

America and Japan, and indeed such rumours 
as I have referred to would be unworthy of 
attention, except for the wide circulation 
which they have attained. 



CHAPTER IX 
Foreign Policy 

PART I 

To Bribe or Not to Bribe 

In regard to the Russo-Japanese Treaty 
and Convention, the Franco-Japanese Agree- 
ment, and the x\merican- Japanese Agreement, 
I have already shown in connexion with the 
last that in its inability to conclude a con- 
vention on account of other questions, such 
as the immigration problem, the Saionji 
Cabinet committed no fault which would give 
the Katsura Ministry the right to attack it 
on the grounds of its foreign policy. In fact, 
the Katsura Ministry has not been able to 
make any direct attack on its predecessors 
on this point. 

If there were any points in connexion with 
foreign affairs on which the Katsura Cabinet 
might have been able to attack the former 

255 



256 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

Saionji Ministry, it would have been in re- 
ference to its Chinese policy. This attack, 
however, came not only from members of 
the Katsura Cabinet but from the Press and 
from members of the Diet, who raised the 
Government's Chinese policy in questions 
in Parliament. 

The principal point on which the late 
Cabinet was attacked was that we had spent 
in Manchuria several hundred millions of 
yen and 100,000 lives in order to win our rights 
and privileges in that country. We ought 
not, therefore, to be slack in our policy in 
Manchuria. We ought still to extend further 
the rights which we have acquired and to 
strengthen the foundations of our position 
there, but on no account are we to make 
China our enemy. The object of Japan 
ought to be to maintain the peace of the 
Orient and obtain Chinese goodwill and 
trust. But as it was alleged, judging from 
the way in which the Saionji Ministry carried 
on its business, that Cabinet tried to surrender 
to China all the privileges which we had 
gained in Manchuria at the cost of so much 
of our national energy, whilst simultaneously 
the anti- Japanese agitation in China and the 
anti-foreign agitation in China to curtail the 
rights and privileges which had been ceded 



Foreign Policy 257 

to foreigners in that country had gained a 
great deal of ground and Japan was rapidly 
losing the confidence of the Chinese. Conse- 
quently the enemies of the late Cabinet 
insisted that we had committed a great 
diplomatic failure in China and that our 
diplomatists were quite incapable. 

These were the themes of the attacks made 
against the Saionji Ministry. 

When in office we had explained that our 
attempt to extend our rights and privileges 
in Manchuria would conflict with the rights 
of China, and it was natural that if we should 
try to extend those rights we should lose the 
confidence of the Chinese, and in any case 
however far we might want to go in trying 
to establish our rights, we could not proceed 
beyond the stipulations in the various treaties, 
and if we did proceed beyond those stipula- 
tions eventually we should have to surrender 
what we gained. 

Again, even though various treaties have 
gained us special privileges in China, the 
Chinese will eventually try to limit the sphere 
of influence as much as possible, whilst we, 
on our part, must try to reserve as much room 
for our own expansion in that country as 
possible. Consequently, it is clear that there 
is ground for objection from both sides, and 
17 



258 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

it is impossible to avoid ill-feeling and a 
conflict of interests. 

In reply to the explanation of the Cabinet, 
its opponents said that the fact that we drove 
the Russians from Manchuria must, in view 
of our explanation, be considered as an act 
of magnanimity on the part of Japan for the 
benefit of the Chinese, and as we had failed 
to make the Chinese appreciate our service, 
or to agree to our propositions, we had lost 
their confidence. 

To sum up, the view raised by the opposi- 
tion, in regard to the Cabinet's foreign policy, 
was that we ought to get everything for our- 
selves and at the same time to gain the con- 
fidence of the Chinese by making them 
appreciate our great services in having driven 
away the Russians. 

The mere fact of our replacing the Russians 
in Manchuria should not be a reason for the 
Chinese to dislike us. In my opinion such 
arguments are extremely unreasonable and 
selfish. That we drove the Russians out of 
Manchuria was because we wanted to protect 
our own interests. Our action was necessary 
for our self-preservation. We were not re- 
quested by China to drive Russia out. 

Even if we had not taken over the Russian 
undertakings in Manchviria and were pre- 



Foreign Policy 259 

pared to abandon that country, some other 
nation might come in our place, and then we 
should be compelled to fight another big 
war. 

It is, therefore, for our own preservation 
that we are holding Manchuria. We have 
not acted in the least from humanitarian 
considerations. Even the Chinese under- 
stand these things. To say that we fought 
for China is rather vStretching the truth. 
There may be some truth in the statement, 
but to expect other people to believe it is like 
trying "to steal a bell by shutting one's own 
ears." 

Although we drove the Russians away we 
have come in their stead. So, looked at from 
the Chinese point of view, we may be likened 
to ''the wolf that follows the tiger." 

From the manner in which the Russians 
conducted themselves in Manchuria, it looked 
as if they intended to absorb the whole pro- 
vince. We on our side endeavoured to carry 
on our work strictly in accordance with the 
spirit of the treaty stipulations. Conse- 
quently, as a fact there is a great difference 
between the positions of the two nations. 
From the Chinese standpoint, however, the 
difference is only one of degree. 

Our critics at home imagine that we may 



./ 



.■- 



/ 



26o Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

have yielded too much, and it is, therefore, 
natural for the Chinese to feel dissatisfied 
with the arrangement. 

The only way to win the confidence of the 
Chinese is to agree to all the propositions 
made by their Government. 

To insist on one's point of vantage is one 
thing, to secure the goodwill of the party of 
the second part is another. It is impossible 
to carry out both policies. The two have 
nothing in common. This is true as between 
individuals and much truer as between nations. 
We should, however, be careful not to ignore 
the feelings of others, unless we have good 
reason to do so. 

Now, ever since the occupation of Manchu- 
ria by our army there have been frequent 
instances where we have done things to in- 
jure the feelings of the Chinese. To parti- 
cularize, since the war not only have the 
roughs and toughs who went to Manchuria 
from this country maltreated the Chinese 
there, but even officers of high rank have 
shown themselves to be men of no moral 
principle. Not infrequently they have been 
guilty of acts of gross discourtesy to high 
Chinese officials. 

Such incidents have caused Chinese distrust 
of us, and are within the scope of a review 



Foreign Policy 261 

of our Chinese policy, if it be conducted in 
accordance with treaty stipulations. 

In order to study the feelings of the Chinese 
towards Japan and Russia with regard to 
Manchurian affairs, the most important thing 
to be done is to compare the actions of Japan 
and Russia towards China. As I have said 
before in the chapter on the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, when Japan was given the territory 
of the Yinchow (Liaotung) Peninsula after 
the war of 27 and 28 Meiji (1894-5), Russia, 
together with Germany and France, inter- 
fered and took the Peninsula away from us 
and gave it back to China. Besides this she 
guaranteed the loans of three hundred million 
taels and thirty million taels, which China 
had to pay to us, the first sum as indemnity 
for the war; and the second as the compensa- 
tion for the return of the Peninsula by us. 
Consequently, China was able to float this 
loan in France at the very low rate of 4 per 
cent, interest. 

As a result of this, China was very grateful 
to Russia, and when she was requested by 
Russia to fulfil the condition on which the 
loan was guaranteed, viz., to grant Russia 
the privilege of constructing the Siberian 
Railway through the northern part of Man- 
churia, she consented with a good grace. 



262 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

Count Muravieff, when he planned the leases 
of Dairen and Port Arthtir and the construc- 
tion of the railway through Manchuria, had in 
mind to threaten China by the show of force, 
but outwardly he let China save her "face/* 

Again, those Russians who went to Man- 
churia in the days of Russian supremacy 
were mostly officials whose salaries were very 
high and who would spend those salaries 
lavishly. Again, the work done in the con- 
struction of the railway to Port Arthur, in 
the building of Port Arthur itself, and the 
construction of Dairen necessitated the ex- 
penditure of large sums of money, and the 
Chinese naturally received considerable benefit 
from this circulation of money, so the Russians 
were welcome as the very best customers 
they could have. 

At that time, one of our most prominent 
statesmen, speaking with Li Hung-Chang, 
warned him that to allow the Russians this 
extraordinary freedom in carrying out their 
plans would ultimately end in the alienation 
of Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria. To 
this Li Hung-Chang replied that there was a 
promise that Manchuria should be returned 
to China within a certain limit of time, and 
consequently his countrymen had no need 
whatever to worry. 



Foreign Policy 263 

As a matter of fact, Li Hung-Chang was 
by no means well posted in Western affairs, 
but certainly he was not so ignorant as not 
to know Russia's real intention. I am certain 
that he made this answer because he did not 
know what else to say. He wanted just to 
save his "face'' before his visitor. Why do 
I think so? Because from the day of that 
conversation the attitude of the Chinese 
Government slowly began to change towards 
Russia and Japan, gradually becoming un- 
friendly to Russia. 

After the Boxer trouble, Russia began to 
be restless about her eventual success, and 
openly came out on the side of the occupation 
of Manchuria, thereby gaining the distinct 
bad feelings of the Chinese. The Chinese, 
indeed, at that time began to favour the 
Japanese, who were raising an army against 
Russia. But when the Russo-Japanese peace 
was concluded the Japanese became the 
successors of the Russians in their various 
enterprises in Manchuria, and Japan not only 
got the Yinchow Peninsula again, but also 
the South Manchurian Railway and the ac- 
cessories of the peninsula and the railway. 

In addition, her general staff established 
military administrative posts here and there 
throughout the country and began various 



264 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

undertakings. Now these undertakings were 
started after the war was over and therefore 
were, without doubt, outside the scope of 
military requirements; also, they were made 
in regions outside the boundary delimited 
by the Peking Treaty which the Chinese 
Government had agreed to observe. Besides 
this, many Japanese entered Manchuria and 
used to take out all the profits from these 
undertakings. As a consequence, the attitude 
of the Chinese towards the Japanese became 
very unfriendly, and even the Chinese officials 
began to make protests. 

Generally speaking, soldiers who have won 
battles have done so by making sacrifices, 
even of what they value most in the world — 
their own lives. Natiirally, they want to 
gain fame, they want to appropriate, as a 
result of victory and risk, as many privileges 
as possible to crown their success in arms. 
This is only human nature. After the victory 
of Sadowa by the Prussian army the old 
Emperor and his Chief of General Staff, von 
Moltke, and their subordinates, attempted to 
grab as much profit as possible from Austria. 
The "blood and iron" Minister, Bismarck, 
looking far into the future for the days of 
the unification of the German Empire, was 
so chagrined at his inability to restrain his 



Foreign Policy 265 

soldiers* demands that he walked into his 
private room and wept, an incident which is 
recorded in his own memoirs. 

It is easy to imagine how boastful and 
aggressive our soldiers were after the Russo- 
Japanese War. By what they did there 
after the war we have lost not only the good- 
will of the Chinese, but have also won the 
adverse criticism of Europeans and Americans. 

It cannot be denied that such conduct 
disturbs the smooth working of diplomacy. 
It is true that M. Kato (later Baron), the 
then Foreign Minister, resigned his position, 
and, as it was stated, did this on account of 
his opposition to the nationalization of the 
railways, but his resignation was also due to 
the fact that he was sandwiched in between 
the two opposing forces at work at home 
and abroad in regard to Manchurian affairs. 

Also the visit w^hich Marquis Saionji, when 
Premier, secretly made to Manchuria, was 
because he wanted to investigate the con- 
dition of affairs personally. Under these 
circumstances, no one who was placed in the 
public position of Minister of Foreign Affairs 
could have succeeded in further extending our 
privileges and at the same time preventing 
our losing the goodwill of the Chinese. 

It was on May 19, 1906 (39 Meiji), that I 



266 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs 
after my return from England, and on May 
22d a conference of the Genro was held at 
which were present Princes Ito, Yamagata, 
Oyama, and Marquis Matsukata and Marquis 
Inouye, all the members of the Cabinet, Prince 
Katsura, Admiral Yamamoto, and the Chief 
of the General Staff, the late General Kodama. 

After a lengthy deliberation it was decided 
to abolish the military administrative staff 
as soon as possible and to evacuate the 
regions outside the territory delimited by 
the Treaty of Peking; and it was also decided 
that this evacuation should take place even 
before the date fixed in the treaty, and those 
regions should be returned as soon as possible 
to the Chinese authorities. It is, however, 
only human nature to hanker after under- 
takings which have once been begun. Then 
it must be remembered that the under- 
takings in Manchuria had been carried on 
for nearly a year, and the people of the regions 
which had been under our administration 
during this time had in due course entered 
into various complicated relationships with 
our officials. 

It was, therefore, a most difficult thing to 
carry out the decisions of this Genro council. 
Negotiation after negotiation was conducted 



Foreign Policy 267 

and slowly the programme was carried out. 
These negotiations included matters which 
not only concerned China, but such other 
matters as the officials in Saghalien, the Red 
Cross Hospital in Port Arthur, the temples 
and burial grounds and other things con- 
cerning Russia, which took a long time to 
discuss. 

As regards our attitude towards China, 
the negotiations were very difficult owing 
to the many unreasonable things that our 
soldiers had done after their victory. During 
the administration of the Saionji Cabinet 
most of the points arising from the war and 
the post-bellum events in Manchuria were 
disposed of. The Foreign Office had taken 
as reasonable an attitude towards China as 
political conditions at home would permit 
them to do, and there remain to-day but very 
few points which have not been finally cleared 

lip- 

To be sure, Chinese diplomacy is often 

treacherous, so we were prepared to beat 

the Chinese at their own game. We could 

not say on every occasion, ''Yes, yes, we 

agree,'' to whatever the Chinese asked. 

Besides, in those days there arose, from other 

circumstances, an anti-foreign agitation in 

China, having for its object the curtailment 



268 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

of the concessions granted to foreigners, 
and along with this general anti-foreign 
agitation came a specific anti- Japanese agita- 
tion, which assumed serious features. As a 
consequence, our negotiations became doubly 
difficult. 

It was practically impossible to win the 
goodwill of the Chinese unless we were will- 
ing to agree to every proposition made by 
them. Of course, if you are prepared to 
agree to everything that the other side asks, 
negotiation is the simplest matter in the 
world. I think that the demands of our 
countrymen that we should always gain the 
goodwill of the Chinese arose from the fact that 
we were not willing to deceive the Chinese, 
and the Opposition in Japan blamed the 
Government for that. 

As China is the fountain source of one of 
the greatest civilizations in the world, one 
must recognize that civilized institutions 
and customs are already there. On the 
other hand, the Japanese have imported the 
civilization of the West only during recent 
years and have imitated it, and they may 
think when they go to China and associate 
with the Chinese that they are really in no 
way inferior to the latter. 

But if the Japanese will only strip off their 



Foreign Policy 269 

gold braid they will find that they have 
left only that which they have imported 
originally from China, and consequently it is 
clear that they are behind the Chinese in 
every point of- civilization. Certainly, we 
have our peculiar ideas of national solidarity 
and the spirit of Bushido which has been 
with us ever since the prehistoric period. 

In these respects we do not stand behind 
any other nation in the world, but what I 
mean is that in the degree of social civilization 
we must admit, however reluctantly, that 
China is far richer than Japan. If we see 
the Chinese in foreign countries we find them 
endeavouring to adjust themselves to the 
circumstances surrounding them, and, there- 
fore, they are very cautious of what they 
say and do. So aside from the fact that they 
dress differently there is nothing in them to 
attract our attention. 

But if we go to Peking and associate with 
the high officials of that country, we find 
that we have entered a world entirely dif- 
ferent from ours in Japan. The houses, the 
dresses, the social manners, even the methods 
of entering and leaving, are all established 
with the strictest regularity. On those 
Westerners who have grown up under purely 
Occidental civilization, these things may not 



270 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

make any very striking impression, but to 
the Japanese who have braided Western 
civiHzation over their Chinese civiHzation, 
they cause some pecuHarly awesome feeHngs. 

Certainly it may be a Httle different as re- 
gards the young men who have been brought 
up in the new atmosphere of the Meiji era, 
but even they may not be able to get away 
entirely from the impressions that I have 
suggested. Besides, those Chinese who are 
in the upper strata of society, though dif- 
ferently educated from us, are all very well 
educated. They are not bumptious or con- 
ceited as the Japanese are, but they are very 
large-minded, learned and leisurely, and skilful 
in the use of diplomatic language. Besides, 
their standard of living is very much higher 
than that of the Japanese, and consequently, 
if we enter Chinese society, while we may 
lose sight of the Western civilization, we will 
gradually become assimilated into the Chinese 
style and unconsciously become ''Chinasized'* 
and in the end will sympathize with things 
Chinese. 

Thus it is that we have with us people 
who have been feasted by the Chinese and 
told in the characteristic language of Chinese 
diplomacy that China and Japan are like 
''the wagon and its wheels," or '*a man's 



Foreign Policy 271 

teeth and his lips, '* that ''our country (China) 
is far behind in the ways of Western civiliza- 
tion and must look up to Japan for guidance 
and bringing up, " and other such good things, 
and they (the Japanese) straightway become 
elated and at once decide that it is a mistake 
to say that it is impossible to come to friendly 
terms with the Chinese. As a result they 
make up their minds that otir diplomatic 
methods are altogether wrong, and that the 
Chinese are not at all unreasonable nor are 
they obstinate, that the anti-foreign agita- 
tions in that country are due to the unreason- 
ableness of the foreigners, for which the 
Chinese are not to blame, that we should 
yield what we should yield and leave un- 
important things and hold on to the main 
things we want, since the development and 
guidance of China is the mission of Japan. 
Optimists come back to Japan and bluster 
these generalities from one end of the country 
to the other. They think they know every- 
thing there is to be known about China and 
the Chinese. It is through the efforts of 
such men that we have eventually had pro- 
posals even to bamboozle the Chinese. 

Such blundering critics can give no good 
advice to the country or to those who are in 
office, especially at a time when diplomatic 



272 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

negotiations are being engaged in. If we 
were to follow their advice and yield any- 
thing to obtain the goodwill of the Chinese, 
then we should have to be prepared to yield 
everything. What we can afford to yield 
is just what China does not want, and what 
they want is just what we must have. These 
people have been misled by the Chinese 
expressions and by such words as ''we want 
your guidance," "we want your help," etc., 
etc., which are used by the Chinese mostly 
as a matter of deference. 

On their part they use them in a spirit 
of humility, but for us in Japan to publish 
them broadcast in the newspapers, and to 
quote them in our addresses is really a great 
insult to our neighbours and does serious 
harm to our diplomatic work. These points 
ought to be brought home to the Japanese, 
if they would but think a little. Up to only 
fourteen or fifteen years ago, China was 
considered by the Chinese themselves as 
being far superior to Japan. Even when 
China was defeated in the war with Japan 
and temporarily cast down a little, they had 
not really at heart come to admit their defeat. 
If we could place ourselves in the Chinese 
position we could understand this and appre- 
ciate it. 



Foreign Policy 273 

It is not true when they say, "We want 
to be guided and educated by the Japanese,'* 
and again it would be useless for us to attempt 
the policy of "bamboozle," which can only 
be done in the case of uncivilized barbarians. 
To adopt such a policy towards China would 
be the height of insult to the intelligence 
of a nation which stands on equal terms with 
us. If the Chinese get the notion into their 
head that they have been insulted by such 
a policy, it would do a lot of harm to our 
diplomatic work. 

That the Chinese employ the Japanese 
as teachers is not because they want the 
Japanese, or that they want to be educated 
and guided by the Japanese. The real reason 
is that they employ the Japanese because 
the latter can be secured for small salaries, 
and although the Japanese talk big things, 
as a matter of fact they are generally much 
more easily managed than the Occidentals. 
Whether the number of Japanese teachers 
employed throughout China be large or small, 
it does not make very much difference in 
raising Japanese prestige. The Chinese are 
to blame for trying to employ teachers at 
small salaries. Many of these teachers go 
about to ingratiate themselves with petty 
officials in order to win the latter 's favour; 

18 



274 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

mostly that they may report bad things 
about other teachers in order to raise them- 
selves in the eyes of the Chinese, and this sort 
of ugly behaviour has been indulged in very 
often by the Japanese teachers in China. 

I mention these things (with regard to the 
Japanese teachers in China) because they 
hurt the dignity of the nation, and because 
in the 24th session of the Diet there were 
some members who attacked the Saionji 
Ministry for having failed in diplomacy 
because Japanese teachers were discharged 
from China. Even some officials of the 
Government lent their ears to these com- 
plaints. What a blunder ! 

There are also those who think that they 
know the short cut to success in this world, 
and advocate the employment of bribery 
and corruption to win over the high officials 
of the Chinese Government, and by the aid 
of these means to accomplish their diplo- 
matic ends. There are those who say that 
in Chinese official circles bribery was resorted 
to for the recognition of Russia in Manchuria. 

Of course, such arguments are not used 
publicly, but I judge that the very spirit of 
the men who advocate trying such methods 
on the high officials of the Government of 
our neighbour is a source of our failure. 



Foreign Policy 275 

Besides this, I think they are misinformed 
as to the practice of bribery in Chinese official 
circles. In the first place, when the Chin 
dynasty unified and established the Govern- 
ment, the officials of that Government, taking 
a warning from the results of the extravagance 
of the officials of the Ming dynasty, solemnly 
resolved not to follow in the footsteps of 
their predecessors. 

The Ministers of State, in order to give 
an example to their descendants, instructed 
the artists of those days to draw pictures 
of the Manchus on scrolls. I saw some of 
these scrolls whilst I was in Peking, and I 
judged that the standard of living as repre- 
sented by the pictures was about the same 
as that of the Mongols of to-day. 

I noticed when I went to Peking twelve 
or thirteen years ago that those public 
buildings, roads, and sewers of the city which 
were constructed on a grand scale and were 
splendid in appearance, have now been 
destroyed or left in disgraceful condition 
without any attempt to repair them. It was 
explained to me that this has been because 
the later-day Manchus had misunderstood 
the meaning of the warnings against ex- 
travagance and of the admonitions to be 
economical. Such (economy and frugality) 



276 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

was the policy of the Manchus in the beginning 
of their rule. So the salary of the officials 
was very small. This policy is maintained 
even to-day. To illustrate by one or two 
examples. The annual income of an official 
of the Order of the First Degree of the first 
and second ranks, as the Imperial Tutor, 
the Emperor^s chief attendant, the professors 
of the Imperial University, the tutor of the 
Crown Prince and the attendants of the Crown 
Prince, and the Ministers of State, amounts 
to only 545 taels, 60 cheng. At the exchange 
of one tael to Yen 1.50, this sum translated 
into Japanese currency amounts to Yen 

818.40 ( = £81 105.). 

The Viceroys of provinces, who are of the 
Order of the Second Degree of the first rank, 
and the military governors who are of the 
Second Degree of the second rank, receive 
yearly 498 taels, 45 cheng, which translated 
into terms of Yen, is Y. 747.60 ( = £74 Js. 6d.). 
It is true the Viceroys and military governors 
receive certain extra pay (in the form of 
''encouragement for frugality '*)» but the 
regular and the extra pay together are not 
enough to maintain their official dignity. 

In the earlier days of the Manchu rule the of- 
ficials met the people with the pride of conquer- 
ors and they could manage to live somehow. 



Foreign Policy 277 

It may have been that such a policy was 
originally a better one to sptir men to greater 
efforts. When the Romans governed a for- 
eign country they took a pride in their pov- 
erty, but when they began to enjoy the 
fruits of their military success, they became 
extravagant. It was just the same with the 
Manchus. When the Manchus began to re- 
ceive the influence of the Chinese civilization 
and to associate with the Chinese of the richer 
classes, they began to feel the pinch of their 
insufficient salaries and to see that they could 
not therewith maintain their dignity. 

When I was in Peking, Li Hung-Chang 
was the great doctor of learning, and Minister 
of State for Foreign Affairs. He was living 
in a Buddhist temple called ''Shien Liang 
Shii.'^ His salary was that of an official 
of the First Degree of the first rank, but as 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs he re- 
ceived an extra sum of 1000 taels, for, as it 
was officially termed, ''encouragement of 
frugality.'* If one visited the ''Shien Liang 
Shii" temple one would find that some of 
the cottages of the monks had been rented 
and offices installed there, whilst ten of Li's 
servants or relatives would also live in such 
little houses. There were also to be found 
several tens of riding horses and asses in 



278 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

company with a few officers, who officially 
received Yen 500 (£50) or more, and who 
were his supporters. These men, however, 
were all paid by Li Hung-Chang. 

When I went to call on him there I was 
shown into a sort of rest room, which was not 
very spacious, the bed being rather coarse 
and cheap, similar to those used in soldiers' 
barracks. The floors were bare, there being 
no rugs, and the chairs were of hard wood 
in plain Western style. 

Li Hung-Chang, when I entered, was sitting 
on a rubber air cushion. He arose and offered 
me the cushion, but I said, "I am a young 
man and do not need it! You are an old 
man, so do not mind me, continue to sit on 
it as you were doing when I entered.'* ''I 
have been ill, with piles," he said, ''and 
cannot very well sit, so please excuse me,'* 
and resumed the cushion. On the floor to 
his right were scattered sundry books on in- 
ternational law by Chi, books on astrological 
studies and other things. On the desk were 
to be seen brushes, ink blocks, papers, en- 
velopes, etc. Such was the simple furnishing 
of his work room. 

His life was a very simple one, but the 
amount of money which he used to spend 
every month in keeping up the dignity of his 



Foreign Policy 279 

position easily reached several thousand taels. 
As for the high officials whose manner of life 
was very extravagant and luxurious and who 
loved scrolls of writing and pictures and ar- 
ticles of antiquity, it is quite impossible to 
estimate how much was spent by them. 

Mr. Shii was the teacher of calligraphy to 
the Emperor Kwang Hsu and used to live 
in the Chio Ming Chang Palace where the 
Japanese Legation was formerly situated. 
He used to keep on his premises about 300 
servants, and the director of the Hanlin, 
whom I used to know, received about Yen 
40 per month as salary, but every month he 
spent from Yen 500 to 600 for bare living 
expenses. 

Such a state of affairs was due to the fact 
that the officials were compelled to incur high 
expenses owing to the general high standard 
of living, but as their salaries, which were 
fixed by the official system, created centuries 
ago and long continued without any change, 
cannot be altered, the officials are compelled 
to get extra revenues from somewhere else. 

The result was that the Peking officials 
would take tribute money from the Provincial 
officials and the Provincial officials would 
take tribute money from the people. 

In the west, too, in olden times, there were 



28o Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

systems by which the collection of Provincial 
taxes was farmed out on a commission basis. 
Those who undertook the work would pay 
to the Government a certain fixed sum, 
and they could exact as much as they could 
get for themselves. And then again, officials 
would perform various offices for different 
people in connection with other official duties, 
and then take commission from these people 
for the services rendered. These systems 
eventually came to be recognized as a part 
of the system of salaries. Such a system is, 
indeed, a very bad one, but it cannot neces- 
sarily be called one of bribery. 

It is true that the Chin Government is 
an antiquated and despotic Government. It 
has many deep-rooted iniquities, and it may 
be true that bribery flourished under it, 
but as regards the system of salaries which I 
have tried to describe above, it cannot be 
said that bribery is practised openly in China. 

We often hear people say that in order 
to meet an official in China one has to attach 
a five-dollar note to one's visiting card; other- 
wise the servants of the house would not 
usher a visitor in. 

When I was in Peking I heard that in 
order to meet a Prince of the blood or a high 
official, a Chinese would have to attach a 



Foreign Policy 281 

fifty-dollar note to his visiting card, but even 
these cases cannot be called bribes. It woiild 
be more correct to call them a bad system 
of commissions which was general throughout 
the country. 

In olden times the Chinese used to say of 
the Japanese that " the Japanese can afford 
to be unstained because their salaries are 
high.'* I think that unless we begin to pay 
some serious attention to our official system 
of salaries, some very bad customs may 
develop in the future. 

But it would be a disgraceful thing if we 
attempted to attain our diplomatic ends by 
the use of money in dealing with high officials 
merely because there is a system of open 
bribery or commission such as I have just 
explained. Supposing, for argument's sake, 
that we decided to bribe them, the amounts 
which would be required to move the high 
officials of the Chin dynasty would be far 
greater than the sums paid as bribes by the 
Japan Sugar Refinery Company which paid 
yen 200 to yen 300 and yen 20,000. 

Just think of it! The price of the honour 
of our noted men is indeed very cheap. But 
in China such men would not sell themselves so 
cheaply. Of course, this is only a suppositious 
case to make the matter more easily understood. 



282 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

Let us suppose again that Russia has really 
used bribes to buy up the high officials of 
China. After the Chino- Japanese War, when 
the Triple Alliance interfered and helped to 
have the Liaotung Peninsula returned to 
China, the amount of bonds issued in Paris 
was 330,000,000 taels, including the amounts 
which had to be paid as war indemnity and 
the purchase price for the return of the 
Liaotung Peninsula. The bonds were issued 
bearing interest at 4 per cent. They were 
guaranteed by the Russian Government, and 
were sold at 98 francs per 100 francs face 
value, as far as I remember. What was the 
net amount received by the Chinese Govern- 
ment I do not know, as this was kept secret, 
but at the very highest it could not have 
been more than 90. There was, therefore, 
a difference of 8 francs, or 8 per cent. The 
whole issue was a little over yen 300,000,000. 

Eight per cent, on that would be 28,800,000 
yen, and on that amount interest assessed, 
and the expenses for printing the bonds, for 
taxes and miscellaneous expenses, would not 
be very much in comparison. Supposing 
it were yen 2,000,000, there would still be 
left yen 26,800,000 to be accounted for. This 
last figure represents what went to the banks 
and the financiers who were interested in 



Foreign Policy 283 

making the issue. Supposing the amount 
were shared with the Chinese, the latter 
would have got yen 13,400,000, or, if they 
only got 10 per cent, on the difference between 
the net and the gross price, they would have 
got yen 2,680,000. A bribe of such a large 
amount might indeed be effective in bringing 
about the signature of a contract for the 
construction of railroads in Manchuria. 

If Russia had really resorted to such meth- 
ods of bribery, it follows then since she has 
established the Chinese-Eastern Bank in Pe- 
king and conducted business in the character- 
istic way of Russia, she must have continued 
ever since that policy of bribery in accordance 
with the precedent of the Paris bond issue. 

Now, granting that the suggestions of 
those who advise our Government to bribe 
the Chinese officials were to be taken, and 
the incident mentioned with regard to Russia 
were true, could Japan in her present position 
employ any such large bribes? Even if Rus- 
sia had employed this method of bribery, if 
we consider what is the attitude of the Chinese 
towards Russia, it cannot be said that the 
Chinese were well disposed towards Russia. 
They were only compelled by the force of 
circumstances to yield to the Russian pro- 
posals, and once they found that they could 



284 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

not endure it any longer they looked around 
for some other nations to come to their aid. 

Regarding the negotiations about the Rus- 
sian evacuation of South Manchuria, my 
colleague at St. Petersburg, Yang Ji, was 
grief-stricken and died, I think, on that 
account. To buy the high officials of a 
neighbouring country with bribes had been 
practised during the days of the Bourbons 
in France, as history relates, but in these 
days when budgets are decided in Parliament 
such methods can never be practised. 

As regards our own country, in the first 
place we have no resources for such a fund, 
and even if we had such a fund available 
it would consist of only a few hundred thou- 
sand yen, which might be used as a special 
fund for the high purposes of State, but 
such an insignificant sum would be quite 
insufficient for any great purpose. The 
difficult point in dealing with the Chin 
Government is somewhere else, and has no 
relation whatever to bribery or Machiavellism 
or firm attitude, bamboozling, or any other 
such nonsense. 



CHAPTER X 

Foreign Policy (Continued) 

PART II 

Friend "Pidgin" 

China for ages past has been boasting to the 
surrounding foreign countries about her being 
the celestial land. She has had the habit 
of making much of herself in a proud and 
haughty manner, so even when she was at- 
tacked by a foreign Power and was unable 
to resist the aggressions she still kept proud 
and haughty. 

When the Ching and Han dynasties entered 
China from foreign countries, these, in their 
turn, became proud and haughty. In the 
case of the Chin dynasty it was the same. 
When a Government is powerful the pride 
of the officials of that Government may be 
excused by other persons on account of the 
Government's power, but as soon as that 

285 



286 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

Government loses its power other parties 
will not remain submissive. In China civil 
society is held in much higher esteem than 
military society. 

As soon as temporary warfares are put 
an end to, she will not be able to boast to 
foreign countries about herself. But the 
Government would like to hide that fact 
from its nationals, so the officials are always 
trying to save the face of the nation by any 
means. This "saving of face" is the first 
consideration of Chinese officials in any 
diplomatic dealings in which they may be 
engaged. 

Supposing an incident happens. If the 
Chinese Government should yield only 20 
per cent, of what is demanded, the remainder 
could be left undisturbed, yet as the officials 
are anxious to save the national face they 
do not like to yield, and eventually China 
loses the whole 100 per cent. 

From the point of view of the Chinese 
they are not by any means, so to say, the 
party of the first part, to seek intercourse 
with foreign countries. They would much 
rather not have the foreigners within their 
confines. But foreigners come to China on 
their own account and stir up various diffi- 
culties, so it is the foreigners and not the 



Foreign Policy 287 

Chinese that make the various requests. 
Consequently there is a call for an agitation 
for the expulsion of foreigners or for clos- 
ing up the Treaty Ports. Yet they are not 
able to meet the foreigners with the point of 
the bayonet, and China must therefore drag 
along indefinitely because they do not know 
what else they can do. 

That is the essence of Chinese foreign 
policy, and if any incident brings matters to 
a critical condition then she would employ 
Machiavellism and play one Power off against 
another, herself remaining in between and 
gathering the profits for herself. That is to 
say, she uses the method of playing two 
tigers off against each other. Well, if even 
one tiger dies and the other is wounded 
there is not enough strength left in China 
to drive off the wounded tiger. So, even 
if she employe the plan of playing two nations 
off against each other, in the end she will 
be pressed to the wall by one or the other 
of the two countries engaged. Even if there 
should be intelligent Ministers in the Govern- 
ment who could see this point clearly, and 
who tried to yield what is inevitable and 
settle matters quickly, the other class who 
always insist upon saving the face of the 
country would come out with the most bitter 



288 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

criticism of the Ministers, who wotild soon 
be unable to hold their positions, and indeed 
would find it impossible to maintain their 
heads on their bodies. 

Now what is the ''face" which they want to 
save? It is really that they want to carry 
through their proud and haughty manner as 
of old ; they are not satisfied with standing on 
equal terms with foreign countries. Such a 
state of affairs can be found (to some extent) 
in almost every country. Those who are in 
diplomatic positions of trust will often find 
themselves sandwiched between the people 
at home and foreign countries, but in China 
it is carried to the extreme. That is the main 
difficulty which foreign diplomatists have in 
dealing with China. 

The officials of the Chinese Government, 
even if they should be men of intelligence, 
would therefore keep postponing matters and 
postponing them until they got pressed to 
the wall and then they would refer it to 
the high council of the Government, and only 
then comply with the demands made upon 
them, and because there is no other alter- 
native. No one shoulders any responsibility 
and finally the matters get settled in this way. 
If they settle matters too soon they might 
lose the national ''face, " and then if they lost 



Foreign Policy 289 

the national ''face," foreign nations would 
scorn them, thereby leaving a bad example 
to posterity. 

When I was dealing with China I well 
knew this inevitable circumstance, but, never- 
theless, I continued my negotiations per- 
sistently. The Ministers of the Foreign 
Office at Peking are individually men of 
intelligence, and all understand what is good 
and what is bad for the country. During 
the negotiations I had with China I found 
that the men who had the power of quick 
decision were Li Hung-Chang and Shu Yun 
Yi. When I say they had the power of quick 
decision it must be understood that it was 
comparative in accordance with the import- 
ance of the matter under discussion, and 
when it came to really big matters it cannot be 
said that even these officials were capable of 
quick decisions. It was all a matter of degree. 

The man whom I admired a great deal 
for having the power of very clear judgment 
was Prince Kun of earlier times. He might, 
indeed, be called a man of genius. He was 
a man whose position was very firmly estab- 
lished and what he did could not ever have 
been done by any other official, high or low 
in the Government. 

Whilst circumstances in the official world 



290 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

in Peking are such as I have described, 
foreign Powers are unable to do anything 
except take up the position of defendant, 
because the position of plaintiff would be a 
losing one. The foreign Powers must decide 
to be prepared to stay always in a defensive 
position, so that whichever way affairs may 
be settled they should not lose, and they 
must be prepared to wait as long as China 
wants to wait, for hurry with China certainly 
results in loss. 

For the Press abroad, without considering 
these things at all, to say that matters between 
China and foreign countries must be solved 
immediately, or it would be a loss for the 
foreign country, shows no understanding of 
Chinese diplomacy. It would mean, indeed, 
that such advice was tendered only as an 
attack on the Government and its acceptance 
would be a serious thing. Newspaper attacks 
on diplomatists, who are conducting negotia- 
tions with China, only result in tying the 
hands of the officials. To be sure the negotia- 
tions might unduly drag on, which could re- 
sult in a conflict of feelings, which would be 
far more endurable than injured feelings due 
to the publication of self-satisfied accounts 
of how China wants us to guide them and 
educate them, or other such useless nonsense. 



Foreign Policy 291 

Such diplomatic issues as exist to-day 
between Japan and China must arise from 
time to time. We have to be prepared for 
them. There is no reason to worry that 
such incidents might cause trouble in the re- 
lationship between the two countries. Even 
if the trouble came it would not be our fault 
alone. China would also have to share the 
responsibility. If we are constantly accused 
of being all wrong and of hurting the feelings 
of China, then the only thing the Ministry 
can do to relieve the tension would be to 
yield every point that the Chinese claim. 

It is no use for the newspapers or the 
opposition to attack the late Saionji Ministry 
on account of its Chinese policy and to demand 
a reform of Japanese diplomatic methods, as 
it did in August and September last (1907), 
to advocate the winning of Chinese friendship 
by a sympathetic policy. One result of this 
is, as has been frequently testified, that the 
Chinese in Peking all believed that the Katsura 
Ministry when it came into power would ac- 
cept without delay all the demands made by 
China. That is the evidence of men who live in 
Peking. 

It does not matter which Ministry is in 
power diplomatic matters cannot be accom- 
plished in a hurry. The Chinese found that 



292 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

the attacks on the Saionji foreign policy by 
the Opposition did not mean that the Japanese 
disapproved of that policy; they found that 
Japan had deceived them, or so it appeared 
to them. She was greatly disappointed and 
the negotiations have continued to drag on. 

In general it is a very great mistake to 
attack any Government on its foreign policy 
unless there is a very definite point at issue. 
For it simply means that the foreign policy 
of the Government is being used as a plank 
of the platform of the party for party reasons 
and in party quarrels. 

In dealing with China we want to take 
plenty of time to regard all the provincial 
and local problems of that country, to insist 
upon our claims and to explain patiently 
and steadily the reasons for the position 
we take up. We should be ready to re- 
ciprocate in yielding and then wait until the 
convention is finally signed. We ought not 
to boast and brag to the Chinese, for thereby 
we only hurt their feelings. To the Ministers 
of State and gentlemen of China we should 
be polite in our manner and should try to 
cultivate a warm friendship. There is no 
other way to success. 

We are told, perhaps, that China has now 
turned her attention towards Russia, or, 



Foreign Policy 293 

perhaps, towards Germany. These things 
ought not to trouble us. It is a waste of 
time to trouble ourselves about them. It is 
only China's old game of playing one tiger 
against another. 

As I have said before, the only thing to do 
IS to be calm, not to get jealous, and to wait. 
Whichever Ministry is in power, Saionji or 
Katsura, it ought to make no difference to 
our foreign policy. It is not plausible to 
attack the foreign policy of a Ministry on 
mere hearsay information. 

My dissertation on the Chinese policy has 
become rather long. 

I shall end it with a brief outline of the Tatsu 
Maru incident. As I have often had to speak 
on this matter, I do not mean to go into details. 

On board the Tatsu Maru was cargo shipped 
by Chinese and foreigners, and including some 
cases shipped by Japanese. In these latter 
cases were rifles, the consignee of which resided 
in Amoy. All bills of lading and other docu- 
ments were in perfect condition. When this 
vessel was lying at anchor in the neighbour- 
hood of Amoy waiting for the tide, Chinese 
military officers came up in a steam launch 
and boarded the Tatsu Maru, They pulled 
down the Japanese flag and seized the vessel, 
convoying it to Canton. The reason given was 



294 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

that the Tatsu Maru had arms aboard which 
were intended to be used by rebels inland. 

But to place an embargo on contraband 
of war is permitted only during the time of 
war when either belligerent or neutral vessels 
can be seized. No nation has any right to 
seize contraband merely because there is a 
rebellion within its territories. She has cer- 
tainly no right to capture the vessel of a 
foreign country and seize its cargo, even if 
the cargo does consist of arms. It may be 
imagined that China could have seized the 
arms when they were landed from the Japanese 
vessel and could have used them itself to 
assist in putting down the rebellion. 

The action of the Chinese officers was just 
that of pirates. 

The Saionji Cabinet recognized that there 
was a rebellion in the interior of China and 
knew well the conditions in the interior. 
They sympathized with the officials of the 
province affected; they were willing for the 
provincial officials to buy the arms if they 
were not willing to let them go to the rebels, 
and they were willing to assivSt in negotiating 
with the sellers; but also they insisted that 
China should indemnify the owners of the 
ship and apologize for the insult done to the 
Japanese flag, according to established custom. 



Foreign Policy 295 

On the other hand, the JapanevSe Govern- 
ment, which had issued regulations with 
regard to the shipment of arms to China, 
agreed to prohibit the shipments to Amoy. 
The incident was settled on this basis. If 
that arrangement had not been considered 
satisfactory we should have had no alterna- 
tive but to surrender the shipment of arms 
to China as she had captured them, and 
leave the insult to the flag unsatisfied. In 
addition, the damage done to the owner of 
the ship would not have been indemnified, 
whilst the Japanese Government would have 
had to indemnify other foreigners for damage 
done to their cargoes. 

There seems to me only these two alter- 
natives. If we had adopted the latter, the 
Chinese, of course, would have been glad, 
but the Japanese certainly would not have 
been satisfied. That the Saionji Cabinet, 
taking all the circumstances into considera- 
tion, took mild steps in this affair, seems to 
me very proper. I believe it was a fair and 
impartial thing to do, and it was most un- 
reasonable of the Kwantung officials to declare 
a boycott against Japanese goods. But it is 
actions such as these which cause China to be 
scorned by foreign nations. 



CHAPTER XI 
The Powers and China 

[A considerable portion of the following chapter 
was published by Count Hayashi in the Chuo-Koron 
in November, 1908. — Ed.] 

Before the Chino- Japanese War, China 
was regarded as the sleeping lion of Asia, but 
the war showed that far from being a lion 
China was only a sleeping badger. It was 
as a consequence of the Chino- Japanese War 
that the period of the territorial partition of 
China took place. 

Germany acquired the lease of the Kiao- 
chow territory in Shantung, Russia seized 
Port Arthur and Kwantung, whilst France 
obtained the rectification of her frontier in 
the region of Annam. 

The outstanding feature of Far Eastern 
politics at that time was the combined pres- 
sure on China of the Triple Alliance of Russia, 
Germany, and France. The United States, 

296 



The Powers and China 297 

England, and Japan were not parties to that 
combination, and indeed looked on it with 
considerable misgiving and suspicion. As, 
however, these three countries were not then 
in a position to take any decisive action in 
the matter, the situation remained without 
amelioration until the Boxer Rebellion of 
1900. 

Who actually instigated that rebellion is 
unknown, but there is no doubt that Russia 
must be held principally responsible by the 
Powers, if for no other reason than that she 
did not warn them, when she well knew that 
the rising was Imminent. 

More important, however, than the ques- 
tion of who instigated the rebellion is the 
question of what induced China to resort to 
such violent measures in order to drive the 
Powers out of China. 

The explanation is that China realized that 
the Powers were divided amongst themselves, 
and that the two groups were in constant 
antagonism. So it may be said that the 
Boxer Rebellion, was caused by the friction 
between the two groups of Powers and the 
constant clashing of their interests. This gave 
China the opportunity of setting up a counter- 
balance to the ambitions of the Powers, and of 
asserting for herself a dominating position. 



298 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

China, however, went too far. The rebel- 
lion became so serious that all the Powers 
were forced to combine and to work harmoni- 
ously together. In the face of a union of 
all the Powers, China trembled and abjectly 
sued for peace. 

The result was that an enormous indemnity 
was paid, strong Legation guards were posted 
in Peking, and a fort was erected in the com- 
pound of the German Legation, which com- 
manded the Imperial Palace. That was the 
work of the Powers working together in uni- 
son. It was a lesson from which the Powers 
could learn that if they all acted together 
they could obtain whatever advantages they 
wanted from China. But if they worked inde- 
pendently they were certain to be completely 
baffled. 

Railways, mining concessions, teaching ap- 
pointments and privileges, the import and 
export of merchandise, are all lucrative enter- 
prises, which the Powers could control if they 
did not always fight and wrangle over their 
acquisition. As soon as the Powers begin 
to dispute amongst themselves, China uses 
her time-honoured policy of harnessing the 
opposing forces and driving them at her own 
sweet will. 

Some Japanese say that English influence 



The Powers and China 299 

in China is declining. I would not go so far 
as that, but certainly I would agree that 
English influence is not gaining ground in 
China. It must be said that even European 
influence generally is not so strong in China 
as it was. But if European influence is los- 
ing its position in China it is because the 
European Powers are always competing 
amongst themselves, and stultifying their 
own endeavours. 

Instead of each nation looking after its own 
business, the European nations are always 
engaged in looking after their neighbours' 
business and in trying to depreciate their 
neighbours' business and interests. 

For example, Japan undertook certain en- 
terprises in Manchuria, which she had legally 
acquired and which had been recognized by 
China as being hers. But certain English 
firms and individuals were also seeking to 
start commercial undertakings in that coun- 
try, which conflicted with Japan's lawful 
undertakings. These people, though them- 
selves engaged in a wrongful undertaking, 
endeavoured to make out that Japan was in 
the wrong and actually appealed to China on 
the point. What is the result? China sees 
that in spite of the treaty of alliance between 
Japan and England, the interests of those 



300 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

two countries can be opposed to each other. 
Consequently her ambitions to set off England 
against Japan are encouraged. This is only 
one instance out of many which I could relate.^ 

Some diplomats are so zealous for the ad- 
vancement of the interests of their own coun- 
try that they forget everything else. Such 
zeal is certainly excellent and praiseworthy, 
but when such diplomats go so far as to 
disparage openly the rights of other Govern- 
ments to the Chinese Government, then the 
latter is easily able to recognize that the in- 
terests of the different Powers are in oppo- 
sition, and intrigues to set the one against the 
other. In such cases it is very easy work for 
China to outwit the Powers. 

When I was Minister at Peking I proposed 
to China to introduce a law for the regis- 
tration of trademarks. The British Minister 
seconded my proposal. The German Minister, 
however, for some unknown reason, refused 
to agree to the proposal and so nothing was 
done in the matter. Nowadays there is a 
great number of fraudulent trademarks on 
the Chinese markets, and the Japanese are 

^ Count Hayashi obviously refers to the Fa-ku-men Railway 
aflfair. It was the first important incident which went to assure 
the world that Japanese pledges to maintain the open door were 
only scraps of paper, and that the Anglo- Japanese Alliance's 
reiteration of the same was merely a polite formula. — Ed. 



The Powers and China 301 

accused of being the counterfeiters of them. 
Such an allegation impairs the honour of 
Japan. 

Incidents such as these reveal the discords 
between the Powers, and the Chinese are not 
so slow-witted as not to take advantage of 
them. 

A similar situation is seen to-day in regard 
to the outcry against Japanese trade which is 
being made in America. The Manchurian 
markets came under the control of Japan be- 
cause her methods of trading are very good. 
But the Americans are jealous of our success 
and complain that Japan is monopolizing the 
trade of Manchuria . Extremists in the United 
States even go so far as to threaten us, and 
urge that an alliance be made between the ^ 
United States and China. 

Such dissensions are fatal to the true inter- 
ests of the Powers, for they enable China to 
attack them in vital parts. 

Events in history have repeatedly proved 
that if only the Powers combine against China, 
they can dictate any terms to her. But if 
they act inharmoniously and independently 
then they will be sadly outwitted by that 
country. Repeated experiences of such na- 
ture ought to have taught the Powers bitter 
lessons. 



302 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

The attitude of the Powers towards China 
has of recent years undergone considerable 
change. This has put their acting in unison 
quite within the limits of possibility. Now- 
adays political considerations are of minor 
importance, as compared with economic 
considerations. 

Russia, in order to satisfy the schemes of 
a court clique, converted the barren wastes of 
Siberia into a colony, and acquired an ice-free 
port on the Pacific. No other Power in the 
world would attempt such a useless task. 

It is true that England holds Wei-hai-Wei, 
and Germany has acquired a lease of Kiao- 
chow. But both places are of very minor 
importance commercially and both Powers 
would be glad to get rid of them, if they could 
do so without loss of prestige. The same is 
true with regard to the American possession 
of the Philippine Islands, and as a matter of 
fact the feeling in America against keeping 
the islands is strong and grows stronger every 
year. 

The policy of the Powers in China is the 
expansion of the commercial spheres. There 
is no longer any desire to obtain control of 
parts of China, for China is a very difficult 
country to manage and the population is very 
large. 



The Powers and China 303 

No Power in these days wants to partition 
China, and Japan wants it least of all. Par- 
tition would mean a general conflagration. 
Of course China might force a partition, but 
it is not likely, and the Powers would be very 
reluctant to accept the suggestion. 

China is a country of obscurity. It is 
impossible to know what China really wants, 
for she seems to think it a disgrace to dissolve 
the mystery with which she surrounds herself 
even to her best friends. It is not, therefore, 
surprising that the outside world is not easily 
able to get the exact truth with regard to 
occurrences in that country. 

The foreign representatives in Peking try 
assiduously to learn the state of affairs, but 
with but poor success. The late rebellion 
(Anhui) may produce grave results, or it may 
be really only a flash in the pan. Any de- 
ductions with regard to China are always 
rash, and it is quite premature to say that the 
rising will produce a great, far-reaching dis- 
turbance in the Extreme East. 

The attitude of the Powers towards China 
must be considered in relation to the internal 
conditions of the country. 

The two most successful revolutions in the 
history of the world have been those of Peter 
the Great in Russia and of the Meiji Restora- 



304 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

tion in Japan. The rising in Anhui has no 
sort of resemblance to either of them. 

But there is another point of great potential 
importance. The late Emperor of China 
gave an Imperial Rescript to his people, pro- 
mising the inauguration of representative 
government in nine years. As he is dead 
it is doubtful whether that promise will be 
realized as it had been intended. 

In despotic countries, like China or Rtissia, 
the succession of a wise sovereign to the throne 
imports great deeds both at home and abroad. 
But when the Government rests in the hands 
of a sovereign of only ordinary intelligence, 
it but affords opportunity for the intrigues 
of men who are anxious to increase their 
political power or even for men who have no 
political power to obtain some. 

It is true that China annually sends many 
young men abroad to study, and later after 
their return they receive appointments in the 
Government service. But these appoint- 
ments are generally only technical, and the 
real administration remains in the hands of 
men who are generally incapable, for they 
have only old-fashioned ideas of govern- 
ment. So long as such men keep the reins of 
government reform in the administration is 
impossible. 



The Powers and China 305 

The late Empress Dowager and the late 
Emperor represent two opposing political 
factions. These have now been both re- 
moved, and China may, perhaps, no longer 
be a scene of trouble, but her future may in- 
deed reveal many rapid changes, especially 
in the administrative spheres. 

But even if the representative government 
promised by the late Emperor never material- 
izes, it has already commenced to evolve a 
very important change, which must affect 
the situation in regard to the Powers. In 
all grades of Chinese society preparations 
have been made for the inauguration of repre- 
sentative government. Newspapers are now 
being published everywhere, and political 
parties are being formed in all the provinces. 

What better and more popular motto 
could all these parties choose than restoration 
to China of the rights acquired by the for- 
eigners? No more inspiring text could be 
imagined. 

Of course the Chinese authorities may not 
approve of such a war-cry for the young 
politicians. On the other hand, it might 
suit them very well to encourage it and so to 
distract attention from the mismanagement 
and maladministration of the country and 
to focus the public mind on foreign affairs. 



3o6 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

An anti-foreign agitation, which is the true 
name of the rights recovery movement, is 
always popular in China. . Such an agitation 
finds a great field and would extend as China 
grew to realize her riches and resources. The 
heaviest sufferers would be the Powers. 

Past experience in China only serves to 
strengthen my apprehensions. Japan de- 
feated China severely in the Chino-Japanese 
War, but the punishment which China then 
received was not sufficiently severe to teach 
her how weak she really is. Nor was it 
sufficient to prevent her starting the Boxer 
Rebellion against foreigners. To crush that 
rebellion the Powers combined and the Im- 
perial House was humbled to the dust. But 
even then the lesson was not sufficiently 
severe for China. This is seen by the objec- 
tions which she now raises to the Russian 
administration in Harbin, to the Japanese 
administration and rights in Manchuria, to 
German enterprise at Kiaochow, and by the 
boycott of American and Japanese goods in 
the south of China. 

The day will come when China will rise 
against England. As that Power has the 
greatest interests in China it stands to reason 
that she will suffer the heaviest losses of any 
of the Powers. 



The Powers and China 307 

It is high time for the Powers to take to 
heart the lessons of their bitter experiences. 

Some Japanese are so foolish as even to 
advise the authorities to be ''mild" in their 
treatment of China, and to befriend and con- 
ciliate that country. Such advice is supreme 
folly. China is not a savage tribe in the South 
Sea Islands, but a great Empire, diplomati- 
cally even superior to the great Empires of 
Europe. 

It is impossible to trick China into doing 
what the Powers may want, or into relinquish- 
ing her aims. 

The way to deal with China is for the Powers 
to combine and insist on what they want 
and to go on insisting until they get it. The 
Japanese have learnt that. The European 
and American Governments often advocate 
mild measures, but, like the Japanese have 
done, they, too, will one day find out their 
mistake. 

There are only these alternatives before the 
Powers. They must either bring their com- 
bined forces to bear on China to get what 
they want or else leave her alone, until like 
an awakened lion she is ready to spring on 
her prey, in which case she will be powerful 
enough to threaten the acquired rights of all 
the Powers. 



APPENDICES 

A. Memorial of Chang-pei-lun and the Board 

OF Censors 

B. Text of Anglo- Japanese Alliance, 1902 

C. The Franco- Japanese Agreement, 1907 

D. The Russo-Japanese Convention, 1907 

E. The American- Japanese Agreement, 1908 



309 



APPENDIX A 

SUMMARY OF THE MEMORIAL OF CHANG- 
PEI-LUN AND THE BOARD OF CENSORS, 
1882. 

Since the epoch of Tao-Kowan and Shien-Lung 
our country has been attacked by four calamities. 
The first of these was the Opium War, the second 
was the Taiping RebelHon, the third was the Insur- 
rection of the Mohammedans, whilst the fourth is 
composed of the troubles arising from foreign inter- 
course. 

Since Your Majesty has assumed the direction of 
the Affairs of State You have by Your supreme ability 
and the wisdom of Your orders established the strength 
of the Government, and You have suppressed all 
difficulties except those arising from our intercourse 
with foreign nations. 

Our foreign relations are of supreme importance 
and form a very complicated question. But of all 
our foreign relations, those with Japan cause more 
trouble than all the others. 

The Japanese Government does not enjoy the 
confidence of its own people, for these reasons. The 
two principal clans, Satsuma and Choshu, are con- 
tinually fighting to obtain the predominance in the 
government, and there are also serious financial diffi- 

311 



312 Appendix A 

culties owing to the over-issue of paper. The people 
in general are very discontented because of the great 
expenditures on armaments. And it may be remarked 
that the military system of Japan is not well organized, 
and the Japanese soldiers may be considered as in- 
ferior to the troops at the disposal of Li Hung-Chang 
and Tsen-Kuo-Fan. 

Yet not recognizing her own weaknesses Japan is 
becoming every year more arrogant towards China, 
and has even ventured to the seizure of the Loochoo 
Islands and will seize Korea, as I have humbly pointed 
out in an earlier memorial. These things, though 
hard to bear, we have borne with for the sake of 
peace and in order not to give opportunity for foreign- 
ers to again become arrogant towards us. 

But now we have had, owing to the actions of 
Japan, to give the matter further consideration and 
can no longer restrain our actions to adjust them to 
the feelings of others. If we do not prepare, then 
the evil day will be upon us with the swiftness of rain 
from the sky. 

We must check the arrogant claims of Japan and 
assert once for all time our superiority over her. 
But this we cannot now do but must make steady 
preparation. Being ourselves without arrogant de- 
signs and having only peaceful intentions we have 
not armaments suitable or ready to effect this object. 
Such an undertaking as the defeat of Japan can only 
be achieved by a preponderating superiority of naval 
forces. The reorganization and increase of our naval 
strength are therefore of paramount importance in 
carrying out our aim. 

Meanwhile we must rely on our diplomatic actions. 
But our diplomacy though directed to suitable ends 



Appendix A 313 

is ineffective in its results. This is due to the deci- 
sions of the Ministers being vague and dilatory, whilst 
the responsibility of the officials to execute the deci- 
sions is limited or irksome. 

In my himible opinion, when the Government 
makes a decision it should also clearly indicate the 
Minister who shall be responsible for its execution 
and the general steps he shall adopt in its execution. 

And in this matter of our relations with Japan I 
humbly suggest that Your Majesty should order 
Your Ministers to discuss and consider the whole, 
and then after Your Ministers have done so, special 
officials shall be appointed who shall be responsible 
for carrying it to a satisfactory conclusion. Only 
in this way is disaster to be avoided. 

And also Li Hung-Chang and Tsen-Kuo-Fan our 
two most brilliant generals, who established them- 
selves as our leading soldiers by their successes in 
the Taiping and Mohammedan rebellions, should also 
be ordered to consider the Japanese affair, and after 
Your Majesty has received their reports, Your 
Majesty's supreme wisdom will decide the matter. 

But whilst Your Councillors and Ministers are 
considering this matter, the Viceroys and the Govern- 
ors of provinces shall make preparation, and com- 
plete the naval and military armaments, so that they 
shall be ready when the time for the conflict with 
Japan shall come. 

It is very important too that the question of the 
relations between foreign nations and China and 
Japan be also considered. For in these days the 
European nations who have established themselves 
in our land and in Japan consider themselves as of 
right qualified to decide matters, which in reality 



314 Appendix A 

only concern ourselves. We should therefore develop 
our friendship with foreign nations so that if it may 
be desirable they may help us, or if they should 
consider themselves called upon to interfere, then 
they should side with us. And this is of the greatest 
importance, for I do not think that Japan would be 
able to fight with us with the help of a foreign ally. 
It is obvious that the strength of Japan compared to 
ours is very inferior, and in my humble opinion it is 
also evident that she could not obtain foreign assist- 
ance so easily as we can. Japan has no close relations 
with foreign countries, nor has she any advantages 
of commerce which she can offer to them as the price 
of assistance in the moment of crisis. 

We on the other hand have long and intimate 
relations with foreign Powers and every year these 
relationships grow closer and warmer. In addition 
to this foreign nations want to trade with China, 
and we have many important and -valuable privileges 
which we can offer to them if they assist us when the 
time comes. From this it is evident that China can 
count with good reason on the assistance of the 
foreign Powers in case of war. 

The moment for decision has now arrived. Japan 
has challenged our rights over Korea, which is our 
tributary State, by recognizing the independence of 
that country. We certainly have not agreed to this, 
and we maintain that Korea is still our tributary 
State, but the matter cannot be left so unsettled, 
and if we do not assert our rights then by the efHux 
of time we may lose them altogether. If we do not 
prepare for war, but leave matters in their present 
inactive condition, Japan will continue making mili- 
tary and naval preparations whilst we shall be delay- 



Appendix A 315 

ing. The power of Japan will be steadily progressing, 
whilst ours will remain stationary. A Japan stronger 
than ourselves would be a permanent danger and a 
continual menace to us. Besides it would have 
serious consequences upon our relations with the 
other foreign Powers. Japan is inferior to China in 
strength and prestige, but if China proves herself 
unable to crush her then the European Powers will 
discount their present opinions of us, and the prestige 
of China will be heavily diminished. 

Earlier in the present year I humbly placed my 
opinion before Your Majesty, and intimated that I 
suspected Japan of harbouring designs on Korea, 
and that we should take effective steps to check any 
further aggression on her part. 

Now I am most fully convinced that the suspicions 
I expressed in that Memorial are correct. I believe 
the situation is critical, hence I submit to the Throne 
this my humble opinion, which I trust will receive 
Your Majesty's most favourable consideration. 

Chang- Pei-Lun 
The Board of Censors 

The above Memorial was ordered by the Emperor 
to be submitted to the Board of Military Affairs, 
which reported on it in entire agreement with the 
views of Chang-Pei-Lun, and recommending that Li 
Hung-Chang be appointed to prepare a plan for the 
invasion of Japan and be appointed to be the respon- 
sible Minister for carrying out the plan. 

An Imperial Edict to this effect was drawn up and 
handed to the Board of Military Affairs for transmis- 
sion to Li Hung-Chang, accompanied by the Memorial 
from Chang-Pei-Lun. 



3i6 Appendix A 

LI HUNG-CHANG'S MEMORIAL IN REPLY 
TO THAT OF CHANG-PEI-LUN 

I have had the honour of receiving the Imperial 
Edict of the i6th day of the 7th month, forwarded 
to me by the Board of MiHtary Affairs and enclosing 
the memorial of Chang-Pei-Lun, on which I am 
requested by Your Majesty to express my opinion 
as to our future relations with Japan. 

I entirely agree with the views expressed by Chang- 
Pei-Lun, that we must prepare for a war with Japan, 
and therefore we must develop our naval armaments 
so as to win. 

For some years past we have been so engaged, 
keeping this object in view, and great efforts have 
been made to reorganize our army and navy. Enor- 
mous sums have been spent in order to enable us 
to display our superiority and assert our power over 
our neighbour, whenever the favourable moment 
for the conflict shall have arrived. 

The Convention lately concluded between Korea 
and Japan is merely the consequence of the attack on 
the Japanese Legation at Seoul, committed by con- 
spirators, and which was followed by a massacre of 
Japanese residents at that place. We have no right 
to interfere on this question. 

In the treaty between Korea and Japan the latter 
recognizes Korea as an independent State, without 
any regard to us. But respecting this we must 
remember that China has never recognized Korea 
as an independent State, in which course other 
Powers have agreed with us, and this has led them 
to assume an attitude opposed to Japan. 

Our best case for causing a rupture with Japan 



Appendix A 317 

is not over the Korean question but in regard to the 
Loochoo Islands. We have an indisputable right to 
these islands, and every foreign Power would have 
to admit our claim, if we demand the restoration of 
our rights over them. 

The actual situation in Japan is that the country 
is labouring under financial difficulties and suffering 
from the burden of a terrible national debt. The 
struggles between Satsuma and Choshu, the two chief 
political parties, affect its power and the present 
weakness of the army and navy is admitted. 

Japan, ever since the restoration, has tried her 
best to make good understandings with foreign na- 
tions, and Japan hopes to preserve her independence 
by means of foreign influence exerted in her favour. 

It is for this reason that the Japanese Government 
has this year sent the Chief Minister of State, Ito 
Hironobu, to Europe, ostensibly to inquire into the 
systems of administration. Prince Arisugawa of 
the Imperial House has been sent to Russia to visit 
the Imperial Court there. This year two diplomatic 
missions have been established in Italy and Austria. 
These servile efforts of Japan to promote international 
intercourse have created a good impression abroad. 
Her envoys have been well received, and in my opin- 
ion, the Powers will help Japan to a certain extent. 
I think that in the event of a conflict between China 
and Japan, the foreign Powers would be on her side. 

But let us remember that the two great principles 
which exercise paramount influence in the world 
are reason and strength. The former is a moral 
power, the latter is material. The former distin- 
guishes between right and wrong, the latter makes 
might into right, when opposed to weakness. 



\^' 



31 8 Appendix A 

Morally we have an undoubted right to the Loochoo 
Islands, and materially China is a large and strong 
Empire, superior to Japan. If we only organize our 
resources, develop our army and navy we shall gain 
the respect of even the more powerful of foreign 
nations, who will rank us with the Great Powers, 
and then Japan will not even venture to carry out 
any hostile designs against us. 

But if Japan should prematurely discover our 
plans to make a war against her, then her Gov- 
ernment and people will be reunited, she will ally 
with a foreign Power, accumulate money by issuing 
loans, increase her army and navy, build and 
purchase warships, with the result that we should 
be in a disadvantageous position, pregnant with 
danger. 

An ancient maxim says: "Nothing is so dangerous 
as to expose one's plans before they are ripe." It is 
for this reason that I recommended to Your Majesty 
that we maintain extreme caution, carefully conceal- 
ing our object whilst all the time increasing our 
strength. Success or failure depends entirely on a 
favourable moment being chosen to put our plans 
into execution. No man however experienced or 
distinguished can hope to achieve success if he strikes 
at the wrong time. 

Japan has since many years followed the Western 
systems, and though her success may not altogether 
be conceded, her fleet, it cannot be denied, is the 
equal of ours. I therefore think it would be hazard- 
ous to send our fleet into Japanese waters to fight. 
Whilst we should not lose sight of the plan for the 
invasion of Japan, we should not make the mistake 
of hurrying the invasion. In my humble opinion we 



Appendix A 319 

must first reorganize the navy before we even think 
of an invasion of Japan. 

Your Majesty has ordered me to prepare a plan of 
invasion and be responsible for its execution. Humbly 
I submit that this plan must be one of the most im- 
portant questions for the future of the Empire and 
is not the work of one man. Such a plan must end 
in failure unless the Viceroys and Governors of all 
Provinces work together earnestly and harmoniously 
for many years to ensure its success. 

During the Taiping Revolution the Government 
ordered the various Viceroys to crush the rebels, 
each being responsible for their defeat in his own 
province, and allowed to use the resources of his own 
province. The result was that the rebellion spread, 
because the action of the Viceroys was limited and 
hampered. When the Government saw this it 
changed its plans, and instead of dividing the power 
and limiting the authority of each Viceroy, they were 
ordered to co-operate and work together. The result 
was immediately visible, for as the result of the great 
efforts, rebellion was completely suppressed. But 
this was due to the possibility of massing troops and 
supplies in sufficient quantities and the stricter control 
over subordinates. 

! Now the present is a period of tranquillity, and the 
ancient laws and regulations are everywhere honoured, 
so that our Government service is only open to men 
who have obtained distinction in the literary exami- 
nations. But being limited for candidates to the ex- 
amination halls, there is great difficulty in obtaining 
suitable persons, and in my humble opinion this condi- 
tion should be altered, so we obtain men who though 
not great scholars will yet be capable administrators. 



320 Appendix A 

Again we must make early and suitable arrange- 
ments with the various Viceroys and Governors for 
the provision of supplies and material, and this will 
need much time and work. 

I think it is essential, if it is desired to obtain 
the services of suitable persons, that quite another 
method of entry into the public services must be 
initiated. That would alter the present examination 
system. 

And to secure the harmonious co-operation of the 
Viceroys and Governors of provinces we must abolish 
their semi-independence and secure joint action from 
them. 

Let the Ministers and Viceroys agree together and 
let Your Majesty instruct them in accordance with 
Your august decisions, and then the scheme to invade 
Japan will be possible of execution. 

But even so it is most inadvisable to place the 
responsibility of the invasion on my shoulders alone. 

What Chang-Pei-Lun says of the ill-success of 
diplomatic action, the indefinite nature of the Minis- 
terial decisions, and the lack of official responsibility, 
is true and indisputable! 

As an example I humbly submit that the necessity 
of building a strong navy and the decision to build 
new warships therefor was fully agreed upon by all 
Ministers and Viceroys, and the Minister of Finance 
ordered an annual appropriation of Tls. 4,000,000 
to form a fund to cover the naval expenditure and 
the cost of coastal defences. This amount must be 
debited to the revenue of the Inland Customs, but 
unfortunately the estimate of revenue was wrong, 
and in most provinces the cost of collection exceeded 
the receipts. In Fukien and Kwantung the amounts 



Appendix A 321 

collected were spent locally instead of being remitted 
to the Imperial Treasury. 

My department as a consequence received barely a 
quarter of the Tls. 4,000,000 appropriated to it, with 
the natural result that the growth of the navy 
and the organization of the coastal defence was 
hindered. 

I humbly hope Your Majesty will order the Im- 
perial Treasury and the Department of Foreign Affairs 
to prepare an accurate estimate of the contributions 
due from each province for defence purposes, and 
an additional amount will be granted for the defence 
of Formosa. Any deficiency in the Provincial con- 
tribution should be balanced from the Imperial 
Treasury so that an annual amount of Tls. 4,000,000 
be available for the navy and coastal defence. With 
this annual sum I will in five years provide a strong 
navy and reorganize our coastal defences. 

As Formosa and Shantung are the parts of the 
Empire most liable to attack, our most capable 
generals should be selected for their defences. 

I summarize my humble opinion as follows: 

(i) It is essential to strengthen the national 
defences. 

(2) It is essential to organize a strong navy. 

(3) There is no hurry to attack Japan. 

Li Hung-Chang. 

It was as a result of Chang-Pei-Lun's memorial 

and the recommendations of Prince Ch'un, the 

Emperor's father, that Li was in 1885 ordered to 

undertake the necessary measures for the naval 

defence of China. A Board of Admiralty was created 

with Prince Ch'un as President, and Li as Associate 
21 



322 Appendix A 

Vice-President and Treasurer. A Naval College 
was founded on the system of competitive examina- 
tion, and Prince Ch'un and Li visited a British war- 
ship at Port Arthur. Chang-Pei-Lun commanded a 
squadron which was defeated by the French off Foo- 
chow and was twice cashiered for speculation and 
misbehaviour. He was described as a man of rare 
force of character but of evil habits, which got 
unlimited scope after 1888 when he married Li's 
daughter. 

* A translation of a considerable portion of the Chang memorial 
and of the whole of Li's comment appeared in the London 
rimes in January, 1895. — Ed. 



APPENDIX B 

ANGLO- JAPANESE ALLIANCE 
{Concluded Jan. jo, igo2) 

Art. I. The High Contracting Parties, having 
mutually recognized the independence of China and 
Korea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced 
by any aggressive tendencies in either country. 
Having in view, however, their special interests, of 
which those of Great Britain relate principally to 
China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which 
she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar 
degree politically, as well as commercially and in- 
dustrially, in Korea, the High Contracting Parties 
recognize that it will be admissible for either of them 
to take such measures as may be indispensable in 
order to safeguard those interests if threatened either 
by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by 
disturbances arising in China or Korea, and neces- 
sitating the intervention of either of the High Con- 
tracting Parties for the protection of the lives and 
property of its subjects. 

Art. II. If either Great Britain or Japan, in the 
defence of their respective interests as above described, 
should become involved in war with another Power, 
the other High Contracting Party will maintain a 

323 



324 Appendix B 

strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent others 
from joining in hostilities against its ally. 

Art. III. If in the above event any other Power 
or Powers should join in hostilities against that ally, 
the other High Contracting Party will come to its 
assistance, and will conduct the war in common, and 
make peace in mutual agreement with it. 

Art. IV. The High Contracting Parties agree 
that neither of them will, without consulting the 
other, enter into separate arrangements with another 
Power to the prejudice of the interests above described. 

Art. V. Whenever, in the opinion of either Great 
Britain or Japan, the above-mentioned interests are 
in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate 
with one another fully and frankly. 

Art. VI. The present Agreement shall come into 
effect immediately after the date of its signature, and 
remain in force for five years from that date. In 
case neither of the High Contracting Parties should 
have notified twelve months before the expiration of 
the said five years the intention of terminating it, 
it shall remain binding until the expiration of one 
year from the day on which either of the High Con- 
tracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if 
when the date fixed for its expiration arrives either 
ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall 
ipso facto continue until peace is concluded. 



APPENDIX C 

THE FRANCO- JAPANESE AGREEMENT 

The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of 
Japan and the Government of the French Republic, 
animated by the desire to strengthen the relations 
of amity existing between them and to remove from 
those relations all cause of misunderstanding for the 
future, have decided to conclude the following Ar- 
rangement. 

"The Governments of Japan and France, being 
agreed to respect the independence and integrity 
of China, as well as the principle of equal treatment 
in that country for the commerce and subjects or 
citizens of all nations, and having a special interest 
to have the order and pacific state of things preserved 
especially in the regions of the Chinese Empire ad- 
jacent to the territories where they have the rights 
of sovereignty, protection, or occupation, engage to 
support each other for assuring the peace and security 
in those regions, with a view to maintain the respective 
situation and the territorial rights of the two High 
Contracting Parties in the Continent of Asia." 

In witness whereof, the Undersigned: His Excel- 
lency Monsieur Kurino, Ambassador Extraordinary 
and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the President of 
the French Republic, and His Excellency Monsieur 

325 



326 Appendix C 

Stephen Pichon, Senator, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
authorized by their respective Governments, have 
signed this Arrangement and have affixed thereto 
their seals. 

Done at Paris, the loth of June, 1907. 

(L.S.) S. KuRiNO. 

(L.S.) S. Pichon. 



APPENDIX D 

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE CONVENTION 

Convention 

The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of 
Japan and the Government of His Majesty the Em- 
peror of All The Russias, desirous of consolidating 
the peaceful and friendly relations, which have been 
so happily re-established between Japan and Russia, 
and wishing to avert for the future all cause of mis- 
understanding in the relations of the two Empires, 
have agreed on the following conditions: 

Article I 

Each of the High Contracting Parties pledges itself 
to respect the present territorial integrity of the other 
and all the rights accruing to either party from the 
treaties, conventions, and contracts in force between 
them and China, copies of which have been exchanged 
between the Contracting Parties (in so far as these 
rights are not incompatible with the principle of 
equal opportunity) and from the Treaty signed at 
Portsmouth on September 5th (23d August, Old Style), 
1905, as well as the special conventions concluded 
between Japan and Russia. 

327 



328 Appendix D 

Article II 

The Two High Contracting Parties recognize the 
independence and territorial integrity of the Empire 
of China and the principle of equal opportunity in 
that which concerns the commerce and industry of 
all the nations in that Empire, and pledge them- 
selves to sustain and defend the maintenance of the 
status quo and respect for this principle by all pacific 
means in their power. 

In witness whereof the undersigned, being author- 
ized by their respective Governments, have signed 
this convention and have affixed thereto their seals. 

Done at St. Petersburg, the 30th day of the seventh 
month, of the 40th year of Meiji, corresponding to the 
17th (30th) July, 1907. 

(L.S.) I. MOTONO. 
(L.S). ISWOLSKY. 



APPENDIX E 

THE AMERICAN- JAPANESE AGREEMENT 
Notes 

Exchanged between the Japanese Ambassador at 
Washington and the Secretary of State of the 
United States, 

From the Japanese Ambassador to the 
Secretary of State 

Japanese Embassy, 
Washington, November 30, 1908. 

Sir, — The exchange of views between us which has 
taken place at the several interviews which I have 
recently had the honour of holding with you, has 
shown that Japan and the United States holding 
important outlying insular possessions in the region 
of the Pacific Ocean, the Governments of the two 
countries are animated by a common aim, policy, 
and intention in that region. 

Believing that a frank avowal of that aim, policy, 
and intention would not only tend to strengthen the 
relations of friendship and good neighbourhood 
which have immemorially existed between Japan and 

329 



330 Appendix E 

the United States, but would materially contribute 
to the preservation of the general peace, the Imperial 
Government have authorized me to present to you 
an outline of their understanding of that common 
aim, policy, and intention. 

(i) It is the wish of the two Governments to en- 
courage the free and peaceful development of their 
commerce on the Pacific Ocean; 

(2) The policy of both Governments, uninfluenced 
by any aggressive tendencies, is directed to the main- 
tenance of the existing status quo in the region 
above mentioned and to the defence of the principle 
of equal opportunity for commerce and industry in 
China; 

(3) They are accordingly firmly resolved recipro- 
cally to respect the territorial possessions belonging 
to each other in said region ; 

(4) They are also determined to preserve the 
common interests of all Powers in China, by support- 
ing, by all pacific means at their disposal, the inde- 
pendence and integrity of China and the principle 
of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of 
all nations in that Empire; 

(5) Should any event occur threatening the status 
quo as above described or the principle of equal 
opportunity as above defined, it remains for the 
two Governments to communicate with each other 
as to what measures they may consider it useful to 
take. 

If the foregoing outline accords with the view of the 
Government of the United States, I shall be gratified 
to receive your confirmation. 

I take, etc., etc., 

K. Takahira. 



Appendix E 331 

From the Secretary of State to the 
Japanese Ambassador 

Department of State, 
Washington, November t^o, 1908. 
Excellency,— I have the honour to acknowledge 
the receipt of your Note of to-day, setting forth the 
result of the exchange of views between us in our 
recent interviews, defining the understanding of the 
two Governments in regard to their policy in the 
region of the Pacific Ocean. 

It is a pleasure to inform you that this expression 
of mutual understanding is welcome to the Govern- 
ment of the United States as appropriate to the happy 
relations of the two countries and as the occasion of 
a concise mutual affirmation of that accordant policy 
respecting the Far East, which the two Governments 
have so frequently declared in the past. 

I am happy to be able to inform Your Excellency 
on behalf of the United States, of the declaration of 
the two Governments embodied in the foUowing 
words : 

[Here follows a declaration identical with that 
given by Baron Takahira, and the signature of Mr 
Elihu Root.l 



Japan to America 

$1.25 

Edited by Professor Naoichi Masaoka, 

of Tokio. A Symposium of Papers 

by Statesmen and Other 

Leaders of Thought in 

Japan 

The book is issued under the auspices 
of the Japan Society and contains an 
introduction by Lindsay Russell, Presi- 
dent of the Society. It gives first-hand 
information as to present conditions in 
Japan, as to the ideals and policies of 
Japanese leaders, and on the all-im- 
portant matter of the state of public 
opinion in Japan in regard to the continu- 
ing interest of the Empire in maintaining 
peaceful relations with the United States. 



G. P. Putnam's Sons 



America to Japan 

A Symposium of Papers by Representa- 
tive Citizens of the United States 
on the Relations between Japan 
and America and on the 
Common Interests of 
the Two Countries 

Edited by 

Lindsay Russell 

President of The Japan Society of New York 

/2°. $1,25 

A symposium of papers by fifty-two representa- 
tive citizens of the United States on the relations 
between Japan and the United States and on 
the interests that the two countries have in 
common. The series of essays was inspired by 
the recent message of like spirit and purpose: 
" Japan to America." 

The two books constitute an interchange of 
thought and information between leading minds 
of both countries, unique in international inter- 
course; they indicate the points upon which 
East and West can meet. 



G. P. Putnam's Sons 

New York London 



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